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Abstract: The author argues that when the Supreme Court next
confronts the issue of affirmative action in higher education, it should
examine the policy realistically—in terms of the condition of blacks and
the consequences for the country—not abstractly, and uphold its
constitutionality. In reaching this conclusion, the author: discusses the
status of African-Americans in our society; reviews the legal and
theoretical reasons for and against affirmative action in higher
education for African-Americans; assesses African-Americans' per-
formance on standardized tests and how those tests impede blacks who
apply for admission to selective schools; surveys the states that have
prohibited affirmative action; and, evaluates how the elimination or
modification of affirmative action plans would effect African-Americans.
The author then introduces a new defense of affirmative action, which
he calls a "social conditions" or "closing the gap" theory. The social
conditions argument, considered in the context of current affirmative
action jurisprudence, asks that courts approve affirmative action in
higher education as a way of bettering the social conditions in which
African-Americans live, because those conditions affect everyone in our
society, without regard to their cause.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1945, LL.B. 1948, Columbia University.
Dean, Columbia College (1989-1993). Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Edu-
cational Fund (1961-1984). I am grateful to the following Columbia Law students for their
assistance with this article: Bryan Sells, Erez Liebcrmann, Michelle Burg, Zakiyyah Salim,
Scott Chesil', and reference librarian Dana Neacsu. I am grateful also for advice of friends
and colleagues: Mike Dorf, Cindy Estlund, Jeff Fagan, Sam Issacharoff, Jim Milligan,
Henry Monaghan, James M. Nabrit, III, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Richard Ford, Teddy Shaw,
Susan Sturm, and Kendall Thomas. This article is an expanded version of my 1998 Dean's
Distinguished Lecture at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeon's Medical
School. It deals only with affirmative action for African-Americans in higher education.
Other groups, for example, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Asians, and other activities,
for example, small business and employment, have their own unique features and require
somewhat different discussion.
521
522	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:521
INTRODUCTION
"It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory,"said President
Grover Cleveland, calling for sharp reductions in the tariff, in his
third annual message to Congress. 1 The aphorism is remembered
more than the tariff, or, for that matter, his presidency. It has become
a favored way of expressing the need for action, not words, and is par-
ticularly apt for addressing the African-American condition that con-
fronts us today: something must be done; the issue should not be de-
bated endlessly in terms of abstract concepts like levels of scrutiny and
quality of tailoring. This Article discusses why, when next the issue of
affirmative action in higher education confronts the Supreme Court
of the United States, it should examine the policy realistically—in
terms of the condition of blacks and the consequences for the coun-
try—not abstractly, and uphold its constitutionality,
In these pages I argue that affirmative action is good policy and is
constitutional. I examine, among other things, the legal and theoreti-
cal reasons for and against affirmative action in higher education for
African-Americans. 2
 This includes an assessment of standardized
tests;3 why African-Americans perform on them as they do; 4 how the
tests impede blacks who apply for admission to selective colleges and
universities;5 the experience of states that have prohibited affirmative
action;6 what would be in store for African-Americans if it were termi-
nated;; and alternative proposals.°
This Article describes and assesses the principal traditional ar-
guments in support of affirmative action, described in shorthand as
diversity, reparations, and the closely related concept of societal dis-
crimination.° I introduce a new defense of affirmative action, which I
call "social conditions" or "closing the gap." 10 This Article also dis-
cusses the half dozen main reasons that have been deployed against
affirmative action, including, once more in shorthand, principle,
stigma and stereotype, and backlash."
I Grover Cleveland, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1887).
2 See infra Part H.
3 See infra Part I.A.
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra Part I.C.
6 See infra Part I.D.
7 See infra Part I.D.
8 See infra Part I.E.
9 See infra Part H.
10 See infra Part II.A.1.
11 See infra Part II.B.
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Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke held that affirmative action employed for the purpose of creat-
ing diversity in the student body is constitutional in principle, pro-
tected by the First Amendment right of academic freedom. 12 In the
form it took at the University of California, however, affirmative ac-
tion was not narrowly tailored because minority students were consid-
ered separately for admission and the school was perceived as admit-
ting a fixed number of them.ls Therefore, affirmative action in
principle was constitutional, but as applied, it was not. In 1996, in
Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood 1), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that Justice Powell did not speak for the Court
in writing that affirmative action is constitutional in that it provides
diversity, that Bakke has in effect been overruled by later decisions,
and that affirmative action denies equal protection of the laws to non-
minority applicants." I disagree with Hopwood I and argue that Bakke
was correctly decided and, in any event, now is a binding precedent 15
The social conditions argument asks that courts approve affirma-
tive action in higher education as a way of bettering the social condi-
tions in which African-Americans live and because those conditions
affect everyone in our society, without regard to their cause. 16
 It is not
the traditional demand for recompense for discrimination, sometimes
referred to as a "societal discrimination" argument or a claim for
reparations. It may be analogized to a claim that a state has the right
to order that a toxic dump in a residential neighborhood, the origins
of which may be unknown, that poisons blacks and whites alike, be
cleaned up. Decisions that have denied relief for societal discrimina-
tion are inapposite to the toxic damages argument. Toxic damages
claims seek compensation or reparations for individuals who have suf-
fered loss and seek to be made whole. Without disparaging those ar-
guments, the social conditions argument argues that the state, faced
with a social condition that is extremely harmful, may act against it to
create a more livable society. Grover Cleveland's apothegm is perti-
nent: It is a condition, not a theory, that confronts us. The social con-
ditions argument asserts that admitting black students under affirma-
tive action is in the interest of the society as a whole. It should not be
seen, as opponents characterize it, as the unjust rejection of an Irmo-
IR 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978).
13 Id. at 319-20.
14
 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) [Hopwood 1].
111 See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.A.1.
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cent" white applicant in favor of a black applicant whom she never
harmed. This argument has, so far as I know, not been presented to
or decided by any court, nor discussed in the literature, except to the
extent that it incorporates elements of some of the other arguments.
As a factual predicate, I discuss the status of African-Americans in
our society. 17
 There can be no doubt about the origins of that status,
which include slavery, segregation, discrimination, and exclusion
from the wealth building programs of the last mid-century. There also
can be no doubt about the virulence of socio-economic factors that
characterize African-American life, including: isolation in where they
live and where they spend their free time; teenage pregnancy; the
manner in which many African-Americans speak, that is, "black Eng-
lish"; worldwide color discrimination; whom they marry; income,
wealth, and employment; commission of and victimization by crime;
and rate of imprisonment. These descriptors have persisted through-
out American history. The status of blacks is unlike that of any other
group, although some other groups have experienced some of the
same dislocations. Affirmative action that takes aim at these social
conditions, addressing the real-life situation of the black community,
seeks relief for blacks and, in the process, for everyone else.
Finally, I argue the constitutional issues: I take the position that
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke expressed the narrowest rationale on
which a majority of the Court agreed.' 8 It states the holding of the
case that the First Amendment right of academic freedom to create
an admissions policy that promotes diversity is a compelling govern-
mental interest:19
 That policy, if narrowly tailored, withstands strict
scrutiny and is constitutional. Bakke has not been overruled and
should not be overruled. Indeed, strict scrutiny is a shoe on the other
foot, favoring proponents of affirmative action because overruling
should occur only to serve a compelling governmental interest." I
believe that a majority of the Court may well support such a strict
scrutiny analysis.
I argue also that affirmative action is constitutional as a proven
means of improving African-Americans' social conditions, enabling
blacks to continue moving towards parity or near-parity with whites in
measurements of social status. 21
 That is in the interest of everyone. It
17 See infra Part II Al.
19 See infra Part III.A.
19 See infra Part
2° See infra Part 111A2.
21 See infra Part IV.
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pi,,%i ►le that a mai'rt itv t the Omni will accept that argument. At a
minimum. the (aunt will have received a broader and deeper under-
mantling of why affirmative action is a useful policy. But, if the Court
is reluctant to enter uncharted waters, it may seek a safe harbor by
simply reaffirming Bakke.
I. TESTS, ADMISSIONS STANDARDS, AND RACE
A. How African Americans Fare on Standardized Tests
Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, editors of The Black-
White Test Score Gap, have written that "if racial equality is America's
goal, reducing the black-white test score gap would probably do more
to promote this goal than any other strategy that commands broad
political support."22
 The reason is that "African Americans currently
score lower than European Americans on vocabulary, reading, and
mathematics tests, as well as on tests that claim to measure scholastic
aptitude and intelligence."25
 The typical American black student
scored lower than 75% of his white counterparts on most standard-
ized tests for admission to college, law school, medical school, and
business school. On some tests, blacks scored below 85% of whites. 24
Most American universities are hardly selective at all; that is, they
admit a very large percentage of applicants. 25 Of the remaining
11 Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap: An Introduc-
tion, in THE BIACK WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 1, 3 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips
eds., 1998) [hereinafter TEST SCORE GAP].
21 Id. at 1.
2' Id. These percentages mean that if the black-white distributions are normal and
have the same standard deviation, and if the black-white gap is one (black or white) stan-
dard deviation, when the authors compare a randomly selected black to a randomly se-
lected white, the black will score higher than the white 24% of the time. If the black-white
gap is 0.75 rather than 1.00 standard deviation, a randomly selected black will score higher
than a randomly selected white about 30% of the time. Id.
The score gap has narrowed since 1970, but that trend may be reversing. Between
1988 and 1998, blacks' average SAT score rose 1%; during the same period, whites' scores
increased more. By 1998, the gap had grown to 194 points. See Why There Has Been No Prog
ress in Closing the Black-White SAT Gap, 22 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 6, 6-7 (Winter
1998/1999) [hereinafter Why There Has Been No Progress].
25
 Reluctantly, I am using the U.S. News &' World Report ratings, which often make un-
warranted discriminations among schools, incorporating factors that have no necessary
relationship to quality of education. The weight U.S. News gives to SATs and similar tests
discourages schools from engaging in affirmative action, because admitting low scoring
blacks reduces test score average, and thereby, a school's position in the ratings hierarchy.
But they are the only widely circulated ratings. By encouraging or discouraging applica-
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schools, most are only somewhat selective. 26
 But, fifty undergraduate
schools in the United States are highly selective, admitting only a
small fraction of applicants, and 150 are very selective, admitting a
somewhat higher ratio. 27
 There are 50,000 places in the first-year un-
dergraduate classes at the nation's twenty-five most highly selective
universities, about 3,000 of which, or 6%, are filled by black stu-
dents.28
 The highly selective and very selective schools offer superior
faculty, research, laboratory, and library facilities; readier access to
highly rated advanced or professional studies; and greater intellectual
challenges. Their students also enjoy years of developing relationships
with schoolmates, many of whom in later life will hold important posi-
tions. They meet visiting recruiters who seek out undergraduates for
promising career opportunities. Although success may follow gradua-
tion from any school, and has been achieved by many who did not
attend college or even graduate from high school, graduating from a
selective institution improves life's prospects. Certainly, that is the
perception of the many students who apply to selective institutions.
They (or their parents) are willing to pay a great deal for the oppor-
tunity to attend such schools. These schools easily could fill their
classes with white or Asian students who score in the highest percen-
tiles on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and American College Test
(ACT)." Blacks comprise less than 1% of this top scoring group."
At professional schools, the situation is the same. On the Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT), which is graded on a scale of 120 to
180, the black median score in 1996 was 142.7; for whites, it was
153.9.31
 Among those admitted to medical school, black Medical Col-
tions they affect a school's selectivity and have evolved into a self-fulfilling prophecy of how
a school will be regarded by the general public.
26 On college selectivity or competitiveness, see BARRON'S PROFILES OF AMERICAN
COLLEGES 223-1622 (23d ed. 1999).
v Barron's designates fifty-four schools as most competitive. Id. Admission to one of
these schools requires rank in the top 10% to 22% of high school class, a B+ to A average,
and a score of 655 to 800 on.each of the SATs. Id. Barron's labels about 100 schools as
highly competitive. Id. Admission to one of these highly competitive schools requires plac-
ing in the top 20% to 35% of high school class and a score of 620-650 on the SATs. Id. The
vast majority of other schools are labeled at lesser levels of competitiveness. Id.
" Theodore Cross & Robert Slater, Special Report: Affirmative Action and Black Access to
Higher Education, 17 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 8, 10 (Fall 1997).
29
 The ACT, a test similar to the SAT, is given mainly in the Midwest and the South. See
id.
" Id.
51 Id. at 12. The median score at Yale is 171; at second-tier schools (ranking fifty-first to
eighty-ninth in U.S. News rankings), it is 153 to 161; at third-tier schools, it ranges from 150
to 157; at fourth-tier schools, it runs from 144 to 154. Id. Only 1745 blacks scored at or
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lege Admission Test (MCAT) scores averaged 23.5; white scores aver-
aged 30.2, on a scale of zero to forty-five." The MCAT scores for re-
jected whites were significantly higher than those for admitted
blacks." One commentator has estimated that if MCAT scores were
the determining factor in admissions, probably only seven blacks in
the entire United States could be admitted to any of the top ten
medical schools. 34
 And, of course, scoring at this level merely makes
admission possible; it does not assure it.
At the fifty highest-ranked business schools, the mean score on
the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) of admitted stu-
dents was nearly 200 points higher than the mean score of black stu-
dents who took the test." Blacks now make up 10% of the student
bodies at the top ten business schools." In race-blind admissions in
which GMAT scores were the determining factor, blacks would be
close to 1% of the same population."
In a study of SAT, ACT, LSAT, and MCAT scores, the Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education has concluded that if standardized tests be-
come the determining factor for all students in admissions decisions
at America's leading universities, black enrollment would drop by at
least one-half and at many schools by as much as 80%. 38
 If selective
undergraduate colleges operated on a race-blind policy, black enroll-
ment would fall to 2% or below." Many excluded black applicants
would not have ready access to second, third, and fourth tier schools
that admit on the basis of test scores because typically their grades and
above 150, the median score for students at most of what U.S. News calls the third and
fourth tier law schools. Id. More than 36,000 whites scored above 150. Id. at 14.
32 Id. at 16.
33
 Cross & Slater, supra note 28, at 16. In pre-med science courses, blacks admitted to
medical school had a grade point average (GPA) of 3.09, whites, 3.58. The average GPA of
whites who were rejected was 3.28, higher than the GPA of admitted blacks. Id.
34 Id. at 17.
35
 Calculating the Impact of a Rollback of Affirmative Action on the Nation's Major MBA Pro-
grams, 18 J. BLACKS HIGHER Enuc. 6 (Winter 1997/1998) [hereinafter Calculating the Im-
pact]. In 1994-95, only 422 black students in the whole country scored over 600, while
22,429 whites did. Id. at 6-7. In the same year, only thirty-three blacks scored over 700,
while 3238 whites did. Id. at 7-8.
In 1960, before affirmative action, blacks were less than 2% of all executives, manag-
ers, and administrators; now they comprise 7.2%. Id. at 9.
38 id. at 8.
57 Id.
" Cross & Slater, supra note 28, at 8.
" What if Private Universities Were Forced to Abandon Affirmative Action, 28 J. BLAcits
HIGHER Enuc. 6, 7 (Summer 2000) [hereinafter What if Private Universities].
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scores are below those of white applicants.* This outcome has been
averted, however, because beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing
since then, almost every selective American college and profêssional
school has used race as a factor in admissions decisions to make pos-
sible the admission of lower-scoring black students."
Now, affirmative action is under attack. It has been prohibited in
California by referendum* and by the Regents of the University of
California.* A referendum in the State of Washington has had the
same effect.44
 The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood 1) has banned affirma-
tive action in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.* In response, Texas
has passed a statute that assures the top 10% of high school graduates
admission to the flagship University of Texas at Austin." In Florida,
Governor Jeb Bush has signed an executive order entitled "One Flor-
ida" that would prohibit all consideration of race in admission to the
University of Florida system and, instead, guarantee admission to col-
lege to all students who graduate in the top fifth of their high school
classes.* The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has struck down a scholarship program for black students at the Uni-
4° A Nationwide Ban on Race-Sensitive Admissions Would Have a More Serious Impact on Afri-
can-American Higher Education Than Mast People Expect, 31 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 14, 14-
15 (Spring 2001) [hereinafter A Nationwide Ban] ("LA]t all colleges and universities
surveyed the average combined SAT score of admitted black students was lower than the
average combined score of admitted white students ... not only at flagship state
universities but at second—and third—tier institutions.") (citing ROBERT LENNER &
ALTHEA K. NAQAI, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, PERVASIVE PREFERENCES: RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS ACROSS THE NATION (2001)
(report on file with BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW until May, 2003)).
41 See WILLIAM J. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 7 (1998) ("[T]he
percentage of blacks enrolled in Ivy League colleges rose from 2.3 in 1967 to 6.3 in 1976,
while the percentages in other 'prestigious' colleges grew from 1.7 to 4.8. Meanwhile, the
proportion of black medical students had climbed to 6.3 percent by 1975 and black law
students had increased their share to 4.5 percent.").
42 See William Claiborne, Affirmative Action Ban Is Upheld, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at
Al.
43 Williant Booth, U. of Calif Ends Racial Preferences, WASH. PosT, July 21, 1995, at Al.
4'1
	 Initiative 200, Proposed Washington State Civil Rights Initiative, at http://www.
secstate.wa.gov/inits/text/i200.htm
 (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
4° 78 F.3d 934 (5th Cir. 1996). A second Hopwood decision, Hopwood u Texas, 236 F.3d
256 (5th Cir. 2000) (Hopwood 11), that moderated the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Hopwood 1,
has had little discernible effect in reviving affirmative action in that Circuit. See Hopwood
236 Rid at 267-77 (summarizing the differences between Hopwood / and I lopnood II).
See infra Part I.D.I.
47 See Nlark Hollis, briernakrts Hope to Revive nage .totroit ( hie I km &At, ()it 1.0,N11.11 •fif
NEL, Julie 10, 2000, at C3: C c Jeb Nth Man fur I oax•-* ( PIM, I %.10.ri.,Nt
LANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 1099, 41 AI I.
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versity of Maryland." In the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, two anti-affirmative action suits have been brought
against the University of Michigan." In one, the University's position
has been upheld in a trial court; 5° in the other, against the law school,
the University's affirmative action plan has been struck down. 51 The
cases were heard before the Sixth Circuit en banc on December 17,
2001. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
held the University of Georgia's affirmative action program unconsti-
tutional because it "mechanically awards an arbitrary 'diversity' bonus
to each and every non-white applicant . . . and severely limits the
range of other factors relevant to diversity. . . "52
 Although cases until
now have involved only state universities covered by the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibition of state action that denies equal protection
of the laws, private universities may be similarly affected. 55 Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other civil rights laws impose the same
obligation on all institutions that receive federal funds. 54
 All selective
colleges and universities, private and public, receive federal funds, but
a recent Supreme Court decision casts doubt on whether an individ-
ual would have the right to file a private suit against a school. 55
48 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
49
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev d, 247 F.3d 631
(6th Cir. 2001); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000), ard, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
5° See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (striking down the University policy from 1995 to
1998, but upholding its 1999-2000 policy as a legitimate means to achieve diversity); Gratz,
135 E Supp. 24 at 802 (rejecting argument that 1995 to 1998 policy remedied past or pres-
ent discrimination).
m See Grittier, 137 F. Supp. 2t1 at 872 (holding that the law school's use of race as a fac-
tor violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, that diversity of the student body was not
a compelling state interest and not narrowly tailored, and that the law school could not
claim that remedying societal discrimination is a compelling state interest); Grutter, 247
F.3d at 633 (granting stay of injunction pending expedited appeal because the district
court's interpretation of Bakke diverged from other courts' interpretations, including the
Gratz decision).
52
 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001).
53
 See, e.g., id. at 1237 (basing the decision on a violation of Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection clause, but noting that the University also violated Tide VI); Grutter, 137
F. Supp. 2d at 872 (same).
m See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994) (covering non-state
actors who receive federal funds); see also Id. § 1981 (granting all persons within the United
States the same right to make and enforce contracts as that enjoyed by white citizens; no
state action is required). Title VI and the Equal Protection clause are coterminous. See
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv, Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1983); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
53 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-86 (2001) (holding that individuals
have no private right of action to enforce regulations that prohibited discriminatory im-
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B. Why the Score Gap?
If universities knew' the cause or causes of the score gap, they, or
society, might address those causes instead of instituting affirmative
action. Unhappily, although there are many theories, the source of
the discrepancy remains a matter of much research and writing, but
little certainty. The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education explains that
"[b]lack students, for a host of reasons, are not as well prepared as
white students to take the SAT. " 56 Some have attributed the racial test
score gap to environmental causes, primarily poverty, segregation, and
unequal funding of black and white schools. These explanations have
become less persuasive. As the four decades since Brown v. Board of
Education" have witnessed a slow but steady rise in black income and
net worth, an end to legally required school segregation, and a clos-
ing of the gap in funding for black and white students and schools, a
score gap between the races has persisted. After some decrease since
the 1970s, there has been a modest increase in the size of the gap in
recent years.68
 Other observers rely primarily on "self-generated" fac-
tors, but they have been equally unpersuasive. They attribute blacks'
low test scores to a "culture of poverty," an overwhelming number of
single-parent black households, and innate (read, "genetic") differ-
ences between the races.59
 The first account does little to explain the
considerable gap between the lower scores of children of affluent
black parents and the higher scores of children of low-income white
parents. The second has been weakened significantly by a recent study
which, after "control [ling for] a mother's family background, test
scores, and years of schooling," demonstrates that "whether she is
married has even less effect on her children's test scores than whether
she is poor."69
 A number of other studies also lead to no clear conclu-
sions.°
Within the last twenty years, the most influential commentary on
the subject of the racial test score gap has combined elements of ear-
pact of conduct by federal funding recipients, because implementing statute only prohib-
ited intentional discrimination in federal programs).
86
 See Why There Has Been No Progress, supra note 24, at 9.
67 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58 See Jencks & Phillips, supra note 22, at 9.
" Id. at 10 ("In the 1960s and 1970s, many conservatives blamed blacks' problems on a
culture of poverty that rejected school achievement, the work ethic, and the two-parent
family in favor of instant gratification and episodic violence.").
6° Id.
61 Id. Jencks and Phillips summarize related research as well, but those studies yield no
definitive conclusions. See id. at 16-20.
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her theories, focusing both on environmental factors and on self-
generated factors. In 1986, Nigerian anthropologist John Ogbu co-
authored a study suggesting that "because blacks had such limited
opportunities in America, they developed an 'oppositional' culture
that equated academic success with 'acting white.'" 62 According to
Ogbu, black children, and especially teenagers, are encouraged to
shun academic pursuits, lest they lose the respect of their peers." This
theory and others like it, which tie a cultural account to a history of
oppression, have found considerable support." Similarly, the Ameri-
can Psychological Association points out that all over the world "chil-
dren of caste-like minorities do not have 'effort optimism,' i.e., the
conviction that hard work (especially hard schoolwork) and serious
commitment on their part will actually be rewarded. As a result, they
ignore or reject the forms of learning that are offered in school."65
Stanford psychologist Claude Steele has proposed another theory
that has been persuasive in many quarters. Steele wrote in 1998, "Afri-
can-American students know that any faltering could cause them to be
seen through the lens of a negative racial stereotype. Those whose
self-regard is predicated on high achievement—usually the stronger,
more confident students—may feel this pressure so greatly that it dis-
rupts and undermines their test performance.""
" Id. at 9. Other commentators recognize similar effects. According to Elijah Ander-
son:
To accept the school would be to give in and act white, to give up the value of
the street for some other thing. And the value of that other thing has not
been sufficiently explained.... In fact, the code of the street, and by exten-
sion the oppositional culture, competes very effectively with traditional val-
ues.... Alienated black students take on the oppositional role so effectively
that they often become models for other disaffected students.
ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET 97 (1999); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 72 (1996).
63 See BOWEN & Box, supra note 41, at 84.
61 See Jencks & Phillips, supra note 22, at 11.
65
 Explaining the Gap in Black-White Scores on IQ and College Admissions Tests, 18 J. BLACKS
HIGHER EDUC. 94, 96 (Winter 1997/1998) [hereinafter Explaining the Gap] (article
adapted from AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT (1996)
(chaired by Ulric Neisser of Emory University)).
66
 Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Aca-
demically Successful African Americans, in TEST SCORE CAP, supra note 22, at 402; see also
Claude Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 614 (1997). But cf. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY,
THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN Lire (1995) (explor-
ing ways that low intelligence, independent of social, economic, or ethnic background lies
at the root of social problems in the United States).
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By far the most contentious debate in contemporary test score-
gap discussions concerns heredity: Is there a genetic basis for blacks'
comparatively low performance? Some argue that because there is a
genetic factor in variations among whites in IQ scores, genetics must
play a part in causing black scores to be lower than those of whites. 67
In The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, Rich-
ard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray argue that intelligence is heri-
table, basing their conclusions principally upon tests of identical twins
as well as transracial adoption studies." The Bell Curve has been se-
verely criticized in, among other places, a volume devoted to that
purpose, The Bell Curve Wars. 69
 One scholar of the subject, Richard E.
Nisbett, has concluded that "[d]espite the assertions of some scholars,
including Herrnstein and Murray, a review of the evidence . . . pro-
vides almost no support for genetic explanations of the IQ difference
between blacks and whites.""
For me, the most persuasive studies are based on the hypothesis
that if race determines IQ, and whites supposedly are innately more
intelligent than blacks, then blacks with a greater proportion of
European ancestry should have higher test scores. That should be
true unless it were asserted that a single drop of black ancestry creates
a disposition to be less intelligent than one would be if of completely
white heritage. As one study recognized, however, perhaps 30% of the
black American gene pool comes from European ancestors." Yet, af-
ter determining ancestry by appearance, blood tests, and family his-
tory, it was found that African-Americans with a greater degree of
European ancestry did not score any higher on IQ tests than those
with less. 72
Although there is no clear explanation for the test results, they
suggest that, in combination, different elements of environment play
a large role: quality of schooling, unequal treatment by teachers, weak
or complete absence of educational support at home, parents' educa-
67 See Richard E. Nisbett, Race, Genetics, and IQ, in TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 22, at
86-90. There also are studies of German children born to American soldiers in Germany
that offer little or no support for the genetic explanation. One such study reports that
among several hundred children fathered by American soldiers in Germany, those fa-
thered by black G.1.5 had an average IQ of 96.5, whereas those fathered by white C.I.s had
an average IQ of 97. See id. at 91.
68 See HERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 66, at 105-10, 309-11.
69 See generally THE BELL CURVE WARS (Steven Fraser ed., 1995).
7° Nisbett, supra note 67, at 89.
71 See id. at 88.
72 See id. at 89-91.
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tion.0 attainment. low household income, peer pressure, "stereotype
inadequate pi('} station for the SAT in the curriculum,
sew rioted living and schooling conditions, and inadequate support
from guidance counselors. Together, all or some of these factors may
be more virulent than any single one in isolation.
Without knowing the causes, the country nevertheless must con-
front the questions of justice that would persist if the best schools
were to exclude all but a few black applicants and educate nearly all-
white classes to live in a society that would remain as racially stratified
as it is today. And the country should consider the quality of life that
such a condition would promote for blacks as well as whites.
C. The Disputed Role of Standardized Testing
Without affirmative action, standardized test scores would be de-
cisive in keeping black admissions at a low level. Test supporters justify
them on various grounds. Wide differences in high school and college
quality, grade inflation, and applicants' different courses of study
make grades alone an unreliable basis for comparing students from
different institutions. Test proponents claim the tests factor out such
variables and predict academic performance.
But, even supporters of standardized tests do not claim that they
predict with pinpoint accuracy. Students whose scores are a modest
number of points apart may do just as well in the classroom, or be-
yond, and the one who scores lowest may, following admission, do bet-
ter than the highest scorer. Several years ago at Columbia Law School,
the top student in the graduating class two years in a row had been
admitted from the wait list, as was the editor-in-chief of the Law Re-
view in another year. Recently, a student who was admitted from the
wait list the day before classes commenced later became a Supreme
Court law clerk." Students admitted from the wait list often rank
higher in their classes than those who had been admitted before
them,74
 which indicates that at least within the range of students
whose scores are high enough to be wait-listed, the tests are not very
discriminating.
Test opponents point out that the tests do not identify qualities
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success after graduation." Additionally, they contend that tests are
biased against poor people and minorities, that black students are so
tense in testing situations that they do not display their true abilities,
and that test results are manipulable through expensive test prepara-
tion courses, which blacks are less likely to attend than whites, giving
white students an unfair advantage." In response, the testing organi-
zations claim that test preparation courses do not affect scores to any
material extent, but the tutoring organizations disagree. 77
Grades and scores together predict performance better than tests
alone. Tests predict performance only for the first year of school,
when students typically take the same courses, thereby making scores
comparable." At law schools, test scores correlate at the rate of 0.41
or at best 0.50 with first year grades." But, they do not purport to
predict performance for subsequent years, or how competent or suc-
cessful a student will become after graduation. 8°
75 See Susan Sturm Sc Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innova-
tive Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 969 (1996).
76 See id. at 991; Tony Schwartz, The Test Under Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1999, § 6
(Magazine), at 30. On black students feeling tense during tests, see generally Steele & Ar-
onson, supra note 66.
" A study by the Law School Admissions Council reports that for the 1996-97 aca-
demic year, 28.03% of black and 31.31% of white test takers took such courses. See ANDREA
E. THORNTON ET AL., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LSAT TECHNICAL REPORT 97-02:
SUMMARY OF SELF REPORTED METHODS OF TEST PREPARATION BY LSAT Mims FOR TEST-
ING YEARS 1991-1997, at 11 tb1.13 (1998). Course takers average score was less than a point
higher than that of those who did not. See id. at 17 tb1.25. Tutoring companies argue that
such studies lump together one-day cram courses with much more extensive preparation.
See Schwartz, supra note '76, § 6, at 30. SAT tutoring companies, meanwhile, claim that
some students raise their scores up to 100 points in lengthier courses costing up to $175 an
hour. See id. Some tutors charge over $400 per hour. For some students, tutoring through-
out high school has cost $25,000. See id.
76 See Edward G. Haggarty, LSAT. Uses and Misuses, 70 N.Y. ST. BAR. J. 45, 45 (May/June
1998).
79 LAw SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION & INFORMATION
BOOK 121 (2002) ("Correlation is stated as a coefficient for which 1.00 indicates an exact
correspondence between candidates' test scores and subsequent law school perform-
ance.... The closer to 1.00 the correlation coefficient is, the greater the test's predictive
validity.... The correlation between LSAT scores and first-year grades varies from one law
school to another.. .. During 2000, validity studies were conducted for 183 law schools.
Correlations between LSAT scores ranged from .13 to .62 (median is .41). Correlations
between LSAT scores combined with undergraduate grade-point averages and first-year law
school grades ranged from .26 to .67 (median is .50).").
gg Bowen and Bok present a wealth of evidence on the income of former affirmative
action students. See BOWEN & Box, supra note 41, at 122-28, 362-79; see also DAVID B. WIL-
KINS & ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL BLACK ALUMNI SURVEY, PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT 1-22 (Sept. 2000). For information on former affirmative action students at
Michigan Law School, see David L. Chambers et al., Doing Well and Doing Goad, The Careers
20021
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Some, but not most, students admitted by affirmative action
graduate with grades as good as or better than those of whites with
higher test scores. 81 It is not clear, however, that failure of tests to pre-
dict accurately downgrades the evaluation of black applicants dispar-
ately. Opponents of affirmative action cite studies showing that the
tests over-predict for blacks, i.e., that they generally do not perform in
school as well as their scores forecast. 82 Moreover, opponents argue,
the tests are not economically biased; black students from families
with incomes between $80,000 and $100,000 have mean SAT scores
lower than those of whites from families with incomes under
$10,000.83
Even though the predictive value of the tests is flawed, schools
continue to use them. 84 The tests move the admissions process along
quickly. Without them, college admissions officers would have to as-
sess the predictive value of grades by quality of education (which var-
ies by school and courses taken) and by the relative strengths of indi-
vidual students' high school programs. Such a system would burden a
college or professional school with five, ten, or even twenty thousand
applicants.
Nevertheless, despite what they like about the standardized tests,
most schools ignore or discount them at times. When I sat in on ad-
of Minority and White Graduates of the University of Michigan Law School 1970-1996, 42 L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 61, 62 (1999).
et Hugh Price, current president of the National Urban League, former vice-president
of the Rockefeller Foundation, and former member of the editorial board of The New York
Times, was admitted to Yale Law School with LSAT scores about 200 points below those of
his average white classmate, and graduated at the lower end of the middle third of his
class. There were only seven blacks in his class, which indicates that in law school he per-
formed better than about a third of his white classmates whose scores were far better than
his. See Hugh Price, Speech to the Commonwealth Club of California (Feb. 10, 1995), in
COMMONWEALTH, Feb. 1995, at 1, 4.
82 See Charles L. Finke, Affirmative Action in Law Sclwol Academic Support Programs, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 55, 66 n.22 (1989) (observing that blacks do not perform as predicted and
that the tests "over-predict"). A recent study of the predictive capacity of the SAT con-
cludes that "high school class rank and SAT scores were very accurate predictors of which
students would graduate with honors at a group of several private liberal arts colleges" and
that "using a large sample of institutions and students ... high school grades and SAT
scores are good predictors of both freshman GPA and individual freshman course grades."
L. Scott Miller, Promoting High Academic Achievement Among Non-Asian Minorities, in PROMISE
AND DILEMMA: PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL DIVERSITY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 47, 54
(Eugene Y. Lowejr. ed., 1999).
RI See Why Family Income Differences Don't Explain the Racial Gap in SAT Scores, 20 J.
BLACKS HIGHER Enuc. 6 (Summer 1998).
" See Cross & Slater, supra note 28, at 12.
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missions committee meetings as Dean of Columbia College, 85 I ob-
served that committee members, not always articulating the reasons,
voted mainly on the basis of the official criteria. But, sometimes they
departed from numerical standards to favor, for example, an appli-
cant from a poverty-stricken family, a Vietnamese boat person, or
someone who had escaped from a war-torn region, by recognizing the
importance of having overcome hardship, or by a desire to promote
social equality. Geographic diversity also was a factor. A Wyoming
resident applying to Columbia or any other East Coast school, in the
all-other-things-being-equal situation, would have an advantage over
someone from the region in which the school is located.
Many schools admit children of alumni ("legacies") or applicants
from rich or famous families over others with better academic creden-
tials.86 For an extremely rich and generous donor, a school may even
favor the children of his friends.87 Ivy League colleges admit legacies
at rates higher than the rates at which other applicants are admitted,
ranging from more than double (Harvard, Yale, Princeton) to 20%
(Cornell).88
 In recent years, legacy admits at Harvard had average
SAT scores thirty-five points below those of non-legacies, lower grade
point averages, and fewer extracurricular activities in high school
than other admitted students.89 George W. Bush's college board
scores (leaked by Yale students during the 2000 presidential campaign
and reprinted in The New Yorker) were 566 verbal and 640 math.° The
median scores for students admitted to his class, as published in his
Yale class's twenty-fifth reunion book, were 668 verbal and 718 math."
His father, the forty-first president of the United States, and grandfa-
88 1 was dean from 1989 to 1993.
86 See Naked Hypocrisy: The Nationwide System of Affirmative Action for Whites, 18 J. Buclts
HIGHER Enuc. 40, 40-43 (Winter 1997/1998) [hereinafter Naked Hypocrisy].
87 See, e.g., Ralph Frammolino et al., UCLA Eased Entry Rules for the Rich, Well-Connected,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at Al (stating that the UCLA chancellor and others often gave
preference to friends and relatives of donors).
88 Naked Hypocrisy, supra note 86, at 40.
89 Id. at 41-42. At Harvard University, there were 264 legacies in 1997; at Cornell,
1150. Id. at 41. Schools usually will not reveal the numbers or names of students admitted
because of affluence or celebrity of parents, although occasionally it leaks out. Addition-
ally, to endear themselves to alumni, schools often will make public the number of alumni
children whom they admit.
Jane Mayer & Alexandra Robbins, Dept. of Aptitude—How George W Made the Grade,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 8, 1999, at 30.
91 See Nicholas D. Kristof, The Campaign 2000: The Cheerleader; Earning A's in People Skills
at Andover, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2000, at Al. The article continues: "So if his father and
grandfather had not been stars at Yale, and his grandfather had not been a Yale trustee,
George almost certainly would have ended up at Texas." Id.
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ther, a United States senator and Yale trustee, were Yale graduates.
The reason legacies are favored, of course, is that schools look to their
alumni for financial support. For example, when Columbia, in the
1960s, eliminated preference for legacies, alumni contributions fell
drastically. Columbia soon returned to the prior policy. 92 This tilt in
favor of alumni, who attended school when few or no blacks did, is
also a tilt towards whitepess, and will continue to be until the children
of affirmative action students start applying in substantial numbers.
Preferences based on wealth and influence are covert. A 1996
study in the Los Angeles Times revealed preferences in admission to the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) accorded to children
of politicians, donors, alumni, and celebrities, often processed
through the office of the chancellor or the fund-raising department.93
The article stated that the Chancellor admitted the son of an Arab
sheik after the admissions office decided he was unqualified and the
child of a movie producer after he agreed to give the university
$175,000 over five years." Some schools also extend preference to
children of their faculty and of some scholars as an incentive to join
the faculty.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke," the Supreme
Court had never been informed that U.C. Davis's Dean personally
admitted about a half-dozen applicants each year, including children
of rich and influential physicians who had been rejected or wait-listed
by the office of admissions.96
 Allan Bakke challenged U.C. Davis's af-
firmative action program on the ground that it denied him a place in
the incoming class; the identical criticism could have been made of
the Dean's special admissions program."
99 I learned this as Dean of Columbia College.
95 See Frammolino, supra note 87, at Al.
" Id.
95 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
" JOEL DREYFUS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INE-
QUALITY 23-24 (1979).
97
 There is a basis in human rights theory for arguing that discrimination on economic
grounds is prohibited. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which also
is a compendium of widely accepted fundamental rights, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of wealth. It provides that "the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as .. .
social origin, property, birth. . . ." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar.
23, 1976, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis supplied). The United States has ratified the
Covenant and pursuant to it might prohibit favoritism for legacies and children of wealthy
parents. See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992). But the United States has de-
clared that the Covenant is not self-enforcing. See id. Moreover, the United States takes the
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D. Returns on the Prohibition of Affirmative Action
Nathan Glazer, one of the earliest opponents of affirmative ac-
tion in higher education, now favors it for black students (although,
apparently, not other minorities) 9 8
 He observes that lo]ne way or
another, the commitment to enrolling more blacks than would qualify
based on academic criteria alone will be pursued. "99 He has so far
been right for some of the states where affirmative action has been
prohibited. While referenda, court decisions, and executive orders
have prohibited affirmative action in Texas, Florida, and California,
those states have nevertheless struggled to keep a substantial black
and Hispanic presence in their public universities. 100 To that end,
Texas and Florida have changed the rules at the undergraduate level
to guarantee admission to their university systems to a fixed percent-
age of the top students in each high school based on rank in class.lo
Since these states have many tightly segregated residential areas and
schools, this system allows the creation of classes with substantial
numbers of black students. In addition, all three states also have in-
corporated subjective, non-quantified factors into admission stan-
dards by statute or by rules adopted by the schools that can ease ad-
mission of blacks in several ways. 102 First, blacks may be
disproportionately numerous among applicants with the favored
characteristics. Second, some of the factors are impressionistic and
difficult to challenge in an affirmative action case.
1. Texas
The Texas statute, titled "Automatic Admission: All Institutions,"
provides that each institution in the higher education system "shall
admit an applicant ... as an undergraduate student if the applicant
graduated with a grade point average (GPA) in the top 10% of the
student's high school graduating class in one of the two school years"
preceding the year for which the applicant is applying for admis-
position that this and other human rights treaties do not bind the states. See id The Su-
preme Court has held that wealth is not a suspect classification. See San Antonio v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-28 (1973).
" See generally Nathan Glazer, Should the SAT Account for Race? Yes, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
27, 1999, at 26.
°
1" See infra Part I .D.1-3.
10 See infra Part I .D.1-3.
104 See infra Part I.D.1—S.
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sion. 103
 Because all or mostly black high schools in Texas are wide-
spread, many black high school graduates are eligible for admission to
the University of Texas at Austin. Before adoption of the statute, with-
out affirmative action, most black applicants would have been re-
jected for insufficient test scores. In effect, the Texas law amounts to a
redefinition of merit, away from system-wide test scores and towards
comparison of students with others who most likely share the same
background. The top ten standard amounts to adopting a recom-
mendation of test opponents, that is, to judge by what students have
done, not by a test that purports to measure potential.
Texas enacted a second statute to provide for undergraduates not
in the top 10%. Titled "Other Admissions," it states that "[b]ecause of
changing demographic trends, diversity, and population increases in
the state," in addition to academic achievement, schools "shall also
consider" any or a combination of "socioeconomic" factors. 104
 There
follows a list of eighteen factors, including whether the applicant
would be in the first generation of his or her family to attend or
graduate from an institution of higher education; has "bilingual pro-
ficiency;" is from a rural, urban, suburban, or central city area; at-
tended school under a desegregation plan; or is from a family whose
income is below poverty leve1. 1 D5
 The law prescribes a personal inter-
view and the evaluation of "other considerations." There is enough
elasticity and even suggestiveness in these criteria (the interview,
"other considerations," and such words as "bilingual," "central city,"
"desegregation") to create a student body that could resemble one
fashioned by affirmative action.
The new statutes enabled the University of Texas to restore un-
dergraduate black admission numbers to about where they had been
before Hopwood 1 06
 After a sharp decline from 266 in 1996 to 190 in
1997 following Hopwood 1, black enrollments increased to the pre-
103
 TEX. EDIJC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a) (Vernon 2002). Of note, Texas A&M University
has recently proposed extending the plan to the top 20% of graduates from each of 250
high schools. See Jeffrey Selingon, Critics Blast Plan to Expand Glass-Rank Policy in Texas as
Affirmative Action Ploy, CITRON. Eouc., Jan. 11, 2002, at 29. Many have criticized the
plan, but one of the architects of the 10% plan says he "believes the A&M plan is within
the confines of the class-rank law and Hopwood" Id.
1 °4 TEX. Enuc. CODE ANN. § 51.805(b) (Vernon 2002).
105 Id.
198 See infra app. A (statistics for 1995-1996).
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Hopwood I level of 286 in 1999 and then decreased to 242 in 2001. 107
Following two years of the 10% rule, the University reported that top
ten-percenters outperformed their classmates at every SAT level and
had a better retention rate. 108 The 10% rule has resulted in admission
to the University of Texas at Austin of many students, not merely
blacks, from areas where students had not traditionally been admit-
ted. But, some observers in Texas believe that during the first years of
the program students from the least effective high schools had not
taken advantage of the 10% rule and that in the future the perform-
ance level may fall.
The automatic admission standards do not apply to professional
schools, which admit students from all over the United States and
from abroad. It is difficult to imagine how a 10% rule would work at
that level to achieve an integrated student body. The law school bulle-
tin informs applicants that "[n]o decisions will be made on numerical
criteria alone." 109
 One of the goals of the admissions process is "to
identify those students with the greatest probability of success in law
school, giving due weight to proven predictors (LSAT, GPA, under-
graduate school and major, but also giving appropriate weight to all
other factors)."11° The law school seeks to discover students with
commitment to public service and leadership, with the background,
experience, and other qualities likely to be of value in the classroom,
and to provide a service to the state by educating citizens from under-
107 See infra app. A; see also Office of Institutional Studies, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Fall
Enrollment of New Students by Group and Ethnicity, at http://www.utexas.edu/aca-
demic/ois/stathb.00-01/students/s12b/s12b.litml
 (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
198
 GARY M. LAVERGNE & DR. BRUCE WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE
TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (H13 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN,
REPORT NUMBER 4, DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS, FALL 2001, ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE AND
PERSISTENCE OF Toe TEN PERCENT SturrErrrs, ACADEMIC YEARS 1996-2000, available at
http://www.utexas.edu/student/research/reports/admissions/HB588-report4.hun
 (last
visited Feb. 19, 2002) ("Top 10% students perform about as well as their non-top 10%
classmates with SAT scores about 200-300 points higher. This is true in all colleges and for
all racial/ethnic groups."); see also DR. BRUCE WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF
HB 588 AT UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, PRELIMINARY REPORT NUMBER 2, ACADEMIC
PERFORMANCE AND PERSISTENCE OF TOP 10 PERCENT STUDENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR, 1998-09,
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN NEWS, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Oct. 19, 2000, available
at http://www.utexas.edu/studen
 t/research/reports/admissions// top10. html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2001) ('Top 10 percent students at every level of the SAT earn grade point aver-
ages that exceed those of non-top 10 percent students having SAT scores that are 200 to
300 points higher.").
109 UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 30 (2002), available at http://www.
utexas.edu/law/depts/admissions/UTLAWbul.pdf> (visited Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
TEXAS LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN].
110 SeeLAVERGNE & WALKER, supra note 108.
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represented regions of the state and disadvantaged socio-economic
backgrounds.m Its new criteria include "history of overcoming eco-
nomic or other disadvantage," "personal experiences with discrimina-
tion," and "diversity of experience and background." 112 Black students
can do as well as white students with these standards, and with regard
to some of them (for example, experiences with discrimination), bet-
ten )"
But, black law school enrollment is now well under what it was
pre-Hopwood I. University of Texas Law School had enrolled twenty to
forty African-Americans each year. 114 Following Hopwood I, for the
class entering in 1997, the law school offered admission to eleven
black students; four enrolled:116
 In 1998, black enrollment rose to
nine. By 2000, the number of blacks enrolled for the first year in-
creased to seventeen.'" In the fall of 2001, the number of entering
black students dropped to sixteen. 117
In 1996, pre-Hopwood I, one black medical student entered the
University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio. In 2000,
five enrolled. At the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center
in 1996 there were eight. In 2000, the number had risen to thir-
teen.'" These are shockingly small numbers.
2. California
At the University of California, the prohibition of affirmative ac-
tion produced strikingly poor black enrollment at some schools.'"
Overall, in 2000 and 2001, the number of black students enrolling for
the first time at the university's undergraduate colleges stabilized at




114 See infra app. A. In 1996, there were twenty-nine African-Americans at the Center.
For a more complete history of enrollment figures al the University of Texas at Austin, see
THE UNIVERSITY OF T1DSAS AT AUSTIN, OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, FALL ENROLL-
MENT OF NEW STUDENTS BY GROUP AND ETHNICITY, FALL AND SUMMER ENTRANTS COM-
BINED NUMBER DISTRIBUTION, at http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ois/stathb.01-02/stu-
dents/512a/s12a.html
 (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
115 See infra app. A.
116 Infra app. A.
111 Infra app. A.
118
 Infra app. A.
119
 California has operated under a top 4% plan, but it has not led to an increase in
the presence of minorities in California colleges. See infra notes 131-141.
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tion.12° But, that statistic masked the even greater decline of black en-
rollments at the more prestigious colleges and their rise at the less
selective ones. Admissions criteria at University of California cam-
puses are once again undergoing revision. In November 2001, the
Regents of the University of California approved a modified selection
process for freshmen admissions, known as "comprehensive review." 121
The new system replaces the previous "two-tiered" process, by which
the campuses were required to admit 50% to 75% of their freshmen
based solely on academic factors. 122
 The full freshman class will now
be selected by using fourteen selection criteria—ten academic and
four supplemental—that include characteristics such as "special tal-
ents, unusual intellectual or leadership skills, and accomplishments in
the face of personal challenges."123
Moreover, the Regents have approved a "dual admissions" plan,
but it is being held up by budgetary constraints.124 Under this system,
the University will continue to guarantee admission to the top 4% of
each of the state's high school's graduating classes, based on grades
alone.I25
 In addition, Californians who graduate with grades that
place them in the top 4% to 12.5% of their high school classes will be
assured of a place at one of the University's eight campuses, although
some will first have to complete their freshman and sophomore years
at community college with satisfactory grades. 126 University spokesper-
sons estimate that the new policy will produce 1000 new community
college transfers in its first year, and 3500 per year thereafter. 127 They
believe that 36% of the students admitted under the program will be
African-American, Latino, or American Indian, up from the 18.6%
120 See app. B, tb1.4. In 1997, 920 black undergraduates enrolled. In 2000, 728—or
somewhat over 79%--enrolled. See id.
121
 Office of the President News Room, Regents Approve Comprehensive Review in
UC Freshman Admissions, at littp://wwwucop.edu/news/archives/2001/nov15artl.hun
(Nov. 15, 2001).
122 Id.
12' Id. For a list of the new criteria, see University of California, Introducing the Uni-
versity, Freshman Selection, at http://www.ucop.edu/news/archives/2001/nov15artl.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
124 See generally Office of the President New Room, Regents Approve "Dual Admissions"
Plan, at hup://www.ucop.edu/news/archives/2001/july19art2.1tun
 (dated July 19, 2001,
updated Sept. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Office of the President].
125 See id.; see also Rebecca Trounson, Regents Consider Plan to Widen Diversity, L.A. TIMES,
July 19, 2001, at 10.
126 See generally Office of the President, supra note 124; see also Office of Strategic
Communications, Facts About the University of California (2001), at http://www.ucop.
edu/news/factsheets/2001/admissionsoverview.pdf
 (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
iv Trounson, supra note 125, at 10.
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admitted system-wide for the freshman class entering in fall 2001. 128
Low-income and rural students are likely to benefit also.'"
Finally, University President Richard C. Atkinson has proposed
that admission to the California system no longer require students to
take the SAT I, but would continue requiring submission of SAT II
scores, until new subject area tests could be developed.'" The Univer-
sity of California faculty's Board of Admissions and Relations with
Schools (BOARS) has released preliminary recommendations that
support eliminating the use of the SAT I and call for a new testing ar-
ray, similar to subject matter achievement tests. 131
University-wide, 920 African-Americans enrolled as college
freshmen in 1997. 132 That number fell to 739 in 1998. 133 In 2000, it
was 728. 134 At U.C. Berkeley, the most selective of the colleges, fresh-
man black enrollment went from 252 in 1997 to 122 in 1998. 135 And
from 144 in 2000 to 138 in 2001. 136
 At UCLA, black enrollment fell
from 204 in 1997 to 138 in 1998. 137
 In 2000, 146 blacks enrolled but
that number fell to 125 in 2001. 138
 But, at less selective U.C. Riverside,
the trend was in the other direction: ninety-seven in 1997, 133 in
2000. 138 U.C. Irvine, which also is not very selective, increased black
enrollment over the same three-year period from fifty to seventy-
four.14° U.C. Davis went from ninety-three in 1999 to fifty in 2000.141 At
other schools, there were relatively small differences from the previ-
ous year.142
The top 12.5% plan, although not affirmative action in the sense
that term ordinarily is used, will admit some of the best students from
ghetto schools without test scores that would have been required un-
"8 id.
"9 id.
133 See Richard C. Atkinson, Standardized Tests and Access to American Universities, at
http://www.ucop.edu/news/sat/speech1.11 mil (Feb. 18, 2001).
131
 Board of Admissions and Relations with Schools, The Use of Admissions Tests by
the University of California 16-18, at littp://www.ucop.edu/news/sat/boars.pdf
 (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2002).
"I See infra app. B, tbl.4.
133 See infra app. B, tb1.4.
134 See infra app. B, tbl.4.
1" See infra app. B, tb1.4.
"6 See infra app. B, tbl.4.
137 See infra app. B, tbl.4.
1" See infra app. B, tb1.4.
139 See infra app. B, tb1.4.
140 See infra app. B, tbl.4.
141 See infra app. B, tbl.4.
144 See infra app. B, tb1.4.
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der the old standards. Some whites who would have been admitted
under those standards will be rejected unless something is done to
protect them, which the plan proposes to do by expanding its total
enrollment. 143
 By doing so, the school can continue to offer about as
many places to non-minorities as before the top 12.5% plan went into
effect.
Trends have been similar in the University of California's profes-
sional schools. Boalt Hall, the University of California law school at
Berkeley, one of the leading law schools in the country, admitted
twenty black students in 1996. 1" In 1997, after affirmative action was
prohibited, it enrolled only one, a student admitted a year earlier,
who had deferred enrolling. In 2000, it enrolled seven.149 In 2001,
twenty first-year blacks enrolled at University of California medical
schools, more than half the pre-abolition total. 146
 But, individual
schools enrolled blacks in very different proportions of their entering
classes. In 1997, U.C. Davis School of Medicine (total annual enroll-
ment ninety-three), enrolled five blacks; in 2000 it enrolled two. 147 At
U.C. Irvine, between 1996 and 2000 (total annual enrollment ninety-
two), two blacks entered each year, except in 1997, when none en-
tered. 148
 U.C. San Francisco (total annual enrollment 141) had eleven
black enrollees in 1996 and seven in 2000. 149 At UCLA (total annual
enrollment 121), the numbers gradually diminished from ten in 1996
to six in 2000. 15°
Affirmative action opponents in California charge that affirma-
tive action is being continued surreptitiously. 191
143
 Karen Arenson, Cali; 	 Proposal to Improve College Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2000, at A16.
144
 For statistics on blacks in the University of California Law, Medical, and Business
Schools, see app. B.
143 See infra app. B, tbl.1.
146
 University of California, Medical School, at http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/
 da-
tamgmt/graddata/mednum2.hunl (providing applicants, admits, and first-year class en-
rollment numbers) (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).





 According to the unsigned website http://www.acusd.edu ./—e_cook-vault/ medi-
cal/sanfrancisco/uscf-med-98.hunl, while 4% of Asian and white applicants were admitted
to U.C.S.F. Medical School in 1998, 10% of black and Hispanic applicants were admitted,
and that the probability of that many black and Hispanic acceptances is less than one in
four million. The site makes similar claims about U.C. Irvine Medical School for 1999 (1%
decrease in black/Hispanic applicants but 250% increase in their acceptances); UCLA
Medical School (alleging that even ignoring grades and MCAT scores the probability that
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3. Florida
Florida reported that in 2000, under its plan to admit the top
20% of each high school class to college, 152
 total black undergraduate
enrollment was 6.27%, compared to 5.43% in 1998. 155
 In August 2000,
the State University System announced that black enrollment at Flor-
ida's "flagships," the University of Florida and Florida State University,
had increased 33% and 21% respectively over the previous year.'"
The announcement distinguished Florida from California in that
Florida black students did not cascade downwards to the least selec-
tive schools. 155
 The reason may be that Florida's flagship schools are
not nearly as selective as California's. 158
The professional schools do not operate under a top percentage
plan. The Florida State University College of Law reported 10.65%
black enrollment for 2000. 157
 But, to the contrary, black enrollment
plunged by about 40% and Hispanic enrollment dipped 7.5% in the
first freshman class since the University of Florida discontinued its
consideration of race and ethnicity in admissions decisions. 158
 Black
freshmen went from being 11.8% of the class to 7.2%. 158
 The Univer-
42 black/Hispanic applicants could have been admitted among 241 acceptances is
.000003); and U.C. Davis Medical School (claiming that black and Hispanic applicants
were 12% and received 27% of the acceptances; likelihood of this occurring by chance is
less than one in 100 million even if all applicants were equally qualified, but blacks and
Hispanics had lower GYAs and MCAT scores). It is not inconceivable that litigation will
follow. SeeU. C. SAN FRANCISCO MEDICAL SCHOOL 1998, ETHNIC PROFILE REPORT, available
at http://www.acusti.edu/–e_cook/vault/medical/sanfrancisco/ucsf-med-913.11unl (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2002). One article claims that blacks and Hispanics were admitted to Califor-
nia medical schools and the University of Texas Law School in extraordinarily large num-
bers, given number of applicants and their academic records and test scores. See The Death
of Meritocracy, LA GIUFFE DU LION, June 2000, available at http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.
com/prop209.1um.
152 See Page, supra note 47, at A13.
153
 Rick Bragg, Minority Enrollments Up in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at A18.
154 Id.
I" One Florida Yields Big Gains in Minority Enrollment, at http://www.myflorida.
cotn/myflorida/government/governo.../one_florida_gains_in_
 minority.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2002).
156
 See Top 30 Public National Universities—Doctoral, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 17,
2001, at 107 (ranking U.C. Berkeley at one, UCLA at four; University of Florida at nine-
teen, and Florida State University at forty-eight); Best National Universities--Doctoral, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept, 17, 2001, at 106 (ranking U.C. Berkeley at twenty and UCLA at
twenty-six; neither Florida university is ranked in the top fifty).
167
	 Miller, UF's Black Enrollment Plummets, GAINESVILLE SUN.COM , Sept. 1, 2001,
at littp://www.sunone.corn/articIes/ 2001-09-01c .shtml.
155 See id.
169 See id.
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sity of Florida Levin College of Law reported that its black enrollment
numbers held steady. 166
E. What Are the Alternatives to Affirmative Action?
1. Top Percentage Plans
The top percentage plans, in combination with factors like char-
acter and experience, have brought diversity to college campuses in
Texas and Florida. 161
 Their ability to facilitate admission of blacks in
other states depends on the extent of high school segregation and the
educational background of the students. Top percentage plans work
for blacks (and Hispanics as well) where there is, ironically, rigid sepa-
ration in residential areas and schools. Where there are many all or
nearly all black high schools, a college that desires diversity but is
prohibited from using affirmative action could switch to a system
based on class standing, as Texas and Florida have. That would guar-
antee admission of many black applicants without any mention of
race.
But, where high schools are integrated, a top percentage plan
would not work. The plan would pass over well-qualified minority stu-
dents who attend well-funded white or integrated schools. Although
some would not be in the top 10% of their own schools, they might be
better prepared than someone in the top 10% of an inferior, ghetto
schoo1. 162
 Under the top 10% plan, top ten-percenters need not con-
stitute the entire entering class. Others can be admitted under stan-
dards like the eighteen indicia in the Texas law that include hardship,
character, and other personal qualities. The Texas plan has resulted in
mean SAT scores declining at the University of Texas at Austin from
1240 in 1996 to below 1220 in 2001. 165 At the same time, GPAs are up
for students at all SAT levels. Fewer whites have been admitted to the
Austin campus, stirring resentment. And the number of Asians admit-
ted is up sharply. Furthermore, the plans do not work to integrate
graduate and professional schools. The University of California top
160 See id.
' 61 See supra Part I.D.1, 3.
162
 Under a top ten percentage plan, however, minorities from integrated high schools
may still be admitted to a flagship college. Top ten percenters need nog consiittlie the
tire entering class. Others ran he admitted tinder ant lat tk 1il.r the 	 to in the
Texas law that identify hattkItip, th..trat lcr. and ulhrl titt,thlict. .. It 	 11.1 I I 'lot
§51.805(b) (Vt•uttoit 2002).
163 Jim Yardley, Tin 	 l'eneta Soluuoti, N.Y. I CM .1111. I I, .11 512.	 I
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percentage plan, coupled with satisfactory performance in junior col-
lege, is too new to have elicited much reaction. The University has
pledged that students who do well in community college are guaran-
teed admission to the University system. 164
In addition, the United States Commission on Civil Rights and its
chair have criticized the Texas and Florida plans because Florida and
Texas have not admitted to college the same proportion of minority
students as were admitted under affirmative action. 166
 The chair of
the Commission has charged that the University of Texas rejects mi-
nority students who would have succeeded under affirmative action. 166
In Florida, GPAs of the top 20% of students varied substantially from
high school to high schoo1. 167
 In some schools, students with a C+
average may be in the top 20%. 168
 Elsewhere, someone with a high B
would not be in the top 20%. 169
 White students are proportionately
more numerous in the top fifth and blacks are proportionately under-
represented in the top fifth. 1"
2. Do Nothing
Opponents of affirmative action say that blacks should, meta-
phorically, pull up their socks and get about the business of doing as
well as whites do on tests. This challenge, they say, will stimulate blacks
to score better. If they do not do better, Stephan and Abigail Them-
strom, the leading academic objectors to affirmative action, argue
that a student rejected by, say, the University of Texas School of Law,
164
 But students might be wary of how that pledge will be implemented. There may be
a stigma attached to being consigned to community college, even as an interim measure,
which might discourage students from taking advantage of the opportunity. See supra notes
126-127 and accompanying text.
16s For the full text of the Civil Rights Commission criticism, see UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PERCENTAGE PLANS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTES FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?, avail-
able at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/percent/stmnt.htm
 (last visited April 7, 2002); Mary
Francis Berry, How Percentage Plans Keep Minority Students Out of College, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Aug. 4, 2000, at A8. In 1996 (pre-Hopwood 1), 65% of Hispanic and 57% of black
applicants to the University of Texas were admitted. Berry, supra, at A8. In 1999 (under the
top percentage plan), the numbers were 56 and 46%, respectively. The admission of white
students remained steady at 62%. Id.
1e4 Berry, supra note 165, at A8.
' 67 See Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren't Saying About the "X-Percent Solution," CHRON.
HIGHER Eouc., June 2, 2000, at A31.
I" See id.
16u See id.
1" White students are 59% of the high school seniors in Florida, but over 67% of stu-
dents in the top fifth. Blacks are 25% of high school seniors and 14% of the top fifth. Id.
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would have "the academic credentials to get into a less competitive
institution—fair and square without playing the race card . . . [al-
though] those black students with the weakest grades and scores in
the nation would probably be left having to choose another profes-
sion."171
 They assert that black undergraduates rejected by the Univer-
sity of Michigan could go to Western Michigan University or Wayne
State University, which, like most of the three thousand colleges in the
country, are not highly selective. 172
In an admissions regime favored by the Thernstroms, if no provi-
sion like a top percentage plan were introduced, black presence at the
U.S. News ce World Report twenty-five highest-ranked colleges, with a
combined student body of 50,000 freshman, would fall from 6%, or
3,000 students, to an estimated 2%. 173
 Without affirmative action, in a
test score driven regime of admissions, all but a few blacks would at-
tend non-selective colleges and, if they chose to go to professional
school, almost all would either be rejected or admitted only to the
lowest tier schools. 174
 But, it would be almost as difficult for black ap-
plicants to enter second and third tier undergraduate schools. At all
colleges and universities "the average combined SAT score of admit-
ted black students was lower than the average combined score of ad-
171
 STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE
421 (1997).
172 Id.
173 Cross & Slater, supra note 28, at 10-11.
174 See id. at 11-12. At highly selective schools a student needs at least 1300 on the SAT
(i.e., 650 verbal, 650 mathematics) to be considered for admission. See id. at 9. Whites are
fourteen times as likely as blacks to attain a score of 650 on the mathematics exam and
four times as likely on the verbal part. Id. At law schools, in 1995-96, Harvard's and Yale's
admits had a median LSAT score of 170. Id. at 13. Only seventeen black students in the
United States scored 170; 2300 others (whites, Asians; and Hispanics) attained that score.
Id. A score of 165 was the median at the top fifteen law schools, Id. Of white, Asian, and
Hispanic test takers 7227 students scored at or above that level; seventy blacks nationwide
reached that score. Id. At a score of 160 or more, 267 blacks in the country attained the
median level of admits to the top thirty-four highest-ranked law schools. Id. There were
16,278 students of other groups at 160 or above. Id. The third and fourth or lowest tier law
schools had a median score of 150. Id. at 14. Only 1745 blacks in the entire country scored
at that level; more than 36,000 whites did. Id. Whites outnumbered blacks twenty to one.
Id. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that most black applicants, shunned from se-
lective schools, would be admitted readily to even a non-selective law school if affirmative
action ended. See id. at 11-15. Medical schools confront a similar distribution of black and
overall scores. The median combined MCAT score of 25.2 for white students who were
rejected for admission to medical schools nationwide was significantly higher than the 23.5
median score of black students who were admitted. Id. at 16.
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mitted white students. This was true not only at flagship schools but at
the less selective institutions:175
3. Introduce Non-Racial Admissions Criteria by Which Blacks Fare as
Well as Whites
There have been other proposals. Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier
propose developing ways of assessing a range of abilities wider than
SATs purport to measure. 176
 They also argue that, because tests do not
make fine discriminations, applicants should be scored in broad
bands, within which admissions decisions might be made by lottery. 177
But, a lottery, unless it were to include all applicants, needs to identify
who goes into the pool from which winners will be selected. That im-
plicates selection standards. If, instead of precise grades and/or
175 A Nationwide, supra note 40, at 14.
175 Sturm & Guinier, supra note 75, at 957-78, 1009-22.
177
 While Sturm and Guinier do not discuss it, the Netherlands has extensive experi-
ence with lotteries for university admission purposes. By law, for subjects (usually medical
education, although sometimes other disciplines) in which there are more applicants than
places, students are ranked by grades earned in high school {medical school is an under-
graduate program). A weighted lottery is conducted, in which students with higher grades
have a better chance of being admitted. The lottery tends towards producing equality of
result, in that students with the highest grades may be rejected in favor of others with
lower grades. Some highly publicized instances have occurred, giving rise to protests, as a
consequence of which the law is likely to be amended. The pending proposal is to admit
students with grades above a certain level (now proposed as eight out of a possible ten)
and place the remaining applicants in the lottery. The public reaction to the existing sys-
tem resembles that of opponents of affirmative action in the United States. See NETHER-
LANDS MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE AND SCIENCE, INFORMATION DEP'T, EDUCATION IN
THE NETHERLANDS, available at http://www.minocw.nl/english/edusyst/edn105.htn1
 (last




Germany employs other equalizing devices. Where there are not enough places for all
the students who should be admitted "places available for first-year students shall be
awarded in accordance with" the following principles. "Up to three tenths of the study
places are to be reserved for: I. applicants, for whom refusal of enrollment would consti-
tute unusually great hardship, particularly from a social point of view; 2. applicants who ..
have committed themselves to practicing a profession in sectors of particular public
need...." There are other priorities for making admissions decisions, Beyond those pri-
orities, selection shall be determined "according to the period of time which has elapsed
since the necessary qualifications ... were acquired" and how that time was spent (waiting
period: Wartezeit), The waiting period may not exceed eight years, I have discussed the
rationale of Wartezeit with German academics who tell me that the rationale is that over
time the applicant will have become more mature and has demonstrated commitment,
Usually, applicants, if not admitted within a few years, give up and get on with their lives.
GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, FRAMEWORK ACT FOR HIGHER
EDUCATION § 32 (2) 1 & (3) 2 (1994).
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scores, selection were made within broad bands, there would likely be
far more whites than blacks in the higher scoring bands, and that
would lead back to where the problem started. Selective schools, at
first, would not be likely to find a substantial number of blacks with
minimum scores to place in the pool. To get more black applicants in
the pool, they would have to lower the minimum score for entering
the lottery. But, then the number of white entries would increase as
well, and the chances of being selected would not improve. Sturm and
Guinier argue also that past performance, rather than test scores, is
the best indication of future performance. 178
 But, apart from using
GPAs, that standard seems to be more workable for employment than
admissions decisions. If past performance does mean GPA, it is not
certain that black students will fare much better than they do with
standardized tests. California's new selection regime may provide a
means of demonstrating past performance by admitting some appli-
cants first to community college. 179 If they perform adequately, they
will be admitted to a four-year school.
Recently, the Educkional Testing Service considered a program
that would add points to test scores of students, whom they called
"strivers," who have demonstrated outstanding character while grow-
ing up in adverse circumstances. 18° Presumably many of them would
be black. But, the proposal was controversial and has not been im-
plemented. In any event, formally and informally, many admissions
regimes take into account character and life circumstances. How the
data are used is not, and is not required to be, quantified or articu-
lated. U.C. Berkeley considers some such factors, as do University of
California medical schools. 181
 Texas requires their use by statute. But,
among the disadvantaged, there are more ambitious, hard-working
white students than black students, even though blacks may be pro-
portionately more numerous. By the point at which admissions reach
a level where blacks are clustered, it may be that enough whites have
been admitted to fill the class. Nevertheless, to the extent that non-
quantitative criteria are used, the exercise of discretion, consciously or
1" See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 75, at 969-80, 1010, 1019-20.
179 See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
180 See Amy Dockser Marcus, Education: New Weights Can Alter SAT Scores: Family is Factor
in Determining Who's a 'Striver,' WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1999, at B1.
	 •
181 See Boalt Hall School of Law — University of California, Berkeley, Policies & FAQS, at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/perspectives/admissions/policyfaci.html
 (last visited Mar. 22,
2002); U.C. Admissions, UC Admissions Chances, at http:www.acusd.edu/—e_cook/
chances/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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unconsciously, may take race into account, although no school would
admit to violating a prohibition of affirmative action in this manner.
The line may be beginning to crack with the proposal by the
President of the University of California that it abandon the SAT. 182
But, almost all schools so far have resisted substituting a more holistic
assessment for standardized tests.'"
Facing the end of affirmative action, UCLA Law School made a
large-scale effort to factor socio-economic considerations formally
into the admissions process, while eschewing consideration of race. It
established a minimum score for admission, calculated from quantifi-
able academic indicators: LSAT score and GPA, the quality of the
school from which the applicant graduated, the applicant's curricu-
lum, grade inflation, and other indicia. 184
 The melded number re-
quired to be eligible for admission, derived from these criteria, was
625. 185
 For applicants with a low academic score who came from a dis-
advantaged background, the score would be increased according to a
formula that incorporates family economic status, parents' education,
whether the applicant came from a single-parent household, quality
of the neighborhood in which the applicant lived, and so forth.'"
The formula resembles one developed by the Supreme Court of
India, although without reference to it, known as the "creamy layer"
principle, a reference to the cream that rises to the top of a container
of milk. 187
 In India, reservations, which means affirmative action, are
182
 See Office of the President News Room, UC President Richard C. Atkinson Calls for End-
ing SAT I Test Requirement at UC, at http://www.ucop ,edu/news/sat/satarticlel.hun (last
visited Mar. 20, 2002).
'83 See Gaston Aperton, Why We Need the SAT, N.Y. Tildes, Sept. 4, 2000, at A16. rile
vast majority of the nation's highly selective institutions, as well as other large public uni-
versities, are expected to rely on the tests for the foreseeable future."); see also Jacques
Steinberg, Most Colleges are Expected to Continue to Use the SAT, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at
A6 ("It's the only standard factor in every student's application.") (quoting dean of admis-
sions at Stanford). But see Jess Bravin, Law School Admission Council Aims to Quash Overreli-
ance on LSAT, WALL ST, J., Mar. 29, 2001, at B14 (noting that the test has become single
most important factor in deciding who gets admitted to a law school, but is in danger of
becoming casualty of battles over affirmative action; and that a past president of Associa-
tion of American Law Schools said "we ought to be open to thinking about whether we
need the test at all").
184
 See Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 471 LEGAL
EMIG. 4'72, 484 (1997). See generally Deborah Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 471
LEGAL EDUC. 504 (1997).
156 See Sander, supra note 184, at 484.
188 See id. at 484-85.
187 See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, 558-60 (formulating
the "creamy layer" test).
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granted on the basis of caste or membership in certain tribes.'" That
privilege is withheld from members of certain scheduled castes and
tribes who come from the creamy layers, which means from prosper-
ous and well-educated families. 188
 UCLA's plan differs from India's
way of allotting preferences in that UCLA does not consider race.
The first year it was in effect at UCLA, this system produced an
extraordinarily diverse class, but black enrollment subsequently
dropped by 72%. 190 In 1999, the decrease was even more pronounced.
Only three blacks enrolled in the law schoo1. 181 In 2000, five en-
rolled. 182 In 2001, ten enrolled.'" In the past, a large proportion of
admitted black students had relatively high socio-economic status
(SES), which includes parents' income, education, quality of neigh-
borhood, and other factors. 184
 Although they had test scores below
those of almost all admitted whites, affirmative action made possible
their admission.
Deborah Malamud points out that while high-SES blacks had
been eligible for affirmative action consideration, they are not eligible
under the new program because they do not receive credit for suffer-
ing from disadvantage. As a result, a large majority of blacks from
families with high SES (superior economic, educational, and other
indicia of status) were deemed too well-off to be eligible for affirma-
tive action and not admitted:185 At the same time, black students from
disadvantaged families did not have scores high enough to be admit-
ted and were too low in SES for the socio-economic supplement to
put them over the top. The three blacks who enrolled were among
'a° The Constitution of India requires that universities (and other institutions) employ
"reservations," or affirmative action, for certain tribes and castes. See INDIA CONST. arts. 15
(4), 16 (4).
189
 The Supreme Court of India has ruled that the constitutional requirement to pro-
vide affirmative action excludes applicants whose families were in the "creamy layer" of
society. See Sawhney, 80 A.1.R. at 560; see also INDIA CONST. arts. 15 (4), 16 (4). The "creamy
layer" included families with income, wealth, and education above a certain level. See
Sawhney, 80 A.I.R. at 558-60. The most comprehensive scholarly treatment of affirmative
action in India iS MARC GALANTER, COMPETING INEQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD
CLASSES IN INDIA (1984).
19° Malamud, supra note 184, at 504. The average black enrollment went from 9.7%
between 1990 and 1996 to 2.6% in 1997. Sander, supra note 184, at 497 tb1.13.
191 Infra app. B, tbl.1.
192 hi,
193 Id.
I" Malamud, supra note 183, at 505.
195 Id.
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nineteen %%hi, had )wets of lewd adni ision that Year. 196
 Sixteen de-
dined the (dim suggesting that they did not want to attend school
isi dated If Oin other black students. The likelihood is that at least some
who declined went to another law school. At least on the basis of the
UCLA experience, non-racial, poverty-based affirmative action will
not result in admission of a substantial number of blacks.
4. Make Test Preparation Courses Available to Black Applicants
A short-range proposal is to encourage and pay for black enroll-
ment in test preparation courses that claim they can raise LSAT scores
at least six or seven points on the sixty-point scale ranging from 120 to
180. 197
 A Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) study, in contrast,
reports gains of less than two points for those who took such
courses.198
 But, the LSAC report does not claim that its conclusion
holds true for all test tutoring, some of which is extensive, taught in-
depth over a period of at least several months, like Kaplan's and
Katzman's, and some of which is not.'" The commercial test tutoring
firms (Kaplan and Princeton Review are the biggest), which charge
approximately $800 per course, say that the study does not apply to
them.
According to a study of the 1996-1997 academic year made for
the LSAC, about 28% of African-American LSAT test takers (median
score 141.58) reported having attended a commercial test prepara-
tion school, compared to 31% of white test takers (median score
152.11).m At best, more blacks taking test preparation courses might
slightly close the test score gap, but probably not enough to make a
major difference.
1 " UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR-
NIA'S LAW SCHOOLS, at littp://www.ucop.edu/acadadV/datamgmt/graddata/lawnos.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
197
 For example, see The Princeton Review, Guaranteed Satisfaction, at http://www.
review.com/integrated/
 templates/defaultrh/testprep.cfaRTPRPAGE=65&TYPE =LSAT
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
1" SeeThornton, supra note 77, at 16-17 tbls.20-25.
199 See Schwartz, supra note 76, § 6, at 16. Schwartz asks why, if the LSAC believes that
test preparation is ineffective, it supplies test preparation materials itself. See Schwartz,
supra note 76, § at 16.
too See Thornton, supra note 77, at 11 tb1.13.
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5. Improve Education of Black Students: Change Society
Finally, there is the long-range approach. No matter what hap-
pens with testing, elementary, high school, and college education for
blacks should be improved. Is improvement likely? Can there be
enough to make a difference in test outcomes or other quantitative
standards? A change as great as is needed to secure admission of a.
substantial number of black students without affirmative action is
most likely to be achieved if efforts begin when children are young.
This is a time of much political talk and experimentation in teaching
techniques, school administration, class size, and other factors, aimed
at improving the education of the most disadvantaged children. Some
experiments have been successful,m leaving open the question of
whether they can bereplicated on a large scale.
Although schools can do a great deal, to achieve maximum
change it is likely the students' home and neighborhood environment
must also improve, a goal that would require major social policy inno-
vations and substantial redistributive measures. Such programs raise
political issues. Some would oppose innovation, saying it is no job for
government, but for individuals or non-governmental groups; others
would urge participation by the state. In any event, the answer in-
volves at least some reformation of society. The political debates
would range from how to organize schools to what the interest rate
should be in order to control inflation, to which international trading
policies will best provide for the economic stability, physical, and emo-
tional well-being of minority children and, of necessity, their parents.
Innovation would involve encouraging school systems to promote mi-
nority high achievement and possibly enrolling minority primary
grade children in after-school, weekend, and summer programs.
There would be opposition from opponents of increased taxes or
governmental social programs of any sort, from those opposed to
government programs designed to assist any single group, particularly
blacks, and from those who believe that such programs do not work.
It remains to be seen whether such a campaign could succeed in to-
day's political climate.
Charles R. Lawrence III goes beyond the testing and affirmative
action issues that he believes are insufficient to address the need for
2131 See Jodi Wilgoren, Seeking to Clone Success for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at Al
(describing the success of K1PP Academy, a pair of public middle schools in poor areas of
Houston and the Bronx, that have instituted various experimental tactics to improve stu-
dent performance).
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improvements. He argues for "Nransformative politics [that] seek to
change the political consciousness of those privileged by systems of
subordination," and asserts that true equality will not be achieved
without thoroughgoing reform of society. 202
 Like the Sturm and
Guinier formula, his ideal is not likely to be realized immediately. The
possible future implementation of the Sturm-Guinier and Lawrence
proposals will not close the black-white gap in society now. To wait for
their arrival, should it come, would consign many African-Americans
to continued subordinate status for many years. In the meantime, af-
firmative action in some form will have to continue. Were it abol-
ished, for at least a generation fewer blacks would graduate from top
colleges and professional schools, diminishing their prospects and
those of their families, friends, and neighbors.
IL PRINCIPAL THEORIES AND EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The theory under which affirmative action is justified is often not
articulated. 203
 Indeed, advocates often do not define any supporting
theory at all or sometimes conflate several together. Of course, there
is no reason why affirmative action cannot be justified by more than
one theory at the same time. But, the theory matters, because if, as we
shall see below, affirmative action is constitutional only if it serves a
compelling governmental interest, that interest needs to be articu-
lated. Moreover, to be constitutional a program must be narrowly tai-
lored, that is, no more extensive than necessary. Therefore, in order
to know its proper extent, there must be some understanding of what
an affirmative action program has been designed to accomplish, and
how.
Briefly, the principal theories that support affirmative action are:
(1) it contributes to closing the gap in social conditions between
blacks and whites; (2) it provides diversity, an important element of
learning; and (3) it serves as reparations for the damage inflicted by
slavery, segregation, societal and official discrimination, and other
policies that have brought African-Americans to their current
status."4
 The courts have not discussed the first of these, social condi-
to2
 Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Af-
firmative Action, 101 CoLuist. L. REV. 928, 965 (2001).
" For a thorough canvas of legal-ethical issues involving affirmative action, see KENT
GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (1983).
201 See infra Part I.A.
556	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:521
dons (closing the gap), but I think it is the most important justifica-
don.
The opposition makes six major arguments: (1) affirmative ac-
tion undermines the fundamental human right of equality; sometimes
stated in terms of constitutional interpretation, i.e., "the Constitution
is color-blind;" (2) it fails to reward merit; (3) it stigmatizes and
stereotypes its beneficiaries in their own eyes as well as those of othr-
ers; (4) it creates a racially polarizing backlash; (5) its recipients are
more likely to drop out of school; and (6) other groups have suc-
ceeded without affirmative action. 205
These are not the only arguments pro and con. For example, I do
not discuss the role model justification. Although more role models
might well stimulate more applications by black students, they would
still need adequate test scores or affirmative action for admission, and
we would return to the first three justifications. I do not address pro-
ponents' argument from principle, because it seems to be subsumed
in their reparations case. Nor do I discuss to any great extent oppo-
nents' position based on principle. It is one of those arguments based
on deep feeling that is impervious to argument.
A. Arguments for Affirmative Action
I. The Gap in Social Conditions Between Blacks and Whites
I begin with the social conditions argument because it is new and
more comprehensive than those theories based on diversity, societal
discrimination, or reparations. Social scientist Elijah Anderson, in
Code of the Street, has described the cumulative effect of the disabilities
the inner-city heaps upon its black residents:
[N]one [of the problems] is more pressing than that of in-
terpersonal violence and aggression. This phenomenon
wreaks havoc daily on the lives of community residents and
increasingly spills over into downtown and residential mid-
dle-class areas. Muggings, burglaries, carjackings, and drug-
related shootings, all of which may leave their victims or in-
nocent bystanders dead, are now common enough. 
. . . 206
He describes some of the origins of the inclination to violence, in-
cluding "lack of jobs that pay a living wage, limited public services . .
205
 See i ',fro i'ari 1,11.
2')6 See AN i)Eits();4., lorphl 'vole 62„ 41 :12—:$3,
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the stigma of race, the fallout from rampant drug use and drug traf-
ficking, and the resulting alienation and absence of hope." 207
 These
and other burdens work their effects cumulatively, spawning an "op-
positional culture." 208
 While all blacks do not live in inner cities, those
who live outside, nevertheless, feel the pressure of those handicaps.
"M amines with a decency orientation," he writes, "oppose the code
of the streets, but often reluctantly encourage their children's famili-
arity with it in order to enable them to negotiate the inner-city envi-
ronment."2°9
Of course, many African-Americans bear no resemblance to those
in the society Anderson describes. They are on the same level of in-
come and status as whites with comparable college or professional
school education. As ChiefJustice Earl Warren wrote in 1954 in Brown
v. Board of Education, "Today ... many Negroes have achieved out-
standing success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and
professional world."210
 Nevertheless, in no other group characterized
by race or ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual preference, physical
handicap, or age, except perhaps Native Americans or Hispanics, is
there so high a proportion of individuals ill-equipped to contribute to
society or harmful to the group and the rest of the country. Following
are only some of the disabilities that African-Americans face; their
most destructive characteristic is that they work in concert.
a. Isolation
Blacks are isolated like no other group in society. Notwithstand-
ing a few regions where blacks and whites live alongside each other,
the general pattern is one of separate black (sometimes combined
with other minorities) and white areas. 211
 One scholar of the subject
has observed:
No group in the history of the United States has ever experi-
enced the sustained high level of residential segregation that
has been imposed on blacks in large American cities for the
past fifty years. . . . Not only is the depth of black segregation
unprecedented and utterly unique compared with that of
107
 Id. at 32.
2°8 Id.
5'og Id. at 33.
210
 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
211 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60-82 (1993).
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other groups, but it shows little sign of change with the pas-
sage of time or improvements in socioeconomic status. 212
While much residential segregation is directly tied to high rates of
poverty within the black community, "segregation cannot be attrib-
uted to income'differences, because blacks are just as segregated at all
levels of income."215
 Even when blacks move to the suburbs, as the
black middle class grows, they tend to live in black areas: "Whereas
segregation declines steadily for most minority groups as socioeco-
nomic status rises, the levels of black-white segregation do not vary
significantly by social class. . . . [B]lacks are segregated no matter how
much money they earn. "214
Indeed, some activities are becoming more segregated. School
desegregation once lessened strict racial separation for many black
children (and lifted black children's test scores). 215
 But, it was never
pervasive, and is now diminishing. Courts are deciding that desegre-
gated districts are "unitary," providing grounds for terminating court-
ordered desegregation plans. 216
 If, following termination of court-
enforced desegregation, a school reverts to a single race, the school
district argues it may not be subjected to a new desegregation order
because the racial composition would not have resulted from state
action. 217
The separation is apparent in everyday life. One newspaper arti-
cle, describing 11 a.m. on Sunday as the most segregated hour of the
week, when blacks and whites go to their separate churches to pray,
observes that:
ER] eligion is only part of the story. Go to a New York restau-
rant of any note, or visit a Broadway theater, or attend a con-
cert at Lincoln Center or a movie at the Lincoln Square em-
porium a few blocks away. You might as well have Jim Crow
laws for all the integration that is taking place. The reality is,
with some exceptions, blacks and whites don't do many
things together except maybe ride the bus and the subways.
212
 Id. at 2.
213 Id. at 10-11.
214
 ld. at II.
212 David Grissmer at al., Why Did the Black-White Score Gap Narrow in the 1970s and
1980sT, in TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 22, at 206-11.
216 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991).
217 See, e.g., id.
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Money alonewho has it and who doesn't—cannot explain
this stark separation. 218
There is a barrier even in language. In 1996, the Oakland, Cali-
fornia Board of Education undertook to introduce into the curricu-
lum a subject it called "Ebonics," a term for "black English," spoken
not only in Oakland, but by many African-Americans across the coun-
try. 219
 I have not seen statistics on how many speak "black English,"
but common observation suggests that it is used widely. The Board of
Directors of Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages
(TESOL) has described Ebonics as "African-American Vernacular
English" or "black English," and said that it is a "rule-governed, lin-
guistic system, with its own lexical, phonological, syntactic and dis-
course patterns."220
 The Oakland Board of Education had concluded
that to teach black children how to speak standard American English,
the best foundation would be to build upon the manner in which they
already were speaking. 221
 But, criticized by conservative educators and
civil rights advocates, it dropped the program. 222
 We need only ob-
serve that blacks and whites are so isolated from one another that a
way of speaking called "black English" exists. 223
The black experience in America is not unique. Throughout
time and across continents, darker-skinned minorities living within or
218
 Clyde Haberman, Integration, One Sunday at a Time, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at Bl.
James M. Nabrit Ill, an African-American lawyer in the District of Columbia, born in the
District in 1932, reports a similar experience. He attended segregated schools in Washing-
ton but his parents, who wanted him to have an excellent, integrated education, sent him
to Mount Hermon School for Boys in Massachusetts for high school. In Legends in the Law,
an interview published in the Washington Lawyer, he said, "Before I went to school in Mas-
sachusetts, I knew only one white person, a man who had a store on Georgia Avenue."
Legends in the Law, WASHINGTON LAW., July/Aug. 2001, available at http://www.dcbar.org/
washLaw/08_01/legends.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002).
21 ° See Richard Lee Colvin, Oakland District Says Policy on Ebonies Misunderstood, L.A.
TimEs, Dec. 31, 1996, at Al.
22° See Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages, Policy Statement of the
TESOL Board on African American Vernacular English (Mar. 10, 1997), at littp://www.cal.
oreebonics/tesoleboltunl (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
• 221 See Colvin, supra note 219, at Al.
222 See CNN Interactive, Oakland School Board Amends Ebonies Policy, Jan. 16, 1997, at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9701/16/black.english/index.html
 (last visited March 23,
2002).
223
 The language-race difference is not exclusively a United States phenomenon.
Frantz Fanon has described a similar barrier between blacks in the French colonies and
whites in Metropolitan France: "I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of lan-
guage.... The black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the
white man." FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 17 (1970).
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under domination of European populations have experienced color
prejudice. Some psychologists have suggested that a sort of primal
bias in favor of lighter-colored skin exists in human cultures vastly
separated by geography and time. This color bias has been explained
by a number of theories, including innate biochemical or psychologi-
cal factors, experiences in early childhood, and inundation with uni-
versal cultural symbols. 224
 Cultures are full of white/black symbolism
from early childhood. Children learn to associate "white" with "good"
and "black" with "bad." These symbols appear in idiomatic speech, in
religious imagery, and in literature (e.g., "black mark," "blackball,"
"black heart," "white hope," "white knight," "fair haired"). In Mozart's
Magic Flute, an opera that virtually every opera-goer has seen,
Monostatos, a villainous Moor, is often played in blackface. In socie-
ties across the world, such as India,225 Japan,226 Britain,227
 and else-
229 See joEs.. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 9 (1984) ("[T]he power of
which I write stems from a view of the universe that takes the symbols of whiteness and
blackness with a deadly seriousness, spreads them out to the whole of human activity, and,
from that point, onto the many-hued skins of men, thereby reducing them to the catego-
ries of race."); see also JOHN E. WILLIAMS & J. KENNrrit MORLAND, RACE, COLOR, AND THE
YOUNG CHILD 262 (1976) ("We propose that virtually every child has experiences early in
life which lead to the development of a preference for light over darkness."); Kenneth
Gergen, The Significance of Skin Color in Human Relations, 96 DAEDALUS 390, 398 (1967)
("More compelling is the possibility that the emotional response to at least the experience
of black and white is established at a very early age, and as a result of almost universal ex-
periences. Two such experiences seem especially germane: the meaning of night versus
day for the child and the training he receives in cleanliness.").
223
 See Andre Beteille, Race and Descent as Social Categories in India, in COLOR AND RACE,
supra note 224, at 172-74. According to Beteille:
The inhabitants of the Northern states—particularly Punjab, Jammu and
Kashmir, Rajasthan, and parts of Uttar Pradesh—are on the whole fairer than
those of the Southern states. Indeed, many North Indians have a vague
prejudice against South Indians because of their dark skin color.... Within
the subcaste, a certain amount of selective breeding has no doubt taken place
for centuries.... The ideal bride, whose beauty and virtue are praised in the
songs sung at marriages, almost always has a light complexion.... Even a cas-
ual examination of the matrimonial columns of such popular dailies as The
Hindu, The Hindustan Times, or The Hindustan Standard shows that virginity
and a light skin color are among the most desirable qualities in a bride.
Id.
226 See Hiroshi Wagatsuma, The Social Perception of Skin Color in Japan, in COLOR AND
RACE, supra note 224, at 129 ("Long before any sustained contact with either Caucasoid
Europeans or dark-skinned Africans or Indians, the Japanese valued 'white' skin as beauti-
ful and deprecated 'black' skin as ugly.").
211 See E. R. Braithwaite, The "Colored Immigrant" in Britain, in COLOR AND RACE, supra
note 224, at 218. Braithwaite wrote:
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where, anthropologists have noted that white skin is often valued as
beautiful and black skin deprecated. Cortez encountered it when the
Aztecs capitulated to him as a white god, as did Captain Cook as he
sailed the South Sea islands.228
Malcolm X recognized black/white symbolism as he contem-
plated his early attempts to "whiten" his appearance by straightening
and coloring his hair. "This was my first really big step toward self-
degradation," he wrote in his autobiography,
when I endured all of that pain, literally burning my flesh to
have it look like a white man's hair. I had joined that multi-
tude of negro men and women in America who are brain-
washed into believing that the black people are "inferior"—
and white people "superior"—that they will even violate and
mutilate their God-created bodies to try to look "pretty" by
white standards.229
The cry that "black is beautiful" that arose among students during the
civil rights movement of the 1960s was an attempt to counter this im-
age.
This assessment of skin color is not anachronistic. Last year, a
study of the significance of skin color among African-Americans and
Mexican Americans concluded:
Consistently, across—and within—race and gender groups,
dark skin incurs a learning and earnings penalty. Although
the magnitude of its negative impact may vary, darker skin is
associated in each instance with lower socioeconomic status.
Our findings show skin color to be a more significant deter-
Immigrant groups have for many centuries been a familiar and important
part of the British community. Mostly refugees from persecution in other
European countries ... all these groups were white-skinned. They could, if
they chose, fade without difficulty into the 'white' background. The colored
immigrant is and seems likely to remain the exception. His high visibility is a
constant reminder to Britons of his earliest relationship with them—slave to
owner, subject to sovereign, conquered to conqueror, and man to master.
Id.
2" Gergen, supra note 224, at 122.
229 MALCOLM X Sc. ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 61-62 (1965).
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minant of education and income among Blacks than among
Chicano/as. 230
This pan-cultural color bias makes reconciliation between the races
more difficult to achieve.
Sociologists look at intermarriage rates to gauge the extent to
which a group is integrated into society. Among third-generation His-




 Among blacks, it is 8% to 10%. 232
 As evidence of the
influence of black isolation, one might compare these ratios with
those of members of the armed forces, the most thoroughly inte-
grated institution in the United States. A study by Reynolds Farley
found that white men who have served in the military were three
times more likely to marry black women as white men who never
served.233
 White women who served in the military were seven times
as likely to marry black men as white women who were lifelong civil-
ians. 234
Setting aside ideological disagreements over intermarriage, a re-
cent explanation of the 50% rate of intermarriage among Jews sug-
gests why there is a low intermarriage rate among blacks: Transforma-
tions in American life that have brought about the high rate among
Jews include "removal of virtually all social barriers between Jews and
non Jews in work, education and leisure" and a "geographic shift away
from older areas of dense Jewish concentration."255
 But, there has
been no such transformation for African-Americans; blacks and whites
live, work, study, and play together far less than members of other
groups. 236
230 Margaret Hunter et. al, The Significance of Shin Color Among African Americans and
Mexican Americans, in Aix. Ass. RES. PERSP., Winter 2001, at 180, available at http://www.
rcgd.isr.umich.edu/prba/persp/winter2001/mhunter.pdf
 (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).
231 See Rochelle L. Stanfield, The Blending of the United States, available at http://us-
info.state.gov/journals/iisv/0699/ijse/stanfld.htm
 (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
232 Id.
233
 Reynolds Farley, University of Michigan, Rates of Mixed-Race Marriages Increasing,
Study Finds (1997), at http://www.sistahspace.com/nommo/ir6.html
 (last visited Feb. 4,





 The Factors Behind the 52 % Intermarriage Rate, available at http: //www.joi.org/ li-
brary/research/rate.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
23° See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
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b. Economic Status
In 1998, only 68% of black men were likely to be working, a pro-
portion lower than that of any other racial group. 237 African-
American, Native American, and Hispanic men were twice as likely to
be unemployed as whites in 1998. 238
 Those who work were more likely
to be in lower-paying, semi-skilled jobs. 238
 Of the various racial or eth-
nic groups in America, annual median household income for blacks
was the lowest (about $25,100) compared to Asians' income ($45,400)
and whites' ($40,600). 240
 Although the United States economy went
through a protracted period of growth during the 1990s, the gaps be-
tween whites and Asians, on the one hand, and different minorities,
on the other, changed little."' Between 1990 and 1997, African-
American, Hispanic, and American Indian incomes grew so that 21%
to 25% of this group earned $50,000 or more. 242 At the same time,
about 40% of whites and 46% of Asians earned annual income at that
level."' A recent government report found that "[t] he income of non-
Hispanic white and Asian families is nearly twice that of black and
Hispanic families. Since the early 1990s black family income has risen,
but . . . the ratio of black to non-Hispanic white median family income
is about the same today as it was 30 years ago."244
 This discrepancy
translates into a loss not only to blacks, but also to the national econ-
omy. If blacks earned as much as whites, the country as a whole would
be richer and better off in all of life's activities that are related to fiscal
resources.
Not surprisingly, the median net worth of whites is more than ten
times that of blacks: for whites it is $45,700; for blacks, $4,400. 243 In
1998, 72% of white households owned homes, compared to approxi-
237 See generally Kelvin M. Pollard & William P. O'Hare, America's Racial and Ethnic Mi-
norities, in POPULATION BULLETIN, Sept. 1999, available at http: //www.prb.org/Con-
ten
 t/NavigationMenu/PRB/AboutPRB/ PopuIation_13ulletin2/Americas_Racial_and_Eth-
nic_Minorities.litm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). But black women had the highest female






 Pollard & O'Hare, supra note 237.
to Id.
244
 Changing America: Indicators of Social and Economic Well-Being, at http:
//search. access.gpo.gov/GPO/Searc
 ItRight.asp?ct= GPO&ci I income&x = 33&y= 26 (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002).
445 Pollard & O'Hare, supra note 237,1.61.6.
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mately 40% of blacks and Hispanics. 246
 One-half of white households
in 1999 owned a computer or used the Internet, compared to one-
quarter of black households. 247
 Business ownership among blacks in-
creased from fifteen per thousand population in 1987 to twenty per
thousand in 1992.248
 Over the same time it increased from sixty-seven
per thousand to eighty per thousand for whites. 249
 According to a re-
cent report, only 2.3% of blacks own businesses. In comparison, 3.4%
of Latinos, 8% of Native Americans, and 8.9% of Asians are business
owners. Although blacks make up 12.3% of the nation's population,
they own 4% of America's businesses, employing 0.7% of their work-
ers, and generating just 0.9% of receipts. Latinos are 12.5% of the
population and own 5.9% of the nation's businesses, while Native
Americans and Asians own a higher percentage of the nation's busi-
nesses than their representation in the population. Native Americans
make up 0.9% of the population and 1% of the businesses. Asians are
3.6% of the country's inhabitants but represent 4.5% of its busi-
nesses.25°
c. Reactions of the Black Community
The combination of residential segregation and high rates of ur-
ban black poverty has been devastating to isolated black communities.
According to one commentator:
In concentrating poverty, segregation acts simultaneously to
concentrate anything that is correlated with poverty: crime,
drug abuse, welfare dependency, single parenthood, and
educational difficulties. To the extent that individual socio-
economic failings follow from prolonged exposure to con-
centrated poverty and its correlates, therefore, these disad-
vantages are ultimately produced by the structural
organization of U.S. metropolitan areas. The mere fact that
blacks are highly segregated as well as poor means that indi-
vidual African Americans are more likely to suffer joblessness







 The State of Black Entrepreneurship: Are We Making the Right Moves for Thue Economic
Empowerment?, KIP. Bus. REP., at http://wwwidpbusinessreport.com/Cover_Story_06-
01.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
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or whites, quite apart from any disadvantages they may suffer
with respect to personal or family characteristics. 231
Poverty-stricken blacks tend to live together in poverty-stricken neigh-
borhoods. 252
 High concentrations of urban poverty are inextricably
linked with a host of social problems, which have come to character-
ize urban black America. The odds of dropping out of high school
and the odds of teenage birth rise in lock step with the age of low
status workers in a neighborhood. 233 Douglas S. Massey has written
that poverty and racial concentration are "mutually reinforcing and
cumulative, leading directly to the creation of underclass communi-
ties typified by high rates of family disruption, welfare dependence,
crime, mortality and educational failure. "454
 Living in a poor neigh-
borhood increases the likelihood of pregnancy among black adoles-
cent girls and lowers the age of first sexual intercourse.255 A 1993
study detected "reasonably powerful neighborhood effects ... on
childhood IQ, teenage births, and school-leaving, even after the dif-
ferences in the socioeconomic characteristics of families are adjusted
for."266
 A study by Linda Datcher has concluded that "community
quality is an important factor generating differences in education and
earnings of young men both within and between racial groups.. ..
[O]ver 40% of the racial differences in education and earnings that
251
 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, POPULATION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHICAGO, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: HOUSING SEGREGATION AND PERSISTENT URBAN POVERTY (Mar. 1994), avail-
able at littp://www.ssri.nithedu/d1/massey.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
252
 Paul A. Jargowski, Tabulations from 1990 Census Summary Tape File 3A, CD-ROM,
at 31 tbl. PF 3.2 (1990), available at http://aspelihs.gov/Itsp/97trelids/P13-2.1itm
 (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002) (documenting percentage of children who live in poor neighbor-
hoods).
2" Douglas S. Massey et al., Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of
Poverty, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 425, 426 (1994) (thing Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Effect of
Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing, 96 Am. J. Soc. 1226
(1991)).
254 Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid; Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 96
Am. J. Soc., 329, 350 (1990). Massey has written "the probability of a teenage birth in-
creases dramatically as the percentage of low-status workers in the child's neighborhood
increases from 70% to 95%, ultimately reaching a likelihood of about 20%." DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY, AMERICAN APARTHEID 178 (1994). Moreover, school performance drops as segre-
gation increases. "Given complete segregation between blacks and whites and a 20% rate
of black poverty, our simulation predicts that children will attend high schools where 47%
of the students score below the 15th percentile on the CAT [California achievement test].
Id. at 141.
255 See Dennis P. Hogan & Evelyn M. Kitagawa, The Impact of Social Status, Family Struc-
ture', and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black Adolescents, 90 Am. J. Soc. 825, 825 (1985).
256 Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Develop-
ment?, 99 Am. J. Soc. 353, 353 (1993).
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result from background arise from poorer neighborhood of origin of
blacks. "257 •
Many blacks have reacted in a socially disruptive manner, includ-
ing by committing crimes. The statistics are astonishing, even taking
into account that they include arrests and convictions tainted by racial
discrimination. According to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau
of Justice Statistics, in 1998, 221.6 of 100,000 young black males ages
eighteen to twenty-four had committed a homicide. 258
 The compara-
ble number for white males is 28.7. 259
 There is a similar disproportion
among homicide victims: 117.1 of 100,000 eighteen to twenty-four
year-old black males died in this manner; among whites, 14.5 did. 26°
In 1999, the numbers dropped to 102.8 blacks and 12.6 whites. 261
In 2000, blacks, constituting about 12% of the population, were
48.8% of those arrested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
53.9% of those arrested for robbery, 34% of those arrested for aggra-
vated assault, and 28.4% of those arrested for burglary. 262
 In 2000,
among the two million incarcerated offenders, blacks constituted 50%
of state and federal prisoners. 263
 Overall, black men and women were
nearly seven times more likely than whites and two times more likely
than Hispanics to have been in prison or jail. 2" Based on current
rates of first incarceration, an estimated 28% of black males will enter
state or federal prison during their lifetime, compared to 4.4% of
white males.265
 Thirteen percent of the black adult male population,
or 1.4 million African-American males, have lost the right to vote be-
227 Linda Datcher, Effects of Community and Family Background on Achievement, 64 REV. OF
ECON. AND STAT. 41 (1982). See generally Mary Corcoran et al., Effects of Family and Commu-
nity Background on Economic Status, 80 AM. Ecox. REV. 362-66 (1990).
222
 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1998), available at http://www.ojp ,usdoj.gov/bis/homicide/oars.txt
 (last




 JAMES ALAN Fox 8: MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 59-60, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf
 (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
262 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, available at
http://wwwfbi.gov/ucr/cius/_00/00crime4.pdf . (last visited Apr. 7, 2002).





265 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDER STA-
TISTICS, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON, available at
littp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm
 (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
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cause of their involvement in the criminal justice system. 266
 In states
with the most restrictive voting laws, 40% of African-American men
may be disenfranchised. 267
 Incarceration makes impossible normal
family life. It makes higher education practically impossible, leading
to another generation of undereducated parents.
To a considerable extent, the prosecution of black men is a func-
tion of the war on drugs and the disproportionately high number and
length of prison sentences imposed for use or sale of crack cocaine,
which is cheaper than powder cocaine and more popular with black
drug users than with whites. 2" Between 1986 and 1991, the number of
white state prisoners who had been convicted of drug offenses grew to
30,950, an increase of 110%, while the number of black prisoners
grew to 82,730, an increase of 420%. 269
A widespread distrust of the justice system among blacks accom-
panies this situation. During the voir dire in the civil suit against 0.J.
Simpson by the families of those he had been acquitted of killing,
white prospective jurors almost all believed that Simpson was guilty of
murder, while African Americans said that he was probably inno-
cent.270
 When the white Los Angeles Police officers accused of beating
Rodney King were acquitted in 1992, blacks in Los Angeles rioted in
one of the most destructive uprisings the country has known. 2" In
New York City, in 1999, after police officers shot and killed Amadou
Diallo, an African immigrant, thousands of people protested on a
daily basis and many were arrested. New York City radio stations
246
 Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement
Laws in the United States, at hup://www.sentencingproject.org/policy/9080.11tm
 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2002).
267 See id.
See Drug Policy Alliance, Drug Prohibition and the U.S. Prison Population, at
http://www.soros.org/lindesmith/cites_sources/brief13.html
 (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
269 Id.
V°
 See Simpson Judge OKs Jury Prospects Who Admit Bias, Sept. 25, 1996, available at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9609/25/simpson
 (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). Similarly, as jurors
deliberated at the New York trial of Sean Combs, a hip-hop impresario, in connection with
a shooting that wounded three people in a Manhattan night club, black and white jurors
were on both sides of the question of whether to convict. But race-tinged tensions charac-
terized the deliberations: a black juror accusing a white of wanting to convict because the
defendant was black; a white juror cried because he believed he was being called a racist; a
black juror confronted a white juror who was adamant about a co-defendant's guilt by
saying "[d]on't forget Amadou Diallo. He was shot 41 times." Katherine E. Finkelstein &
Dan Barry, Jurors in Rapper's That Recall 3 Days of Heated Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2001, at Al, B6.
271
 See Melissa Roth, Understanding the Riots Part 1, The Path to Fury: How Los Angeles
Reached the Crisis Point Again, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at T1.
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broadcast a call to arms for protesters by Reverend Al Sharpton. The
New York City court, at which the four officers were on trial, moved
the trial to the state's upstate capital, Albany, causing anxiety that
hundreds, if not thousands of protesters could stream into the Capital
Region.272 The 1968 Kerner Commission Report presents a lengthy cata-
logue of race riots that have erupted over the years acid left a legacy of
abraded race relations in their wake. 273
William Julius Wilson and Loic J.D. Wacquant summed up the
cumulative results of this congeries of disadvantages:
Among the resources that individuals can draw upon to im-
plement strategies of social mobility are those potentially
provided by . . . the resources they have access to by virtue of
being socially integrated into solidary groups, networks or
organizations. . . . Our data indicate that not only do resi-
dents of extreme-poverty areas have fewer social ties but also
that they tend to have ties of lesser social worth, as measured
by the social position of their partners, parents, siblings, and
best friends, for instance. In short, they possess lower vol-
umes of social capitai.274
Furthermore, one commentator has noted that "[y]oungsters vary in
the extent to which they feel a stake in American society." 275 Ambition
to strive higher would be dampened down if standardized tests were
to remain a barrier to gateways of higher education through which
blacks must pass to achieve parity with successful whites. If there is no
way to be admitted to the schools that prepare one for success, why
try? Affirmative action offers a way. Elijah Anderson writes of the op-
positional culture that underlies much of the alienation that gives rise
to dysfunctional conduct: "Young people must also be encouraged to
adopt an outlook that allows them to invest their considerable per-
sonal resources in available opportunities. In such more positive cir-
cumstances, they can be expected to leave behind the attitudes, val-
"2 Melissa Grace, Dialler Thal Albany-bound, TIMES UNION (Albany), Dec. 17, 1999 at
A8.
"3 Seegelieralry REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968) ("Kerner Commission Report"). As I edit these pages, Cincinnati has just emerged
from a race riot set off by the police killing of a young black man. See Francis X. Clines,
Appeals for Peace in Ohio After Two Days of Protests, N.Y. TunEs, Apr. 12. 2001. at A18.
"4
 Loic J.D. Wacquant & William Julius Wils4)11. Thr (Aral. I 'n,let, Ll	 mi S.teu.• Po•
spec:litres, in 501 ANNAl2,	 D. Pi n.. & S4 44.1AI. Sti. 22-23 111.1m.Js.
275 Jackson "p,by, Six b.!, biwrgriornatwor lord .11,11ke err	 Hi I 4 glriotI 4.1., 4 141 "II
NOLOGY & Pol.. tier, 12.	 195.7).
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ues, and behavior that work to block their advancement into the
mainstream."276
The social conditions outlined in this section have a momentum
that, without intervention, passes them from one generation to the
next. 277
d. Closing the Gap by Affirmative Action
Affirmative action in higher education is an effective means of
closing the gap between blacks and whites. The Journal of Blacks in
Higher Education reports:
[(Aver the past 30 years at least 15,000 black students admit-
ted under affirmative action guidelines have graduated from
America's 25 highest-ranked universities. Another 15,000 Af-
rican Americans, also admitted under preferential admis-
sions policies, have graduated from the nation's highest-
ranked law schools. Some 10,000 more blacks have success-
fully entered the business world after admissions under af-
firmative action policies that were established at our leading
business schools. Another 3,500 young blacks have gradu-
ated from our most distinguished medical schools. 278
Forty-three thousand, five hundred graduations over thirty years may
not seem to be a large number. But, this includes only the highest-
ranked schools. Very selective and selective schools employ affirmative
action, too. Moreover, the increase is probably proportionately higher
in recent years in that fewer blacks were admitted in the early days of
the programs. 279
Bowen and Bok report:
By 1996, blacks made up 8.6 percent of all male profession-
als and 13.1 percent of all female professionals. . . They also
accounted for 8.3 percent of all male executives, managers
and administrators and 9.6 percent of all females in such po-
276
 EUJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET 289 (1999).
277
 See generally Mary Corcoran & Terry Adams, Race, Sex, and the Intergenerational
transmission of Poverty, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP POOR 461-517 (Greg J. Duncan
& Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997).
"8
 T.L.C., Thorna.s Carlyle and Affirmative Action, 24 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 7, 7
(Summer 1999). These statistics may include some double counting in that at least some of
the professional school graduates were also among the college graduates. The number is
impressive, nonetheless.
279
 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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sitions (up from 3 percent and 1.8 percent). From 1960 to
1990, blacks almost doubled their share of the nation's phy-
sicians and almost tripled their share of attorneys and engi-
neers.28°
They observe that among the affirmative action cohort admitted to
college in 1976, black women who graduated from selective schools
on the average earned $64,700 per year, compared to $66,000 for
their white women classmates; black males earned $85,000, compared
to $101,900 for their white male classmates. 281 But, "black women
from the [selective] schools earned 73% more ($27,200 more) than
did all black women with BAs. The [selective school] earnings advan-
tage was even greater for black men, whose average earnings were
82% greater ($38,200 more) than the average earnings of all blacks
who hold B.A. degrees."282
According to Bowen and Bok, "There is, indeed, a real wage
premium associated with enrollment at an academically selective insti-
tution; [t]his premium is substantial (even at a fairly early stage in
one's career); and [t]he premium is at least as high, and probably
higher, for black students than for white students:183 A survey by the
Mellon Foundation indicates that "the average student who entered a
highly selective college' like Yale, Swarthmore or the University of
Pennsylvania in 1976 earned $92,000 in 1995, [while an] average stu-
dent from a moderately selective college, like Penn State, Denison or
Tulane, earned $22,000 less: 184 While attending an elite school has
little financial advantage for a student from an affluent family, "the
payoff . . . appears to be greater for students from more disadvan-
taged family backgrounds. "$ 8' Students from advantaged families can
readily connect with opportunities not available to others. Those who
290 BowaN & 110K, supra note 41, at 10 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census statistics from
1960 & 1990).
281
 Id. at 123.
222 Id.
183
 Id. at 128.
4 Alan B, Krueger, Economic Scene: Children Smart Enough to Get into Elite Schools May Not
Need to Bother, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at C2 (citing College and Beyond survey data col-
lected by the Mellon Foundation).
285 ALAN KRUEGER & STACY DALE, ESTIMATING THE PAYOFF TO ATTENDING A MORE
SELECTIVE COLLEGE: AN APPLICATION OF SELECTION ON OBSERVARLES AND UNOBSERV-
ABLE% (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w7322, 1999), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W7322
 (last visited Mar. 29, 2002); see also Krueger, supra
note 284, at C2.
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are isolated or not so well-off profit more from connections that they
can make only while attending highly selective institutions.
In September 2000, Harvard Law School published a preliminary
report of a survey of its black alumni. 288
 There have been 1700 black
graduates, almost all of whom graduated since 1970.287 Among the
495 alumni who responded, average salaries were $243,655 for 1970s
graduates, $194,468 for 1980s graduates, and $113,283 for 1990s
graduates. 288
 While Harvard black graduates' income was considerably
higher than that of minority graduates of the University of Michigan
Law School, Michigan graduates' incomes were quite substantial as
well. A 1996 survey of University of Michigan's minority graduates in-
dicated that, for the same three decades Michigan incomes were
$141,419, $104,513, and $67,865, respectively. 289
Furthermore, there are nine blacks among the general counsel of
Fortune 500 corporations. All of them graduated from selective law
schools.29° Among the fifty most influential African-American execu-
tives in corporate America, twenty-six received at least one degree
from a selective university. 291
 Based on an informal survey, the upper
ranks of the foreign service are becoming increasingly filled by black
officers who hold degrees from selective schools. 292 Nine blacks as of
the time of the survey were ambassadors. They hold degrees from
Yale, U.S.C., DePauw, Syracuse, Brown, Tufts, and UCLA, as well as
from two schools that are not as selective, Virginia State and Western
College for Women in Ohio. The latter two may not have had much
choice when entering college in 1964. Additionally, five blacks are
ambassador-designates. They have degrees from Penn, Harvard,
UCLA, Michigan, and University of Ohio. Two blacks, graduates of
UCLA and U.S.C., are in the Senior Seminar, an elite training pro-
gram for higher office.
I have inquired of deans, admission officers, and faculty members
at a few highly selective law schools what proportion of their black
"a See WILKINS & CHAMBLISS, supra note 80.
"7 See id. at 1.
2" Id. at 1, 3. This may well not be a representative sample of all black graduates. It is
possible that higher earners replied earlier and more readily than those who earned less.
2a9
 Id. at 3.
290 The Importance of Preserving a Core of African Americans at the Most Prestigious Law
Schools, 26 J. 131.AcKs HIGHER Enuc. 22, 23 (Winter 1999/2000).
291
 See The Higher Education df the Nation's Leading Black Corporate Executives, 27 J. BLACKS
HIGHER Enuc. 78, 78 (Spring 2000).
292
 My information comes from a State Department official who requested anonymity.
572	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:521
students and alumni had been admitted by affirmative action.293 Re-
sponses, made on condition that their schools not be named, were,
for two schools, "enormous;" for one, about "70%;" for another, "vir-
tually all." One admissions officer scoffed at the '70% estimate by an-
other, remarking that the truth would be closer to 85% or more.
In sum, the social conditions in which African-Americans live are
unlike those any other group in American society has experienced
over time and across the land. While slavery and segregation were
their genesis, they have metamorphosed into symptoms without im-
mediate connection to the past. Many of these pathologies have taken
on lives of their own, replicating themselves over generations. There
is compelling national interest in changing these social conditions for
the better, in the interest of national productivity, relationships within
and between racial groups, justice in distributing the goods of society,
status within it, and quality of life for all of us.
2. Diversity
Diversity improves education. The study of history, art, literature,
sociology, psychology, politics, philosophy, law, medicine, and many
other subjects thrives on discussion, in and out of class. Without
schoolmates of diverse experience and viewpoints, including African-
Americans, students would miss an essential part of their education.
For that reason, "[v]irtually all selective colleges and professional
schools have continued to consider race in admitting students."294
 Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
quotes the President of Princeton University: "[A] great deal of learn-
ing occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among students
293 1 received e-mail on January 25 and 26, 2002. The following is an edited extract
from one of those confidential e-mails;
A "Career Ambassador" is the highest rank in the Foreign Service and equates
to a four star general. There are nine blacks serving as ambassadors, only one
is a political appointee, who is serving in Trinidad and is a Yale grad. Of the
eight career Foreign Service Officers, six attended selective schools; (U.S.C.,
DePauw, Syracuse, Brown, Tufts and UCLA). The other two attended Virginia
State 1968 and Western College for Women in Ohio that same year. They may
or may not have had much choice when entering college in 1964. There
are five blacks who are Ambassador-designates and must be confirmed by the
Senate. All are career officers. Four went to Penn, Harvard, UCLA and
Hampton (then Ohio U. for grad school). The fifth attended Emory Univer-
sity in Atlanta and graduated second in his class.
' 1;14 BOWF.N & Box, supra note 41, at 8.
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tit 1w tb .4-Ne.: I If dilkl elll litre, religions, and backgrounds... ."295
irmit ell cited I larval (I .% admissir ins criteria, which includes ad-
mitting students hares diverse backgrounds, including minorities. 296
The law has long recognized that students learn from their
classmates as well as from faculty, and that relationships developed in
school provide opportunities after graduation. Over fifty years ago, in
Sweatt v. Painter, which held unconstitutional the exclusion of the
black petitioner from the then all-white University of Texas, the Su-
preme Court recognized the value of diversity for education and be-
yond graduation. 297
 According to the Court:
Few students and no one who has practiced law would
choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the
law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to
admit petitioner excludes from its student body members of
the racial groups which number 85 percent of the popula-
tion of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses,
jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the
Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of
society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education of-
fered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would
receive if admitted to the University of Texas law schoo1. 299
Recently, in the context of prohibiting the exclusion of women from
the Virginia Military Institute, the Court returned to the insights of
Sweatt, adverting to the "faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni
support and influence" at VMI, from which women had been ex-
cluded. 299
The Association of American Universities has issued a unanimous
statement asserting that "our students benefit significantly from edu-
cation that takes place within a diverse setting. . . . [They] learn from
others who have backgrounds and characteristics very different from
their own.... [T] he value of such encounters will become more im-
"2 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
296 See id. at 316-17.
"7 See 399 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950); see also McLaurin v. Oklahoma St. Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
"8 Sweatt, 399 U.S. at 634.
299 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996).
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portant, not less, than in the past.”3" Bowen and Bok have written,
"[T]here is no mistaking the predominantly favorable impression that
students of all races share about the value of diversity in contributing
to their education: 1m
Diversity obviously is important in law school, sociology, and
other humanities and social sciences. Is it useful for those who study
mathematics, physics, and hard sciences? Students of those subjects
do not confine their academic programs to so narrow a curriculum.
Most colleges have distribution requirements designed to provide a
broad liberal education to all students. Students in these classes in-
clude science majors. Students typically do not declare a major until
halfway through college and commonly change interests and enroll in
new subjects. Whatever their specialty or major, they do not live in
separate compartments. They interact across a campus and its institu-
tions.
Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom attack the diversity argument by
charging that the relationship between black affirmative action stu-
dents and white students is charged with animosity. 3D2 But, they also
form interracial friendships and interact with other students, certainly
more than if they were not at the same school. Opponents of affirma-
tive action might argue that the small number of blacks admitted
without affirmative action can provide enough diversity. As in Califor-
nia, however, following the prohibition of affirmative action, schools
without a critical mass of black enrollments will have a hard time get-
ting black applicants. 903
 Absent racial preferences in admissions, thou-
sands of African-Americans at the nation's highest-ranked graduate
schools would be forced to matriculate at second or third tier
schools."4
How much diversity is necessary for effective higher education?
Experienced faculty and deans must make that decision for their own
schools. Their consensus has been that 2% is not enough. Black rep-
resentation in the freshman classes at most selective universities
ranges from approximately 4% (e.g., Cornell) to about 10% (e.g.,
300
 Association of American Universities, Diversity Statement: On the Importance of
Diversity in University Admissions, Sept. 14, 1997, at http://www.aau.edu/issues/Di-
versity4.14.97.1itml (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
3" BOWEN & BOK, supra note 41, at 254.
3°2 THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 171, at 386-88.
3°3 See infra app. B, tbls.1-4.
3" What Would Happen If the Nation's Most Selective Private Universities Were Required to
Abandon Affirmative Action Admissions?, 28 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 6, 6 (Summer 2000).
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Duke and Columbia)." Most such schools range between 6% and
9%.306
Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom reject the diversity justifica-
tion." They argue that diversity, as understood before Bakke, referred
to individual characteristics, like being a musician, football player, or
physicist." But, Justice Powell referred to geographical origin as an
example of diversity, as the Thernstroms acknowledge." It is difficult
to think of why one kind of diversity should be treated differently
from another.
Diversity for some is an emotionally unsatisfying justification. It
meets needs of academe, but says little about the broader needs of
blacks and whites and society as a whole.") It could be characterized,
or perhaps caricatured, as recognizing the right of a school to admit
blacks in order to benefit whites. Perhaps that should not matter, but
the condition that confronts us goes beyond the need for diverse
classes in selective schools. This is why some critics have recoiled from
the "elitist" nature of diversity justification." ) The social conditions or
closing the gap approach should appeal to everyone, including the
white majority, to support affirmative action in their own interest and
in the interest of justice for blacks. It posits that neither blacks nor
whites can live safe, comfortable lives unless the social conditions sur-
rounding blacks are greatly improved. Those who sit in judgment, as
judges or onlookers, have to balance compassion for the small num-
ber of rejected whites not merely against the claim of a black student
for reparations, but against the common weal.
3. Reparations and Societal Discrimination
There has been much discussion and controversy about repara-
tions in recent years. Some supporters of reparations have proposed
that they take the form of affirmative action, and some affirmative
action proponents have justified it as a form of reparations. In sup-
"5
 See The Progress of Black Student Matriculations at the Nation's Highest-Ranked Colleges
and Universities, 21 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 9,10 (Autumn 1998).
"6 See id.
307
 See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 171, at 415-16.
3°8 See id. at 415.
505 See id.
511) See Lawrence, supra note 202, at 940-41.
l See id. at 941,
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port of this view, affirmative action advocates have written books,'"
introduced legislation in Congress annually,'" filed suit,'19
 and
planned further litigation.515
Today's campaign for reparations inay be traced at least as far
back as 1969, when James Forman, a leader of the Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), arose during Sunday
morning service at Riverside Church in New York City to read a mani-
festo demanding that America's churches and synagogues pay $500
million as reparations to black people for "exploit[ation]," "bru-
tali[ty]," "kill[ings]," and "persecut[ion]."'" The demand for cash
reparations was consistent with the ordinary meaning ascribed to the
term.'" The dictionary defines reparations as, among other things,
"[c]ompensation for war damage owed by the aggressor."'" In this
sense, the claim for reparations resembles claims based on societal
discrimination and whatever may be said for or against the societal
discrimination justification of affirmative action in higher education
may be said about reparations (although this congruence is not nec-
essarily true for affirmative action of different kinds).
The best known contemporary reparations are those that Ger-
many paid Holocaust survivors.'" The United States has paid repara-
312 See, e.g., ELAZAR BARRAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000); RANDALL N. ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES
TO BLACKS (2000).
313
 See, e.g., H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999) (Commission to Study Reparation Proposals
for African-Americans Act); see also Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own
Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 677 (1999).
314 See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.Sd 1103, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1995). In March,
2002, a suit seeking compensation from United States companies for allegedly profiting
from the slave trade was filed in a New York federal court. Robert F. Worth, Companies Are
Sued for Slave Reparations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at B2.
313 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Litigating the Legacy of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002,
at wk 9. See generallyJeffrey Ghannam, Repairing the Past., 86 A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at 38.
316
 BORIS BITTKER, CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 4 (1973).
317
 Id. at 17 .
318
 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989).
311/ Germany, following World War I, paid reparations to the Allies; during recent years,
it has paid reparations to individual victims of the holocaust and to Israel. See, e.g., Michael
J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century
Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 372 (2000) (describing staggering post-war repara-
tions); Jennifer Peter, Germany Pays Nazis' Wartime Slave $4,454 in Reparations. %Vic.tirrA
EAGLE, Feb. 24, 2002, at 6A (noting the German reparations program uhittimelv will dis-
tribute $5 billion to holocaust survivors). SiMilarly, WaV ILA% dal 0011 III 11.51
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tions to Japanese-Americans, who were interned during World War
11. 32° These and other reparations payments typify what the word has
come to mean. Neither paid reparations to remote descendants of
victims."' If the question of reparations had arisen not long after the
Civil War, there would not have been much of a moral question about
whether the former slaves themselves deserved "back pay." Indeed,
immediately following the War, Congress enacted legislation that did
give the former slaves some economic support that in a sense consti-
tuted reparations.522 But, the term has come to be used expansively, to
include the demand for compensation to African-Americans for slav-
ery and its sequelae. For generations, African-Americans worked for
slave owners without pay. This was not merely free labor for the own-
ers. The arrangement was mandated by the law of slavery. Today, eve-
ryday moral standards dictate that upon the end of slavery recom-
pense was due. If former slaves had demanded what today would be
called "back pay" from the slaveholders, they would have objected on
the ground that slavery was legal: It does not take a fine moral sensi-
bility to reject that objection, although courts of that time might have
taken more of a positivist view.
Boris Bittker rejected the argument that blacks were not entitled
to reparations because innumerable groups throughout history also
have been enslaved. He wrote that while there is "merit in the argu-
ment that the Americans of today, who would have to pay the bill, are
no more responsible for ante-bellum slavery in the South than for
serfdom in pre-1861 Czarist Russia," emancipation was not followed
by a century of equality.323 Instead, there was "a mere decade of falter-
impressed into prostitution during the Second World War. Margaret Stetz, Comfort Women's
Due, N.Y. Timm, June 2, 1998, at A22.
520 The United States has made reparations payments of $20,000 to Japanese-
Americans and $5000 to Latin-Americans of Japanese descent who were interned in relo-
cation centers during the Second World War. U.S. Will Pay Reparations to Former Latin Ameri-
can Internees, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1998, at A19; see also Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
103 (1988) (codified as 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b).
521 Under German law, for example, compensation for slave labor will be paid to heirs
of persecutees who died after February 16, 1999 only if they are the spouse, child, grand-
child, sibling or testamentary heir of the persecutee. See Claims Conference on Jewish
Material Claims Against Germany, Slave and Forced Labor Compensation, Am I Eligible?
available at http://www.claimscon.orgicompensation/eligibility.asp (last visited May 3,
2002).
3$4 Justice Marshall summarized some of this legislation in his opinion in Bakke. See 438
U.S. at 390-91 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that Congress passed the Reconstruction
Acts and the Civil Rights Act, and established the Freedman's Bureau in response to
southern states' attempt to re-enslave blacks).
BrrntER, supra note 316, at 12.
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ing progress, repeatedly checked by violence.”324 Reconstruction and
the segregation, inequality, and violence that followed were "suc-
ceeded by a caste system embodying white supremacy. " 325
Conventional reparations usually have taken the form of money.
But, almost a century-and-a-half has passed since abolition. There are
obstacles to identifying who should pay the reparations and who
should receive them. The former slaves married and had children. It
will not be simple to identify the ancestors of today's claimants. For-
mer slaves and their descendants moved about the country, making
them difficult to identify retrospectively; Some children had a parent
who was not black, some had a parent who had not been a slave.
Some families or individuals may have passed for white for genera-
tions. Immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa, whose ancestors
were never slaves, or were not slaves under United States law, and
their descendants, are numerous and indistinguishable from Ameri-
can-born blacks. Some, like Secretary of State Colin Powell, have
achieved success and it might be argued that the society has rewarded
them adequately.
It is not likely that records will give information about relation-
ships adequate for making aludgment about inheritance. Entitlement
might have to be traced back through perhaps five generations. A few
of the former slaves and their descendants may have had wills. Most of
the ancestors of today's claimants, however, probably died without
wills and estates would have been passed down, generation to genera-
tion, under state laws that differ from state to state. In these circum-
stances, a large number of slave descendants would not be able to es-
tablish their claims. Nevertheless, it should be possible to identify at
least some descendants of slaves who were owed compensation for
labor and mistreatment and who can be traced from that time to the
present.
Cash payments to descendants of slaves as reparations, however,
would not be a practical way to proceed without difficulty, unfairness,
and resentment. Most blacks and most descendants would not be able
to establish entitlement. But, social policies designed to help African-
Americans overcome the legacy of slavery could be an appropriate
way of making compensation. One such social policy might be af-
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that the public perceives affirmative action as reparation. "926
 That
would not be too great a leap. Although today's campaign for repara-
tions began with James Forman's demand for money, 327
 programs and
institutions could be employed as substitutes. Affirmative action is one
of those programs and institutions.
The problem is that affirmative action in higher education is un-
like other programs that pay money or invest in the community. Or-
dinarily, money reparations are paid by a state or city or country. The
government obtains the funds for paying reparations by taxing every-
one a relatively small amount. The cost of affirmative action, in con-
trast, is paid by white or Asian students, sometimes referred to as "in-
nocents," whose applications are rejected to make places available for
minority applicants.
The objection to innocents being required to pay reparations,
particularly to minorities who suffered no harm, has become central
to the affirmative action opposition 5Y 8
 It is prominent in all anti-
affirmative action writing. Although proportionately their numbers
are small, the plight of innocents appears in one judicial opinion after
another.3"
In view of the impediments to identifying who is entitled to them,
and potential conflict arising from the effort, it is unlikely that there
will be money reparations. The recent reparations suit filed against
businesses said to have profited from slavery and the wide ranging
reparations suits that are being planned implicitly confirm this as-
sessment. The plaintiffs are not seeking damages for individuals.
Rather, as Charles. Ogletree, a lawyer for reparations claimants put it,
"[T] he reparations movement must ... focus on the poorest of the
poor—it must finance social recovery for the bottom-stuck, providing
an opportunity to address comprehensively the problems of those
who have not substantially benefited from integration or affirmative
action. "990
 But, affirmative action in higher education probably will
346
	 supra note 312, at 294.
327
 See Adolph L. Reed, Jr., The Case Against Reparations, PROGRESSIVE, Dec. 2000, avail-
able at lotp://www.progressive.org/reed/200.htm
 (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
343 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 270 (1995) (Souter, Breyer,
Ginsburg, ji., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276, 281, 282
(1986) (Powell, J., plurality); id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 311 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J.).
3" See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270 (Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, B.. dissenting); 1451gant, 476
U.S. at 276, 281, 282 (Powell, J., plurality); id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 311
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J.).
330 Ogletree, supra note 315, at wk.9; Worth, supra note 314, at B2.
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continue, although unlikely to be called "reparations." Notwithstand-
ing the problems it presents, the reparations argument has had an
effect. It has focused attention on the condition of African-Americans
today and the origins of those conditions. It has alerted society that
something must be done to respond. The reparations argument fuels
other arguments, even when there may be no straightforward logical
connection.
B. Arguments Against Affirmative Action
1. Principle
The first argument in opposition to affirmative action is based on
a priori moral considerations. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example,
has written: "I believe that there is a 'moral [and] constitutional
equivalence' ... between laws designed to subjugate a race and those
that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some
current notion of equality "331
 This sometimes is expressed as a consti-
tutional prohibition: "equal protection" forbids taking race into ac-
count for any purpose, or quoting Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson,
"[O]ur Constitution is color blind." 332
 Originating in natural law or
morality, the belief is deeply felt and cannot be proved or disproved,
like the opinion some have about the death penalty or abortion.
Those who hold it feel passionately. There is no point in trying to per-
suade them otherwise. Justices Thomas and Scalia, for example, be-
lieve that affirmative action is harmful, and neither would find it ac-
ceptable even if they thought the results were good." 5
A variant of principled opposition is the argument that affirma-
tive action is erroneously based upon a theory of "group rights,"
whereas the constitutional right of equal protection is individual and
affords no relief to anyone who has not suffered personal injury.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240.
332
 163 U.S. 537,559 (1896) (Harland., dissenting). There is a question about how far
this commitment to color-blindness goes. Some affirmative action opponents advocate
recruiting the most academically accomplished black students. THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK
EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES 133-34 (1972). But why encourage blacks to go to
college and not whites? Absolutists would outlaw scholarships limited to blacks and, in-
deed, in Fodberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit court so held. Despite Podberesky, race-targeted scholarship
programs are commonplace; to abolish them would further deplete black presence at
some schools.
5" See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 240 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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%%Atm et the gum', tight-individual right dichotomy may mean in
4.11u.1 4 ostirxts. the labels decide nothing because individual rights
I 'hen e t enact as group rights and vice versa. Much civil rights law
readily may be characterized as involving group rights because it deals
with treatment based on group membership. For example, Justice
O'Connor, in City of Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., wrote of discrimina-
tion against groups and indicated that the government is not disabled
from acting against it. 534 Similarly, in an employment discrimination
case, the plaintiff complained of discrimination because of member-
ship in a group. 333 When there has been a finding of discrimination
against an individual because of membership in a group, relief some-
times has been awarded not merely to the adjudicated victim but to
members of the victim's group, some of whom may not have demon-
strated that they personally suffered any discrimination. 336
The Supreme Court explicitly has recognized "group rights." Wis-
consin v. Yoder allowed Amish families to keep their children out of
school once they had attained a certain age. 337 Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez upheld Native American tribal law against a woman who pro-
tested that her group, an Indian tribe, imposed patrilineal kinship
rules that limited marital choice and her relationship with her chil-
dren.338 Although Supreme Court free speech jurisprudence is now to
the contrary,333 Beauharnais v. Illinois, which upheld the state's group
libel law,34° has not been overruled. 341 There may be enhanced pun-
ishment for hate crimes to furnish enhanced protection for those who
have been victimized because they belong to a group. 342 The "group
rights" objection, if accepted, appears to mean only that affirmative
action must be justified in the face of an equal protection claim under
the bright light of strict scrutiny. 343 That burden is on proponents of
affirmative action anyway, no matter whether the right is called
"group" or "individual."
334 See 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
3" See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
3" See id. at 167.
337 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1994).
338 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978).
339 See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953, 953 (1978) (Blackmun Rehnquist, 11., dissenting
from denial of stay) (Court effectively upholding lower court's determination that Skokie,
Illinois ordinances would unconstitutionally bar a Nazi march).
348
 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
341 Smith, 436 U.S. at 953 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, B., dissenting).
se See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993).
343 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
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2. Merit
Opponents often say that affirmative action devalues "merit,"
which they believe is manifested by standardized test scores. This is
just another way of saying that a student with high scores deserves
admission. The tests, however, have limitations, and other considera-
tions often influence deciding who deserves admission, including the
applicant's potential for fundraising, found among legacies and chil-
dren of the rich and famous; the university's sense of social justice;
and the university's goal of adding diversity to the classroom for edu-
cational purposes.MS All the selective institutions under attack for af-
firmative action choose students by taking into account such factors,
but reject others who are just as qualified, admitting some white stu-
dents with scores on the SAT and similar tests lower than those of
many other white admits. 346
Everyone who has been admitted merited admission by some
standard. Merit has many meanings; it may identify someone who is
not an excellent student, but needs the education and can make good
use of it.347
 Proponents of affirmative action argue that minority ap-
plicants are meritorious as well. They say that a black student merits
reparations, or a better chance, or that all students merit diversity in
their classrooms, or that the black student who has surmounted the
obstacles of the ghetto merits admission over the higher scoring non-
black who is privileged and attended superior elementary and high
schools. To argue merit merely returns us to the fundamental issues
in the debate.
3. Stereotypes and Stigma
Critics claim that affirmative action stigmatizes minorities and
stereotypes them by creating the general opinion that affirmative ac-
tion admits will not be as good students as whites. They argue that it
344 See BOWEN & Bolt, supra note 41, at 276-78.
343 See supra Partl.C.
' 443 See supra Partl.C.
347 See CHARLES L. LAWRENCE HE & MARI MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK 101 (1997)
("[Plrivilege should not trump merit, and merit should include the talents of those with-
out privilege.... A good affirmative action plan broadens the definition of qualification,
expanding the pool of talent available for any given opportunity.").
343 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Strauder may be the first case in
which stigma and stereotype were a basis for decision. The Court wrote:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, be-
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encourages the public to have a low opinion even about blacks who
were admitted on the basis of grades and scores alone and causes
black students to hold the same stereotyped view of themselves. 343
How do the critics know this? Supreme Court justices and laymen
alike, without evidence, have not hesitated to talk about stereotyping
and stigma, although some hedge their claims, possibly because they
are not so sure. For example, justice Stevens has written that affirma-
tive action "is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that
those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in
some respect, that is, identified purely by their race."350 justice Powell
wrote in Bakke that "preferential programs may only reinforce com-
mon stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve
success without special protection based on a factor having no rela-
tionship to individual worth."351 Justice Thomas has written that
" [t] hese programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and
may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that
they are 'entitled' to preferences."352 Note the qualifying words: "per-
ceived by many" (Stevens), "may only reinforce" (Powell), "may cause
them to develop" (Thomas). None of those who focus on stigma dis-
cuss the stigma that would attach to blacks if none, or very few, were
accepted.
Looking at the stereotype/stigma concept from the perspective
of the beneficiaries of affirmative action, as well as those who observe
them, there is little or no empirical support for any conclusion. More
important, the stereotype/stigma argument assumes that the percep-
tion or the stigmata do their harm in a dine frame that is unrealisti-
cause of their color, ... [is] practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is
an impediment to securing to individuals of the race ... [equal justice].
Id. at 308. The concept of stigma in the affirmative action context uses the term to refer to
blacks who are benefiting from the programs, unlike &raider where blacks were excluded
from juries.
349 See Tracy v. Bd. of Regents, 59 F. Stipp. 2d 1319, 1323 (1999) (concerning the Uni-
versity of Georgia affirmative action program). The court wrote: "AUCA [University of
Georgia] is willing to stigmatize its non-white students for the sake of a largely symbolic
racial preference." Id. Sometimes the term "stigma" is used to suggest that rejected whites
have been stigmatized. But while excluded whites may feel indignant and that rejection
was unfair, they are not likely to feel or be perceived as unworthy.
35°
 Fullilove v, Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"l Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of the Affirmative Ac-
tion Debate, 22 Onto N.U. L. REV. 1159, 1175-76 (1996) (presenting a number of argu-
ments against affirmative action).
352 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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cally short. Affirmative action students usually graduate and become
successful doctors, lawyers, business managers, or other profession-
als.555
 Even if they felt stigmatized or stereotyped (and there has been
no evidence as to whether many or few feel that way), the prospect of
entering into satisfying careers would seem to more than compensate
for feelings of unworthiness, if any. 354
 If that were not so, the stigma-
tized/stereotyped students would decline admission. They know,
however, that following graduation, with higher status and income to
match, they are likely to feel good. That many black students continue
to apply to selective schools demonstrates either that they do not be-
lieve they will be stigmatized if admitted or that they merit admission
no matter what the test score says, or that it is worth the obloquy, if
any, because life will be much better later. Furthermore, once the af-
firmative action graduates are in school or on their . jobs, they cannot
avoid being evaluated by their performance, no matter how they are
assessed by others while they are in school.
Anecdotal evidence supports the conclusion that stigma and
stereotype do not deter blacks from achievement. In his book, Reflec-
tions of an Affirmative Action Baby, Stephen Carter, a law professor at
Yale, writes that "the chances are good that I was admitted at Yale for
essentially the same reason I was admitted at Harvard—the color of
my skin made up for what were evidently considered other deficien-
cies in my academic record." 55
 He also attributes his appointment to
the Yale faculty to his being black."6
 Yet he disapproves of affirmative
action and its potential for stereotyping and stig-matizing. 357 At the
same time, he has earned distinction and had a successful career as a
law teacher and scholar. Whatever discomfort he may have suffered
probably is far outweighed by the satisfaction he, his students, and
others have obtained because he was educated at Harvard and Yale.
Moreover, one study has demonstrated that black medical school
graduates admitted by affirmative action, despite relatively low scores,
have developed careers remarkably similar to those of whites who had
353
 See BowEr,t & BOK, supra note 41, at 118-55.
.3.." See What about the Charge that Affirmative Action Reinforces a Sense of Group Inferiority?,
18 J. BLACKS HIGHER Eouc. 20, 20 (Winter 1997/1998) ("Ask a Harvard Law School
graduate who was admitted under affirmative action if, as a result of this advantage, he or
she was psychologically damaged or hurt or handicapped in his or her later practice of
law.").
355
 STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 16-17 (1991).
356 Id. at 62-64.
357 1d. at 62, 69.
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higher scores. 558
 It is hard to imagine that any of them regret the help
they obtained from the preferential treatment they received.
In any event, there are no studies linking the effects of affirma-
tive action in university admissions to stigma and stereotype. 359 In
1997, the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology pub-
lished a review of all of the scientific literature on psychological impli-
cations of affirmative action, covering stigma, stereotyping, and back-
lash. 38° The report concluded that "help is likely to have detrimental
555 In October 1997, the Journal of the American Medical Association published a study of
twenty years of affirmative action at the University of California at Davis Medical School.
See Robert L. Davidson & Ernst L. Lewis, Affirmative Action and Other Special Consideration
Admissions at the University of Calfornia, Davis, School of Medicine, 278 ,LAMA 1153, 1153
(1997). In summary, regular admission students had higher grades; there was no differ-
ence in failure rates of core courses. Id. at 1153. Regular admission students had higher
scores on the National Board of Medical Examiners examination, and were less likely to
repeat the examination to receive a passing grade. Id. Following graduation, the experi-
ence of both groups was similar, including completion and evaluation of residency train-
ing. Id. Both populations selected primary care disciplines at the same rate and had re-
markably similar practice characteristics. Id.
559 There are studies of affirmative action in employment of women and in contexts
other than admissions. An example is George Lowenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source
Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157 (1999). The article
reports on a study conducted in a typical manner: experimenters distributed mugs to stu-
dents who had received top grades in a class exercise. Half the students were told they
received a mug due to their performance, half were told mugs were distributed randomly.
The first group valued the mugs more highly. The implication is that those who were ad-
mitted on the same basis as whites would value their admission more highly. See id. at 157—
61, 165-67.
360 See DAVID A. KRAVITZ ET AL., THE SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL ANt) ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEIIAVIORAL RE-
SEARCH (1997), available at littp://www.siop.org/AffirmAct/siopsaartoc.lititil  (last visited
Mar. 19, 2002). Kravitz determined that confident assertions about stereotype and stigma
that favor or oppose affirmative action have little scientific support: "f0Jpinion polls re-
sults revealed that White Americans strongly support equality and the elimination of dis-
crimination, but oppose preferential treatment. Reactions to compensatory actions are less
clear. Polls of Black Americans revealed somewhat higher support for preferential treat-
ment, but a clear preference for equal opportunity." Id. at 12. Experimental data, using
undergraduates as respondents, led to a conclusion that "Where is greater support for the
principle of equal opportunity than for the principle of affirmative action. Evaluations ...
of affirmative action are strongly influenced by actual or presumed AAP [affirmative ac-
tion program] structure; they are inversely related to the weighting of demographic status
in decision making." Id. at 16. "[I]ndividuals do think about affirmative action in terms of
fairness." Id. at 17. "Programs directed at Blacks or minorities are viewed less positively by
Whites than programs directed at women or the handicapped. Reasons for this difference
are unclear." Id. at 25. "Blacks clearly feel more positively about AAPs in general than do
Whites, though the size of this difference depends on details of the AAP." Id. at 32.
"[W]omen generally have more positive attitudes than men." Id. "Neff report measures of
racism are positively associated with opposition to affirmative action targeted at racial mi-
norities." Id. "tBlacklash exists when the individual resents the fact that others have re-
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effects on a recipient's self-esteem or perceptions of competence only
to the extent that the recipient harbors doubts or uncertainties about
his or her relative competence in the domain in which the help oc-
curs."361
This survey of what purports to be all the relevant literature con-
cludes with an unedifying observation:
[A]ffirmative action programs may have positive, negative,
or both positive and negative consequences for recipi-
ents. . . . However, few studies have been conducted on this
topic. . . . Finally, virtually none of this research has dealt
with reactions of racial minorities to race-based selection
procedures, and there is a clear need for such research. 362
A section of the survey dealing with "effects on non-target groups"
(i.e., persons not the beneficiaries of affirmative action) is equally in-
conclusive: "This stigmatization may be eliminated by providing clear
and compelling evidence of the woman or minority member's compe-
tence.“363 In another section, the author reports: "[A] s with any other
organizational change effort, the consequences of the intervention
ceived positive outcomes. With few exceptions . , backlash has been ignored in the af-
firmative action literature." Id. at 37. IA) ttitudes toward affirmative action seem to be
positively associated with having experienced discrimination and having worked at an or-
ganization with an AAP, at least if the AAP resulted in positive experiences." Id. at 40-41.
There is one doctoral dissertation, published subsequent to the survey, that addresses
how beneficiaries of affirmative action in higher education view themselves. See Maudette
M. Jackson, Reactions to Race-Based Preferential Selection (Apr. 1997) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the State University
of New York at Buffalo) (on file with author). "[T]he results showed no significant nega-
tive effects of selection based on solely race or a combination of both merit and race on
the psychological well-being of Blacks selected for a leadership position.... Overall these
results suggest that the negative effects of gender-based selection procedures found for
women do not apply to Blacks." Id. at 26-28. The author acknowledges that the study was
conducted in laboratory settings with college students as subjects, limiting its "gener-
alizability." Id. She writes that "given that this is the first race-based preferential selection
experimental study, additional research is essential." Id. at 29.
361 Monica F.. Schneider et al., Social Stigma and the Potential Costs of Assumptive Help, 22
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 201, 208 (1996). Another study concludes that
laJlthough several psychological theories predict that members of stigmatized groups
should have low global self-esteem, empirical research typically does not support this pre-
diction." Jennifer Crocker & Brenda Major, Social Stigma and Sep' Esteem: The Self-Protective
Properties of Stigma, 96 PsvcnoL. REV. 608, 608 (1989).
"2
 KRAVITZ, SUM note 360, at 53.
3°3 Id. at 44. A Gallup poll asked employed blacks and employed white women whether
they had ever felt that others questioned their abilities because of affirmative action. Paula
fL Skedsvold & Tammy L. Mann, The Affirmative Action Debate: What's Fair in Policy and Pro-
grams?, 52 J. Soc. ISSUES 25, 25-31 (1996).
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depend heavily on the specific characteristics of its implementa-
tion."364
In an article that is much more comprehensive than I have been
here, Linda Hamilton Krieger finds the evidence to be inconclu-
sive.365 She observes, as did the Society for Industrial and Organiza-
tional Psychology, that virtually no studies deal with affirmative action
for African Americans in higher education. 3  Assessing whatever ma-
terial exists, she concludes that generalizations about stigma and
stereotype are not very useful. 367
To extrapolate from the foregoing studies of affirmative action
for women in employment and the slight research into racial factors,
we could conclude that affirmative action leads some people, without
knowing how many or their personal characteristics, to hold stereo-
typed views of beneficiaries of affirmative action that stigmatize them.
Some beneficiaries share the same feelings. But, among both groups,
such views often yield to evidence of competence, allowing the af-
firmative action beneficiaries to be . judged, or to evaluate themselves,
on their individual qualities. In other words, the research provides no
basis for taking a position for or against affirmative action.
4. Backlash
"Backlash" is defined as "a strong adverse reaction. " 368 In Reaching
Beyond Race, Paul M. Sniderrnan and Edward G. Carmines discuss
polls and experiments that test attitudes towards affirmative action. 369
They report overwhelming oppdsition when it is defined as preferen-
tial treatment in college admissidns, but support for "making an extra
364 KRAVITZ, supra note 360, at 53.
so See generally Linda Hamilton Kriegel-, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998).
366 "[M] ost research on the self-derogating effects of affirmative action has focused on
gender preference. Little empirical evidence has been done on the effects of preferential
selection on minority self evaluation." Id. at 1259.
367 "Studies have demonstrated that the self-denigrating effects of affirmative action
are highly sensitive to contextual variables and, under certain conditions, disappear en-
tirely." Jackson, supra note 360, at 1261. Jackson continues: "Taken as a whole, social cogni- .
tion, procedural justice, and social, identity theory can be used either to oppose or support
preferential forms of affirmative action. But even if it were possible to determine whether
the cost of preferences outweighed their benefits, such an exercise would hardly be
worthwhile if it could be shown that, absent affirmative action, remaining policy tools were
inadequate." Id. at 1276.
S68 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1977).
369 See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD 6. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE (1997).
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effort to ensure fair consideration of black.s." 378 They write that the
opposition has not waned over the years, 371 that it exists also in Great
Britain,372
 and that affirmative action stimulates race preiudice. 373
We need go no further than referenda that show a large propor-
tion of whites, probably always a majority, opposing affirmative action,
with the degree of opposition depending on how the questions are
phrased. According to one study:
It is clear that white adults do not favor preferences, quotas,
or economic aid for blacks when these questions are gener-
ally phrased. . . When survey questions have described pro-
grams specifically so that respondents understand clearly
what is being asked and they have provided sufficient justifi-
cation for the policy, opinion has proved to be more moder-
ate. 374
In November 1996, 63% of Californian whites, 26% of blacks, 24% of
Latinos, and 39% of Asians voted in favor of Proposition 209, which
would prohibit a wide range of affirmative action programs, including
those in state universities. 375 Voters in Houston, on the other hand,
rejected a proposition that would have prohibited affirmative ac-
tion.376
 Nevertheless, the opposition was considerable, and the results
of the Houston election were litigated over the language of the refer-
endum. 377 Finally, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the city's
wording of the proposed amendment—the subject of the referen-
dum—was adequate and not misleading. 378
Rickshawn Adkins writes that "[c]urrently, polls ostensibly con-
ducted in order to gauge public opinion on affirmative action do not
ask the specific kinds of questions that would allow a complete picture
of support and opposition to various policies to emerge." The causes
3" Id. at 25.
"'Id. at 28, 30.
372 Id. at 32.
373 Id. at 39.
374 Charlotte Steeh & Mariah Krysan, Polls Rends, Affirmative Action and the Public,
1970-1975, 60 Pus. OPINION 128, 140 (Spring 1996).
375 See Elections '96 State Propositions: A Snapshot of Voters, L.A. Tiais, Nov. 7, 1996, at
A29.
375 See Julie Mason, City's Affirmative Action Plan Gains Support, Polls Says, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 5, 1999, at A17.
377 See Mason, supra note 376, at Al 7 (public opinion poll shows 54% in favor, 46% op-
posed); Ron Nissimov, Affirmative Action Case Will Be Heard, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5,
1999, at A29.
378 Brown v. Blum, 9 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 1999).
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of confusion "include definitional and contextual ambiguities and
issue-framing and questionable wording concerns. "579
Some formulations (e.g. "affirmative action," "racial job prefer-
ence," "racial quotas," "preference to make up for past discrimina-
tion") evoke higher levels of support for affirmative action than oth-
ers. Nevertheless, in all polls opponents of the programs either
outnumber supporters substantially or register a high level of opposi-
tion. 588
 The white reaction exists, notwithstanding that only a very
small fraction of white applicants are rejected by selective colleges be-
cause of affirmative action. After examining admissions at five highly
selective schools, Bowen and Bok concluded that "even if white stu-
dents filled all the places created by reducing black enrollment, the
overall white probability of admission would rise by only one and one-
half percentage points; from 25% to roughly 26.5%."381 They compare'
resentment against affirmative action programs to that against park-
ing spaces reserved for handicapped drivers:
Eliminating the reserved space would have only a minuscule
effect on parking options for non-disabled drivers. But the
sight of the open space will frustrate many passing motorists
who are looking for a space. Many are likely to believe that
they would now be parked if the space were not reserved. 382
If this were widely understood, would it persuade the opposition?
I doubt it. Possibly, opposition would be diminished if it were more
widely understood that whites rejected at their first-choice schools
went on to attend different schools of the same quality. Affirmative
action also might be more acceptable if schools were to increase class
size by a number equal to the number of affirmative action admits, as
California will be doing in 2002 or 2003.3" This would make it possi-
ble to admit students who would have been admitted had there been
no affirmative action.
379 Ricshawn Adkins, Affirmative Action and Public Opinion Polls, in RACE VERSUS CLASS,
"HE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 102-03 (1996).
330 M.A. Aubin, Race Issues in the United States Based on National Public Opinion Polls, in
BLACK AMERICANS! ISSUES AND CONCERNS (N. N. Rachveli ed., 1994).
381 BOWEN & Box, supra note 41, at 36.
582 Id. at 36-37 (quoting Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admis-
sions, in MST SCORE GAP, supra note 22, at 453).
583 Id, at 66.
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5. Dropout Rate
Because the black dropout rate at selective institutions exceeds
the white rate, 384 some opponents argue that black students would be
better off at less selective schools. 383 But, Bowen and Bok report that
in a study of twenty-eight selective schools, "none had a dropout rate
for minority students anywhere near as high as the average attrition of
60% for black students at all NCAA Division I colleges, many of which
are not selective."386 They report that "the more selective the college
attended, the lower the black dropout rate." 387
Students drop out for reasons like financial or family problems,
academic difficulties, lack of interest, or changing interests. Dropping
out is not always undesirable. Although not typical of the reasons af-
firmative action students drop out, Bill Gates dropped out of Harvard,
one of my classmates dropped out of law school to get a graduate de-
gree in political science, and one of my students dropped out to study
wine making in Bordeaux. Some students drop out of one school and
go to another or return some years later. There are usually no records
of the extent to which this occurs. The more selective institutions
have greater capacity to address academic, family, and financial diffi-
culties to prevent dropping out due to those kinds of pressures.
6. African-Americans Do Not Need Affirmative Action More Than
Anyone Else
Oppressive social conditions, objectors argue, are just a rite of
passage through which other minorities have passed. justice Powell, in
Bakke, wrote that "the United States ha[s] become a Nation of minori-
ties."388 Powell's decision noted the struggles of other ethnic groups to
move up to parity with the successful majority. 389 Blacks can too, he
implied, without affirmative action. 39°
THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 171, at 408 tbl.9.
say
	
at 391-93. This is one of the Thernstroms' principal arguments against affirma-
tive action in higher education.
356 BOWEN & Box, supra note 41, at 258-59. The National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) monitors student athletes' academic performance to make sure that their
participation in sports is not at the expense of their schoolwork. As a consequence, al-
though the NCAA is not concerned about questions of race or affirmative action, it is the
keeper of dropout statistics.
387 Id.; see Racial Conservatives Are Still Replaying the Myth that Racial Preferences Cause High
Black Student College Dropout Rates, 321. BLACKS HIGHER EDuc. 12,12-13 (Summer 2001).
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Ir I ► L ► IIV a I	 Pal ing hlatks tit ()diet gimps, however, easily shows
that !wait e l'• nwell was wide of the mark. No other group in the
United State% has labored under the weight of the disabilities that Af-
rican-Americans suffer. A few words of historical perspective will aid
understanding.
Even today, after decades of black northward migration, most
African-Americans live in the South."' The badges of slavery persisted
in the law of every southern state, as well as in a few border and
northern ones (Kansas and Delaware were defendants in two of the
cases that constituted Brown v. Board of Education) for decades after
abolition. 392 Change came only in 1954 when the Supreme Court re-
jected segregation decisively,393 and in the 1960s when Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Acts. 394 Until then, black children in the South
attended separate and inferior elementary and high schools. State law
prohibited them from attending white undergraduate, graduate, and
professional schools until 1938, when the Supreme Court declared
the exclusion unconstitutional if the state was not providing blacks
with equal schools. 393 This decision was uniformly disobeyed until
1950 when the Supreme Court made the measure of equality so strin-
gent that it amounted to holding segregation in graduate and profes-
sional education unconstitutional. 396 Not until the late 1960s and
1970s did more than a few, but not many, southern blacks begin to
attend a few historically white professional schools and colleges, often
under affirmative action policies.
The economic opportunity that other groups enjoyed was also
denied blacks. In the Roosevelt years, the government initiated New
Deal social welfare programs, including social security, welfare, un-
employment insurance, labor, minimum wage, education, home own-
ership, and other programs that generated the prosperity America
391
 As of August 30, 2000, 18,683,698 blacks lived in the South out of a total national
black population of 34,862,169. At the end of the twentieth century, blacks were returning
to the South, producing a surge in that region's non-Hispanic black population. See gener-
ally WILLIAM H. FREY, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, MIGRATION TO THE SOUTH BRINGS
U.S. BLACKS FULL CIRCLE, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, available at
http://wwwprb ,org/Conten t/NavigationMenu/PLar ticles/Apriljune_2001/Migration_
to_the_South_Brings_U_S_Blacks_Full_Circle.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
392 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
393 See generally Brown, 347 U.S. at 483,
394 SeeCivil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000h-6 (1964).
395 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 344 (1938).
399 See MeLautin, 339 U.S. at 641-42; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629.
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enjoys today."7
 The proposals were framed in race neutral fashion,
but southern congressmen threatened to withhold support unless the
president excluded from coverage agricultural workers and domestic
servants, who were almost all black. 3" Moreover, southern legislators
insisted on local, not national, control over the laws' administration,
which discouraged black participation. 3" Where blacks were not ex-
cluded, unsympathetic and hostile administration of the laws discour-
aged them.
In the South, blacks were excluded from vocational training, col-
leges, and professional schools during the period that the G.I. Bill be-
gan paying for the education of World War II veterans. 400 Some voca-
tional training was conducted by private employers, who hired and
trained only whites. 4°1
 Vocational education prepared many southern
white veterans for well-paying industrial jobs. Most southern black
veterans had no more than a fifth grade education; 402
 vocational train-
ing would have been the best they could do. The utility of vocational
training that blacks could obtain, however, was minimal because al-
most all employers discriminated. 403
 For whites, college and profes-
sional school education was one of the foundation stones upon which
the prosperity of succeeding generations rested. 404
 Excluded from
white schools, blacks might have applied to black schools, but black
schools did not have enough room to admit all the veterans who ap-
397
 See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.G. §§ 151-169 (1994); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994) (examples of New Deal programs); see
also Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1994); Nat'l Housing
Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750g (1994) (creating FSLIC, FDIC, and the FHA).
"a A thoroughgoing discussion of the racial impact of the original Social Security, Un-
employment Insurance, and Aid to Dependent Children Acts is in ROBERT LIEBERMAN,
SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE (1998), and William Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship,
98 Mimi. L. REV. l (1999) (describing "social citizenship tradition," a majoritarian egalitar-
ian constitutional tradition). For discussion of unemployment insurance and loans, see
generally David H. Onkst, First A Negro . . . Incidentally a Veteran, 31.1. Soc. HIST. 517, 519(1998).
399
 Ira Katznelson et al, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950,108
Pot- Sct. Q. 283 (1993).




404 Cf. id. at 534 (noting that while blacks could not fully participate in the GI bill
program, "others received significant benefits").
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plied.405 By 1947, black colleges had turned away between 15,000 and
20,000 veterans because of limited resources and facilities. 4°6
The "greatest mass-based opportunity for wealth accumulation in
American history," investing in a home during the 1950s and later,
was also off limits to blacks. 4°7 The Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and the Veteran's Administration (VA), which administered
the mortgage insurance programs that made possible buying a home
at reasonable mortgage rates, explicitly refused to insure mortgages
for blacks in white neighborhoods. 408 Huge housing developments,
like Levittown, would not sell to blacks. 409 Nothing comparable was
built by or for blacks.'" They were tightly concentrated in the ghetto
where property values not only did not soar, but suffered in value be-
cause of the ambient social pathology. 411 In contrast, the value of
homes purchased under FHA-insured and VA-insured mortgage ar-
rangements has increased spectacularly and constitutes many families'
largest asset. 412
The rare black fortunate enough to enter a white college in 1970
at age eighteen graduated in 1974 or 1975. If she went on to graduate
school, she would have finished (to set an arbitrary, yet plausible
date) in 1980. Assuming she had ; a child in 1983, that child would be
of college age now. In other words, the children of the first, small co-
hort of blacks who had some access to the higher education available
to whites would just now be enrolling in college. These black appli-
cants are not far removed from the legally enforced segregation that
commenced in reaction to Reconstruction and ended, as a matter of
law, in 1950. Moreover, in practice, exclusion from white higher edu-
cation endured well into the 1960s. No other group has been afflicted
in this manner.
Another objection to affirmative action is that there is no way to
know when racial preferences, once introduced, should end. No af-
firmative action supporter argues, or should argue, for it to continue
indefinitely. International human rights treaties, which embody widely
accepted human rights standards, refer to affirmative action as
405 0111r.SI, supra note 398, at 529.
408 Id. at 530.
4" MELVIN L. OLIVER 8t THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH 18
(1995).
468
 Id. at 18, 39.
4" Id. at 18.
co Id.
4 " Id.
112 OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 407, at 51-52.
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"[s]pecial measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality"413 that
"shall not be continued after the objectives for which [they were]
taken have been achieved." The United States is a party to these
treaties, although it has hedged its adherence to human rights treaties
with so many reservations, declarations, and understandings that they
are virtually unenforceable.'" The time limitation in these agree-
ments nevertheless strongly suggests that affirmative action plans
should have sunset provisions. When the vestiges of the past are gone,
or no longer are a substantial barrier, affirmative action should no
longer be permitted.
To identify vestiges of discrimination is not a forbidding task. In
school segregation cases, courts now regularly decide whether vestiges
of segregation persist in order to decide whether a school system has
become unitary and should be relieved of a desegregation decree.'"
Similarly, courts can decide when affirmative action is no longer
needed: "Judges need not blind themselves to what they know as
men. "417
III. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE IS A
CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
A. Justice Powell's Opinion in Bakke Is the Holding
A chance to pass judgment on affirmative action in higher educa-
tion once more is on its way to the Supreme Court, 418 although the
Court may avoid reconsidering the constitutional question and decide
that the issue is controlled by stare decisis. The rule would then re-
main, as Justice Powell wrote in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, that a university in using affirmative action to admit minorities
is "seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the
413 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 17.
414 International Convention on the Elimination of AB Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
415 See id. (United States' ratification of the race convention). The United States is not
a party to the Discrimination Against Women Convention.
416 see, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
417
 Dillard v. Indus. Comm., 416 U.S. 783, 800 (1974) (Douglas, J.. dissenting).
418
 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Stipp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2004b, tog ueliii 811i1in4cAr x •
don policies at the University of Nlicliigan. uidtly Expet tell in Ica, It the Innpi rimy ,ntni
See Barbara Kantt ()vitt. Mid f the Chase, Coln olloro'l 	 1114 a I '. 0 i	 a .\ no, 'I
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fulfillment of its mission,"419 and that the "interest of diversity is com-
pelling in the context of a university's admissions program , "420 This ,
he determined, is an exercise of a university's First Amendment right
of academic freedom.421 At the same time, he wrote that the particular
program at the University of California at Davis was not constitutional:
It was not narrowly tailored because it used a quota (as he saw it, al-
though that has been disputed) and minority students were evaluated
in a discrete minority pool, not in comparison to whites.422
Four other Justices joined him in upholding affirmative action in
principle, while disagreeing with , his rejection of how it was used in
the Bakke case.425 That they did not discuss diversity is the basis of the
argument that they did not support his views about it. Another four
Justices dissented, but only dealt with the meaning of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act. 424Some believe that Justice Powell's opinion did not
state the holding of the case.425 But, as I shall explain below, I believe
it did.
Until recently, the most prominent challenge to Bakke had been
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's 1996 deci-
sion in Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwood 1). 426 It may now be that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's forthcoming decision in
the University of Michigan cases, if the Court reaches the merits, will
be the vehicle that brings the issue back to the Supreme . Court. But,
until the Sixth Circuit decides those cases, the issues will remain de-
fined by the University of Texas Hopwood case. There is no reason to
believe that the Sixth Circuit will introduce anything new into the de-
bate. Hopwood I states the case against Bakke as a precedent that up-
holds affirmative action. Hopwood I disapproved a University of Texas
School of Law affirmative action plan (no longer in effect at the time
of the decision) that closely resembled the plan the Supreme Court
had struck down in Bakke. 427 While Bakke disapproved of affirmative
419 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
42° Id.
421 Id. at 316.
422 Id. at 319-20.	 el
420 See id. at 324-408 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, & VVIiite4, concurring).
424 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412-21 (Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, B. & Burger, CJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
425 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (1996) [Hopwood I].
426 Id.
427 See id. at 936. The affirmative action plan at issue in Hopwood I had been suspended
in 1992 and replaced with a different plan by the dine the Court of Appeals decided the
case in 1996. See Hopwood v. Texas, 518 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1996) (internal citation omitted).
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action as used in the case then before it, not as a general proposition,
the Hopwood I court decided that cases following Bakke have held that
affirmative action is only justified when the state is remedying present
effects of past discrimination.428 Last December, however, a different
panel of the Fifth Circuit decided in Hopwood u Texas (Hopwood II)
that Hopwood I was wrong: Cases following Bakke did not ban all af-
firmative action.429
 Nonetheless, the Hopwood II court did agree with
Hopwood Ithat the plan under review was unconstitutional.43u
A recent United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
decision disapproved of an affirmative action plan at the University of
Georgia because in making admissions decisions, the school awarded
a fixed number of points to black students' scores, instead of consid-
ering the students individually against all other applicants. Like the
Hopwood I court, the Eleventh Circuit held that Justice Powell's opin-
ion was not the holding of the case.431
Hopwood I claimed that "Justice Powell's opinion garnered only
his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the
Court in Bakke or any other case."432 Therefore, it was not entitled to
respect as stare decisis. 433 The opinion observed that more recent af-
firmative action decisions had doomed affirmative action in educa-
Justices Ginsburg and Sauter, concurring in the denial of certiorari, gave this as a reason
for declining to review. Id.
428 Hopwood I, 78 F.3d at 948-49.
429
 Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256,275 (5th Cir. 2000) (Hopwood II) ("Although Bakke
clearly stands for the proposition that the government can use racial preferences under
some circumstances, no controlling rationale emerged from that opinion to delineate
precisely what those justifying circumstances are. Thus, in deciding whether the system of
racial preferences emphasized by the Law Schools was constitutional, the [Hopwood
panel was free to determine which among the competing rationales offered by the justices
in Bakke is constitutionally valid.").
43° Id. ("Although Justice Powell would surely have disagreed with [the Hopwood II
holding, we cannot say that [Hopwood 1] conflicts with any portion of Bakke that is binding
on this court.").
431 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001). Johnson discusses diversity
extensively and concludes that Justices Powell and Brennan agreed only that diversity is
important but did not agree that it is compelling. See id. at 1245-47. However, the opinion
does not "decide whether or when student body diversity may be a compelling interest
." Id. "It disapproves the plan because it was not narrowly tailored." Id. at 1237. Because
a fixed number of points were added to the Total Student Index (a measure used in mak-
ing admissions decisions) of minority students, the court held that the plan was not nar-
rowly tailored. See id. The university "must be prepared to shoulder the burden of fully and
fairly analyzing applicants as individuals and not merely as members of groups when decid-
ing their likely contribution to student body diversity." Id. at 1256.
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tion and elsewhere:04 Finally, the Hopwood I court argued that non-
remedial state interests could never justify racial classifications. 435
In asserting that Justice Powell's was a lone voice not deserving
respect as stare decisis, the Fifth Circuit panel made no reference to
Marks v. United States, which provided explicit guidelines for distilling
a rule from the opinions of a fragmented court. 436 "When a frag-
mented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five justices," wrote the majority in Marks,
"the holding may be viewed as that position taken by those members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. " 437 Over
the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court and lower courts many
times have accepted as binding a single Justice's opinion deemed
"narrower" than multi-author opinions. 438 Thus, it is not sufficient for
the Fifth Circuit merely to point out that no other Justices joined Jus-
tice Powell's opinion. Rather, the relevant inquiry concerns the nar-
rowest ground on which five Justices concurred.
Two views of Bakke are possible. On the one hand, as Justice
Brennan wrote, "We also agree with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan like
the 'Harvard' plan . . . is constitutional under our approach, at least
so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is ne-
cessitated by the lingering effec6 of past discrimination." 439 The Hop.
wood I court cited this sentence as evidence that a majority of the
Court rejected diversity as a basis for affirmative action. This "Harvard
footnote," however, is not the whole of Justice Brennan's opinion.
Another reading demonstrates that the "Brennan Four" approved di-
versity as one of a number of grounds upon which affirmative action
could be justified. This approval appears several times in Justice
Brennan's opinion and is consistent with his views expressed else-
434 See id. at 944-45.
4" Id. at 944.
438 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976).
497
	 at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
498
	 examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has accepted as binding a sin-
gle-justice opinion deemed narrower than multiple-justice opinions, see O'Dell v. Nether-
land, 521 U.S. 151, 160 (1997) ("Justice White concurred in the judgment, providing the
narrowest grounds of decision among the Justices whose votes were necessary to the judg-
ment."); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 344 (1995) ("[TJhe concurrence's merely making
the claim causes it to be an accurate description of what the Court today holds since the
narrower ground taken by one of the Justices comprising a five-justice majority becomes
the law."); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) ("Asfustice O'Connor supplied the
fifth vote in Caldwell and concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plu-
rality, her position is controlling.").
4" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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where. He wrote that "any state"--which includes states that had not
discriminated and where, consequently, affirmative action would not
be a remedy for adjudicated discrimination—could properly use a
diversity-based program of affirmative action: "[A]ny State, including
California, is free to adopt [the Harvard plan] in preference to a less
acceptable alternative ...."440 The opinion also described the Univer-
sity's program as one that "does not, for example, establish an exclu-
sive preserve for minority students apart from and exclusive of whites.
Rather, its purpose is to overcome the effects of segregation by bring-
ing the races together. "'4a That is neither a remedial consideration
nor one that rests on societal discrimination. Furthermore, the
"Brennan Four" rejected strict scrutiny for affirmative action cases,
instead urging application of a more relaxed level of scrutiny that
would justify non-remedial selection procedures. 442 These factors,
combined with "at least" in the language of the Harvard footnote, 443
strongly suggest that Justice Brennan's opinion accepted the diversity
justification.
Justice Brennan also endorsed diversity in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,444 decided after Bakke. He wrote approvingly of the Bakke di-
versity rationale in upholding affirmative action in the allocation of
broadcast licenses: "Just as a 'diverse student body' contributing to a
'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally permissible goal' on
which a race conscious university admissions program may be predi-
cated, the diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves
important First Amendment values. "445
In sum, none of the Justices in Bakke rejected race as a constitu-
tionally valid factor to take into account in making admissions deci-
sions. Justice Powell accepted only diversity as a justification for af-
firmative action,' 46 while Brennan and three others would have
approved a more expansive consideration of race in admissions, but a
fortiori accepted Justice Powell's diversity justification. 47 The four
dissenters did not address the constitutional question at all, relying
solely upon their interpretation of Title VI, although their statutory
440 Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring).
441 Id. at 374 (Brennan,J., concurring).
442 Id. at 324-25.
443 Id. at 326 n.l.
444 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
445 Id. at 568.
446 See id. at 311-15.
447 See supra note 423 and accompanying text.
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interpretation sounded a disapproval of race as an admissions stan-
dard.44s Justice Powell's opinion thus represents the narrowest ground
on which the majority agreed.
1. Bakke Has Not Been Overruled
Has Bakke, as it appears in Justice Powell's opinion, been over-
ruled sub silentio or otherwise? The Hopwood I court wrote that the Su-
preme Court had held that non-remedial state interests will never
validate racial classifications in education, 449 but that is not correct.
No Supreme Court case sustains this conclusion. 45° The Hopwood I
court is, of course, right in pointing out that since Bakke the Supreme
Court has severely limited the grounds upon which affirmative action
may be justified. At least three cases—Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion,451 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.452 and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena453—make that clear. In all three, the majority held that the
only constitutional justification for affirmative action is as a remedy
for past discrimination.454 But, they did not refer to higher education
at all and they said nothing about Bakke.
Only two Justices who were in the majority in the three cases have
made clear that they believe affirmative action is precluded in all
cases. In Adarand, justices Scalia and Thomas took that position. 455 On
the other hand, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion asserted, "The
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an un-
fortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it."456 Adarand finished with an inconclusive remand to
decide unresolved questions about "whether any of the ways in which
the Government uses subcontractor compensation clauses can survive
strict scrutiny."457 The remand was consistent with Justice O'Connor's
448 See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
4" Hopwood I, 78 F.3d at 942.
455 The only case involving education is Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986), a layoff situation in which racial balance for high school teachers had been agreed
to in a union contract. Id. at 270. The role model argument was rejected. See id. at 275-76.
None of the opinions discuss higher education.
451 476 U.S. at 267.
"2 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
455
	 U.S. 200 (1995).
454 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-21; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-J34; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239, 240.
455 Id. at 237.
4" Id. at 238.
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belief expressed in Croson, in which Justice Kennedy joined, that some
kinds of affirmative action might be constitutional. 458 Following the
remand in Adarand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld an amended affirmative action plan. 459 Six members of
the Court, therefore, have been at least open to argument that of
 action is valid on grounds other than the narrowly reme-
dia1.46°
Moreover, none of the foregoing takes into account the message
of the recent voting rights case, Hunt v. Cromartie, that race may be
considered in a districting case, if it is not dominant in a classification
scheme.461 Even though race coincided to a considerable extent with
party affiliation in Cromartie,462 and those who drew district lines were
aware of the race of the populations they were allocating among dis-
tricts,465
 the districting was held to have been based on politics, not
race.464 While voting rights doctrine is not fully transferable to the
context of education, those who formulate the admissions policy of a
university, like those who drew the electoral districts in Cromartie, do
not take race into account for its own sake, but for the educational
purpose of assembling a diverse class. At the least, Cromartie suggests a
more supple view of the use of racial factors than has appeared in af-
firmative action cases in recent years.
466 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-92.
462 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1181(10th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) , cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). During the certiorari stage, the petitioner challenged
the statutes and regulations. Adarand, 534 U.S. at 513. However, the petitioner later "chal-
leng[ed] only the statutes and regulations that pertain [ecl] to direct procurement of DOT
funds for highway construction on federal lands." Id. The Supreme Court found that the
petitioner's shift in its posture necessitated a dismissal of the writ. See id.
460 The six justices are Kennedy and Stevens, in addition to O'Connor, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 486-02 (O'Connor, J.); id. at 519 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("I accept the less absolute rule contained in Justice O'Connor's opinion.");
id. at 517 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[O]nly two conceivable bases for differentiating the
preferred classes from society as a whole have occurred to me: (1) that they were the vic-
tims of unfair treatment in the past and (2) that they are less able to compete in the fu-
ture.") ; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 269 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Ginsburg, Sc Breyer, JJ.,
joining in dissent) ("The Court has long accepted the view that constitutional authority to
remedy past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but ex-
tends to eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist . . . .").
461 See 532 U.S. 234,251-58 (2001).
462 Id. at 258.
462 Id. at 251.
464 Id. at 257.
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2. The Strict Scrutiny Shoe Is on the Other Foot: Bakke Should Not
Be Overruled
The Supreme Court will strictly scrutinize affirmative action, but
how strictly is not clear. At the same time, any plea to overrule a con-
stitutional precedent must withstand scrutiny that is also strict. A ma-
jority of the Rehnquist Court has, repeatedly displayed firm unwilling-
ness to overrule a controversial precedent-setting decision that has
nonetheless found "wide acceptance in the legal culture,"465 merely
because of a belief that the original case was wrongly decided. In each
instance, the Court has required that there be a "special justifica-
tion"466 or "compelling reason"467—the literal equivalent of the strict
scrutiny rule. To overrule without compelling reason, the Court has
said, would have the terrible consequence of undermining confi-
dence in the judicial system. 468
Two relevant decisions are Dickerson v. United States469 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 4" In Dickerson, decided
in 2000, the Court, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, declined to
overrule Miranda v. Arizona,471
 a hallmark of the Warren Court's pro-
tection of individual rights. 472 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a
seven-to-two majority that stare decisis prevented the Justices from
approaching the question as if it were one of first impression:
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning
and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the
first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily
against overruling it now. . . . While stare decisis is not an in-
exorable command, particularly when we are interpreting
the Constitution, even in constitutional cases, the doctrine
carries such persuasive force that we have always required a
465 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-82 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
466
 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal citation
omitted).
467 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
468 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 865-69 (to overrule under fire in the ab-
sence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question).
466 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428.
470 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 833.
471
 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
472 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
602	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:521
departure from precedent to be supported by some special
justification.'"
Holding that no "special justification" existed for overruling
Miranda, the Chief Justice referred to its cultural and legal central-
ity.'" Miranda, he wrote, "has become embedded in routine police
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our na-
tional culture. "475
 Quoting Mitchell v. United States, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted, "[T]he fact that a rule has found 'wide acceptance
in the legal culture' is 'adequate reason not to overrule' it . "476
Affirmative action also has certainly gained cultural centrality in
the years since Bakke was decided. Just as the Miranda warnings have
become ensconced in popular culture and police procedure, so too
has affirmative action become virtually standard for university admis-
sions policies throughout the country.
The reason for the highly cautious approach to overruling had
been explicated in the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter in Casey.477 The Court was asked to overrule Roe v. Wade'
and a number of decisions that upheld limitations (twenty-four hour
waiting period, parental notification, parental or judicial consent,
spousal consent) on the right of a woman to obtain an abortion.'"
The decision upheld Roe, although it overruled several earlier deci-
sions that had refused to invalidate some of the limitations."° There
was a difference between the big principle asserted by Roe, the na-
tional controversy it initiated, and the limitations on that principle
that, while controversial, were not disputed nationally to the same ex-
tent.
The joint opinion stated: "[T]he need for principled action to be
perceived as such is implicated whenever [any appellate court] over-
rules a prior case. "481 As a consequence, overruling is rare. 42 The
opinion referred to "the terrible price [that] would be paid for over-
ruling. "483 To pay that price "would seriously weaken the Court's ca-
4" Id.
474 Id. at 443.
475 Id.
4" Id. (quoting Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331-32 (Scalia,J., dissenting)).
477 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
478 400 U.S. 113 (1973).
479
 Casey, 505 U.S. at 83344.
4" See id. at 834-35.
481 Id. at 866.
462 Id.
487 Id. at 864.
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p.44 it. to 444•14 ise the joule ial 1 .,wri and II, function as the Supreme
1.4r1111 1,1 a Nation /leak:tied to the rule of law." 181 It added: "[T]o
44% et t isl• mulct lire in the absence of the most 'compelling reason' to
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy
beyond any serious question. "485
The Casey opinion cited Lochner v. New York 486 and Plessy v.
Ferguson487 as rare examples of justifiable overruling, writing that "ex-
amination of the conditions justifying [their] ... repudiation ... is
enough to suggest the terrible price that would have been paid if the
Court had not overruled as it did." 488 Judicial legitimacy, the opinion
pointed out, is at stake in such a situation.488 Lochner had hobbled the
power of the states to regulate business activities; Plessy had embedded
the separate-but-equal doctrine in American law for over half a cen-
tury. A terrible price, indeed, would have been paid if those decisions
had stood.
The Bakke decision, too, involved that rare category of highly im-
portant doctrines,48° though, unlike Lochner and Plessy, it should be
affirmed, not overruled. Those who would overrule Bakke have not
met the requisite high standard of "special justification." Indeed, the
contrary is the case. Justice Powell was right about diversity.491 Stu-
dents—even those with interests remote from the humanities and so-
cial sciences—do learn from diverse views, values, and attitudes of
classmates who come from various backgrounds 4 92 This is the nearly
unanimous conclusion of educators. They should have the academic
freedom to act on their knowledge of education. As Justice Powell
wrote, that is their First Amendment right. 483
Moreover, the potential reaction to Bakke's overruling would not
be mere dismay at the overruling of any judgment that is a generation
old. Overruling would, for the foreseeable future, cripple one of the
principal means of advancement that blacks have. A credible estimate
is that black presence in highly selective colleges and universities
484 Casey, 505 U.S. at 865.
483 Id. at 867.
486 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
487 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
488 Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
489 Id. at 865.
498 That. Bakke is the center of great controversy in the public arena is obvious. Seventy-
nine amicus curiae briefs were filed, some for a number of amid.
491 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
491 See supra Part II.A.2,
443 See Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,311-12.
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would drop to about 2%. 04 Such a decision would contribute to iso-
lating African-Americans further and increasing the frustration that
often is expressed in a socially harmful manner.
IV. SOCIAL CONDITIONS AS COMPELLING STATE INTEREST
A. Affirmative Action is Constitutional as a Means of Correcting
Social Conditions
There is another and, I think, better reason why affirmative ac-
tion in higher education is constitutional. It is a proven method of
successfully addressing the social conditions in which African-
Americans live that have an impact on the lives of all other Americans.
It has not and cannot do everything needed to correct the conditions,
but it has done, and can do, a great deal. The courts have not passed
upon this justification. But, can this argument survive constitutional
challenge? To succeed it must run the gauntlet of (1) scrutiny at some
level of strictness that a majority of the Court can agree upon (but not
so strict that the plan is doomed); (2) the search for a compelling
governmental interest; and (3) the requirement of narrow tailoring,
or that the use of race-based criteria is no broader than necessary. 495
I. Strict Scrutiny
Five Justices would now require that affirmative action survive
strict scrutiny.06 Four Justices continue to advocate some lesser level
of scrutiny.497 The level of scrutiny, however, does not seem to be the
main obstacle to approval of affirmative action as constitutional. Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy (among the five who require strict scru-
tiny) are somewhat flexible about the meaning of "strict." Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, among the group advocating a lesser level of
scrutiny, have characterized the O'Connor position as lenient enough
that they would not reject affirmative action per se: "[T]he lead opin-
ion has dispelled the notion that 'strict scrutiny' is 'fatal in fact.' .. .
494 See Look What Happens When Affirmative Action is Banned: Black Students are Pushed
Down Into Second- and Third-Tier Institutions of Higher Education, 34 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.
82, 82 (Winter 2001-02).
4" See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 219 (1995).
636 Today those five are Chief justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
467 The four are Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, dissenting in Adarand, noted: "I think it is unfortunate that the majority insists
on applying the label 'strict scrutiny' to benign race-based programs." Id. at 243.
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Today's decision thus usefully reiterates that the purpose of strict
scrutiny 'is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of
race in governmental decision making.'" 498
 This is, of course, the writ-
ing of dissenters characterizing the opinion of members of the major-
ity as embracing a somewhat accommodating level of scrutiny. Al-
though Justice O'Connor should speak for herself, she has not
challenged the characterization. It is consistent with her other views
about affirmative action, which are more tolerant of it than those of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. But, the
question is not so much about level of scrutiny; rather, it is about
compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring.
2. Compelling Governmental Interest
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,499
 the most recent Supreme
Court decision on the issue, and in earlier cases, 500
 the Court rejected
the argument that affirmative action to compensate for societal dis-
crimination serves a compelling governmental interest. 501 These cases
struck down affirmative action programs relating to a school district
considering race in selecting teachers to be laid off when it had to
reduce personne1,502
 and to the allocation of contracts to minority
business enterprises. 50
 These decisions did not involve or discuss
higher education.
In the recent cases, four Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) have, in dissent, voted to uphold affirmative action as com-
pensation for societal discrimination, concluding that this is a com-
pelling governmental interest.5"' They have dissented from opinions
that employ rigid standards in applying strict scrutiny. 505 In those
4" Id. at 275-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38
(O'Connor, J., majority) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,519 (1980)).
495
 515 U.S. at 200.
boo See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Ed. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
501 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220.
544 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270 ("Societal discrimination without more, is too amory
phous a basis for finding a racially classified remedy.").
603 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-06; Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-83.
504 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 269 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Ginsburg & Breyer, B.,
joining) ("The Court has long accepted the view that constitutional authority to remedy
past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but extends to
eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist and skew the operation of public
systems even in the absence of current intent to practice any discrimination."); see also
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
05 See, e.g., id. at 200.
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cases, they used terms like "caste" and "subordination," which could
be part of a social conditions argument. 506
They were dissenters. The five Justices who would require strict
scrutiny in passing on the constitutionality of affirmative action have
rejected compensation for societal discrimination as a compelling
governmental interest. 607
 The five votes, however, are not very solid.
Justice O'Connor has been the least doctrinaire among the five. She
has been cautious about rejecting blacks' claims for redress. In writing
for the majority in Adarand, she was careful not to prescribe rigid
standards in remanding to the Court of Appeals to decide whether
the affirmative action served a compelling governmental interest and
was narrowly tailored.608
 She gave no instructions. Consequently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the pro-
gram.6e9
 The Supreme Court recently dismissed its writ of certiorari,
however, because of a shift in the petitioner's position. 510
Justice O'Connor has gone to some lengths to make clear that
she is not adamantly opposed to affirmative action in all situations.
She wrote in Adarand:
We wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the effects of racial discrimination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
5°5
 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (two of the four dissenters) wrote in Adarand:
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is de-
signed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial sub-
ordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a
disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial
race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality
in society. No sensible conception of the Government's constitutional obliga-
tion to "govern impartially," ... should ignore this distinction.
Id. at 243. Although social conditions were not under consideration, "caste system" and
"racial subordination" are parts of social conditions theory. See supra Part
557
 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. In Croson, justice O'Connor, referring to 145gant,
wrote: 'This Court reversed, with a plurality of four Justices reiterating the view expressed
by justice Powell in Bakke that ' [flocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.'" Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (internal citation
omitted).
SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
4'N See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted
Adarand v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 534 U.S. 103
(2001).
51°
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001). For discussion of this
case, see supra note 459.
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government is not disqualified from acting in response to
She has written that "[On the extreme case, some form of narrowly
tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns
of deliberate exclusion."512 Although Justice Powell would have found
a compelling interest only where there has been "judicial, legislative,
or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations," 513
Justice O'Connor has required less: "[T]his remedial purpose need
not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimi-
nation to be accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has a
firm basis for believing that remedial action is required."514 Justice
O'Connor was also in the majority in Hunt v. Cromartie, holding that
race could be a factor in drawing electoral districts. 515 She is the least
likely of the five-Justice majority to close gateways that affirmative ac-
tion has opened.
Perhaps, if she were presented with a broader perspective on the
conditions that make affirmative action necessary, she would vote to
uphold it. The social conditions (or the "closing the gap") thesis of-
fers a more comprehensive picture of the status of blacks, affirmative
action, and consequences for the entire nation than any other argu-
ment.516 It depicts blacks who, in extraordinary proportions, live iso-
lated lives, are victims and perpetrators of crime, inhabitants of pris-
ons and jails, disaffected from the justice system, sporadically rioting
against real or perceived injustice, and are disproportionately unem-
ployed, with much less income, exceedingly less wealth, and more
than their share of teenage pregnancy and single parent households,
511 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
51; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
5IS Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)
("1Edvery Justice ... agreed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's 'pervasive,
systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct' justified a narrowly tailored race-based
remedy.").
614 1451gant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Croson, Justice O'Connor
applied similar reasoning: lAlppellee argues that the city must limit any race-based re-
medial efforts to eradicating the effects of its own prior discrimination.... Appellant ar-
gues ... the city of Richmond enjoys sweeping legislative power to define and attack the
effects of prior discrimination in its local construction industry. We find that neither of
these two rather stark alternatives can withstand analysis." 488 U.S. at 486.
516
 Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 236 (2001); see supra notes 461-464 and accompa-
nying text. On the other hand, Justice Kennedy, who has agreed with Justice O'Connor
about some aspects of affirmative action, was opposed to the use of race in Cromartie. See id.
at 259-67.
818
 See supra Part II.A.1.
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often speaking English that outsiders cannot understand. 517
 These
and other symptoms compound in the confines of the ghetto, pass on
to the next generation, and metastasize among whites.518 Some of
these and other symptoms of pathology have their origins in slavery
and discrimination 5 19 Others have remote connection to discrimina-
tion, or, if it has played a role, it is too difficult to trace. 5" There is no
other group, defined by race or anything else, that is so large a part of
the American population but is subjugated to such a great degree.
The conditions that oppress them affect everyone. Affirmative action
in higher education has been a means of helping African-Americans
emerge from this environment and diminish the environment's effect
on everybody. 521
That something must be done about the condition that afflicts so
large a percentage of African Americans should be beyond dispute.
That the need is compelling and that government properly may be
concerned about it is equally without doubt. That affirmative action
in higher education is an effective way of addressing the problem has
been established.
3. Narrow Tailoring
"Narrow tailoring" is where many an affirmative action plan has
run afoul of the Constitution. Narrow tailoring requires that an af-
firmative action program be no more extensive than necessary and
protect non-minority students where possible. Otherwise, the pro-
gram will not survive strict scrutiny.
One protection against overbreadth in affirmative action plans
would be to increase class size by the number of minorities admitted
under affirmative action, thereby diminishing the exclusionary effect
517 See supra Part IIA.1.
515 See supra Part II.A.1.c.
M 9 See supra Part IIA3.
520 Justice Powell suggested another compelling interest when he "assumed" in Bakke
that a state has a compelling interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens. Because
there had been no evidence that affirmative action would facilitate health care, he did not
base his opinion on the claim. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. But extrapolating from his
assumption, other social conditions that deserve remedy, if supported by the evidence,
should warrant affirmative action as well. This assumption recognizes that a university
program may encompass more than instruction and scholarship. It may embrace a con-
cern for health care in society. If health care, why not other interests?
521 See supra Part 11.A.1.
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on whites (and Asians). 522 Anyone who would have been admitted be-
fore the increase would be admitted afterwards. Still, there would be a
slight exclusionary effect because affirmative action students will oc-
cupy places that would have been filled by non-affirmative action "in-
nocent" applicants.523 The social conditions argument diminishes any
force the innocence argument might have in these limited circum-
stances. If the justification were not that the state is making an effort
to overcome social conditions, the white student most likely will reply
that she never discriminated, and ask why the cost should fall on her.
Judges, and members of the public, have sympathized with this posi-
tion. Although some Justices have said that to yield her place may be a
price she should pay along with other innocent whites for the greater
good,524 that is not the majority view. 525 The social conditions argu-
ment, however, drains the innocents argument of some of its force. It
considers the consequences for all of society, not merely the compet-
6" If, for example, under affirmative action a class consisted of 100 students, ninety of
whom were white and ten of whom were minorities, an affirmative action opponent might
charge that ten whites had been rejected to allow room for the ten minorities. If the size of
the class were increased to 110, then it might be assumed that all of the 100 whites who
would have been admitted originally, if there had been no affirmative action, would then
be admitted.
523 See supra text accompanying notes 327-329.
524 Chief justice Burger in Fullilove v. Klutznick expressed this view:
It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the ex-
pectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly
tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such "a sharing of
the burden" by innocent parties is not impermissible.... Moreover, although
we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discrimina-
tory conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that
in the past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit
over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these con-
tracting opportunities.
498 U.S. 448,489-85 (1978). Adarand has since overruled Full:dove. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at
202.
Still, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer continue to take the position Chief Justice Burger
took in Fullitove.
When this price is considered reasonable, it is in part because it is a price to
be paid only temporarily: if the justification for the preference is eliminating
the effects of a past practice, the assumption is that the effects will themselves
recede into the past, becoming attenuated and finally disappearing.
Id. at 270. Justice Powell has written: As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating
racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of
the remedy," Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81.
525 See supra Part IV.A.2.
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ing black and white students 528 The perception then changes from
that of an innocent, weighed in one pan of the scales of justice against
a minority student in the other, to the innocent weighed in one pan
of the scales of justice against the interests of all of society. Sympathy
for the innocent, with this perspective, is less likely to outweigh con-
cern for the public at large.
In Croson, although many barriers to minority participation in the
construction industry appeared to be race-neutral, the Court was
critical of the plan because there was no evidence that the city had
considered race-neutral means to increase the proportion of business
allocated to minorities 527 In other words, the plan was not narrowly
tailored. In contrast, race-neutral means in the university setting have
been tried and are still being tried, with limited success. 528 One rem-
edy might be to increase the number of African-Americans in highly
selective and selective schools by improving their credentials. This
would include raising their test scores. But, efforts to discover why
blacks' test scores are low have not produced satisfactory answers s29
There are theories, but no one knows for sure. Not knowing why the
condition exists is a fatal barrier to changing it.
Maybe test preparation courses could raise the scores, but they
have not and do not appear to have the capacity to do so. 830 , Maybe
using socio-economic criteria would allow scrapping racial standards.
UCLA weighs socio-economic, but not racial, factors in admissions
decisions.531 The result has been to reduce severely the number of its
black students. 532 Uplifting the educational attainment of black chil-
dren is, of course, desirable, but there is little agreement about how
that can be accomplished. In any event, there would be no results for
perhaps a generation.
The Supreme Court derided the Croson plan because it entitled
black, Spanish-speaking, Eskimo, Aleutian, or Oriental entrepreneurs
from anywhere in the country to an absolute preference based on
their race over citizens of Richmond, even though no need had been
demonstrated to prefer them.533 Schools with affirmative action do
525 See supra Part IIA.1.
5" See Crason, 488 U.S. at 471.
5" See supra Part I.D.
525 See supra Part I.E.
53° See supra Part 1.E.4.
531 See supra text accompanying notes 184-189.
532 See supra text accompanying notes 190-194, app. A.
637 488 U.S. at 506.
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not face this shortcoming because they readily can show that blacks
need it more than members of any other group. Schools can narrowly
tailor programs to assist blacks alone, or blacks and others for whom
they can make a similar case. Accommodating the needs of blacks
alone may not be easy because other groups will apply political pres-
sure for their constituents, which explains why so many groups were
included in the litany of beneficiaries in plans like the one in Croon.
But, of course, a few other groups could qualify.
Narrow tailoring requires that a program be limited in time so
that it "will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is de-
signed to eliminate.''554 l am not aware that college or university plans
include time limits, but they should, either by imposing a termination
date or requiring periodic reviews of the need for affirmative action.
Affirmative action for black applicants also is narrowly tailored in
that not much needs to be done to implement it. Colleges could sim-
ply cease treating standardized tests as decisive. Schools have shown
that they can run admissions programs without relying on tests, as
demonstrated by the ease with which schools ignore or marginalize
test results when it suits them.555
Depending on the percentage of black high school students and
their distribution within the school system, a top percentage plan
could be a neutral technique for achieving diversity at the college
level, although there appears to be no way it would work for graduate
and professional schoo1. 536 Using such plans, Florida and Texas have
created diverse college classes by admitting black students whom con-
ventional criteria would exclude. 537 California has promised to intro-
duce its own top percentage plan.558 The downside of the top per-
centage plans is that they encourage school segregation and do not
necessarily select the minority students with the best potential. The
plans may not include high-achieving students in the more demand-
ing high schools who are not in the top 10% or 20%. But, those stu-
dents still could be admitted if colleges take into account personal
and societal factors, as required by a Texas statute and the admissions
rules of a number of schools. 539
Adaiond, 515 U.S. at 238 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J., concur-
ring)).
6" See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying test.
516 See supra Part I.E.I.
5" See supra Part. I.D.1, 3.
638
	 supra Part I.D.2.
639 See supra text accompanying notes 109-112.
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A state might not be required to use a top percentage plan in
place of affirmative action as a narrowly tailored way of achieving the
same objective if it could demonstrate that the top percentage plan
encourages segregation in high schools. It might decline a top per-
centage plan because the characteristics of top percentage students
were different from and less desirable than those admitted under a
combination of conventional standards and affirmative action. Nar-
rowly tailoring, therefore, if a state decided to use affirmative action,
would require the state first to find out whether a top percentage plan
would produce a diverse student body. The state might ascertain that
a top percentage plan would not have that result, that it is undesirable
because it would embed segregation in its high schools more firmly,
that it would exclude some of the best students from demanding
schools, or some other reason. If the state then decides not to use a
top percentage plan, affirmative action would be the most narrowly
tailored action it could take towards closing the black-white gap or
towards achieving diversity on campus.
B. The Confluence of Bakke and Social Conditions Theory
The five-to-four divisions in a string of Supreme Court decisions
dealing with affirmative action mirror a similar split in the country.
What will the Court do when the issue returns to it? Hopwood I says
that Justice Powell's opinion does not state the holding in Bakke. I
have argued that Justice Powell's opinion is the holding of the case
and should be controlling. But, if it is the holding, should it be over-
ruled? To hold that affirmative action in higher education is unconsti-
tutional, relying on either reasoning, after a generation in which per-
haps every selective and most non-selective schools based their
admissions on it, would administer a shock to higher education. It
would exacerbate the resentment that too many African-Americans
feel about their place in society. It would increase the isolation in
which they live. It is impossible to overlook the fact that terminating
affirmative action in higher education would severely reduce black
presence in highly selective colleges, graduate, and professional
schools.
For some Justices, this outcome would be profoundly contrary to
the national interest. They very well might factor that result into their
decisions. To give weight to practical consequences may seem to some
to subordinate the role of law. But, it is commonplace, and often is
articulated.
2002]	 Affirmative Action in Higher Education 	 613
It is not difficult to find judicial conclusions that have been influ-
enced by the likely effect of a decision. In Plessy V. Ferguson, Justice
Harlan's historic dissent argued, presciently, the consequences that
would follow a decision holding racial segregation constitutional:
The judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be as
pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case. . . . [It] will not only stimulate aggressions, more
or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of col-
ored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible,
by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent pur-
poses which the people of the United States had in view
when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitu-
tion. . . What can more certainly arouse race hate, what
more certainly create and perpetuate feeling of distrust be-
tween these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, pro-
ceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens?54°
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's opinion in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey rejected a plea to overrule Roe
v. Wade, in part because of "the consequences of overruling. "541 Justice
Scalia, dissenting in Morrison v. Olsen,542 correctly predicted and de-
plored the conduct of the independent counsel in the Clinton im-
peachment imbroglio. He envisioned selecting:
a prosecutor antagonistic to the administration . . . and .. .
should the independent counsel or his or her staff come up
with something beyond [the investigation's original] scope,
nothing prevents him or her from asking the judges to ex-
pand his or her authority or, if that does not work, referring
it to the Attorney General, whereupon the whole process
would recommence . . . . 543
In Bush v. Gore, Justice Scalia, concurring in the grant of a stay of the
decision of the Florida Supreme. Court and an order expediting the
MO Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896).
541 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (ex-
plaining decision not to overrule Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). The Justices also wrote of "the
certain cost of overruling ," id. at 856, and "prescience," id. at 862.
M2 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
542 Id. at 730.
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case to be heard in the Supreme Court, wrote an opinion that ad-
verted to the lack of legitimacy with which a Bush victory would be
perceived if the motion had been denied. In Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,545
 the Justices, in conference, spoke of the possibility of public
school closings and violence should they rule to outlaw segregation.546
The government, as amicus curiae, argued that a decision upholding
segregation would have adverse foreign policy consequences N7
 The
examples could be multiplied.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is a sound justification of af-
firmative action in higher education. At the same time, later cases that
deal with affirmative action in other activities (small business, em-
ployment, etc.) point in the other direction. Some Justices for
whom the contending decisions are in equipoise might consider the
ramifications of a decision holding that Justice Powell's opinion did
not state the holding or that later cases overruled Bakke. The steady
rise of blacks in society, through the gateways of leading universities,
would slow. The improvements in their status and related benefits for
all of society would diminish.
Given the division on the Court it may be that the way out would
be to decide nothing of substance and let sleeping dogs lie. There is a
wide array of doctrines that the Court deploys when it deems it wise
not to make a substantive decision: among them is stare decisis. Stare
decisis is an instance of what Alexander Bickel called the "passive vir-
tues."549
 By basing its decision entirely upon precedent, the Court may
prudently avoid affirming a constitutional norm with which a number
of Justices, perhaps a majority, may disagree, while avoiding a decision
unacceptable to a strident sector of the population. The doctrine of
stare decisis, if applicable, emerges as a prudent way of dealing with
the next higher education affirmative action case that will reach the
Court.
544
 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). Justice Scalia wrote: "The counting of votes that
are of questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush,
and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his elec-
tion." Id. at 1046.
545 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
848 See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 199 (possible abolition of public
education), 192 (violence), 229 (resistance; end of southern liberalism) (1994).
547 See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN, L. REV. 61, 65
(1988).
548 See supra notes 502-503 and accompanying text.
549 See Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). See generally Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 alum. L. REV.
1344 (1990).
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The tom t could inert the problems that would result from over-
t tiling I1ak. and moicl deciding the difficult constitutional questions
about dive' sity, societal discrimination, reparations, and social condi-
tions, as well as related issues of levels of scrutiny, compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and narrow tailoring. It could simply address the
condition that confronts us by upholding Bakke as a binding prece-
dent. Such a decision would also avert the likelihood of widespread
dissents, because if Bakke were overturned, the chant from the ghetto,
"No justice, no peace," would be heard again.
Allowing Bakke to stand would be a conventional outcome, in line
with the Court's policy of avoiding the decision of constitutional ques-
tions when possible. The doctrine often finds expression when the
Court construes a statute to save its constitutionality. For example, in
2000, the Court decided two immigration cases by construing statutes
to avoid confronting constitutional questions. 55° The Court employs
other aversive devices as well, declining to make constitutional deci-
sions in non-adversary proceedings and in other circumstances. Jus-
tice Rutledge explained the policy in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court as
"basic to the federal system and the Court's appropriate place within
that structure."551 He observed:
[A] ... policy of accelerated decision might do equal or
greater harm for the security of private rights. [For] prema-
ture and relatively abstract decisions, which such a policy
would be most likely to promote, have their part too in ren-
dering rights uncertain and insecure. [Time] and experi-
ence [have] verified [that] the choice of the strict necessity
policy was wisely made.552
55° See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
551 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947).
552 Id. at 572. The opinion explained:
the Court will not render advisory opinions; constitutional issues affecting
legislation will not be determined in friendly, non adversary proceedings; in
advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are re-
quired by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied; [at] the in-
stance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute's operation;
[or] if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.
Id.; see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring).
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Upholding affirmative action on the basis of stare decisis would
not exactly avoid the constitutional question. Bakke was a constitu-
tional decision itself, as would be a decision to leave it undisturbed.
But, in these circumstances, holding that the Powell opinion was stare
decisis would implement the avoidance policy. Reopening Bakke
might lead to unforeseen destinations. Cass Sunstein, in arguing that
the Court was correct in denying certiorari in Hopwood v. Texas, court-
seled that the Court
should economize on moral disagreement, refusing to re-
solve large-scale moral issues unless it is necessary to do so.
This proposition does not suggest any particular outcome in
any particular case. What it does suggest is that it would be a
democratic disaster if the Court were to issue a broad ruling
that foreclosed democratic debate. 553
This view is equally applicable to letting sleeping dogs lie by observing
the doctrine of stare decisis in Bakke.
Justice O'Connor and, to a lesser extent, Justice Kennedy, one of
whose votes would be needed for a denouement upholding affirma-
tive action, are not rigidly opposed to it. 554 They have joined in toning
down the severity of strict scrutiny. They have voted against overruling
precedents in cases involving national controversy that could impair
public confidence in the judiciary. 555 The vote of one of them would
create a majority of five or more justices who would not want to repu-
diate precedent where to do so would impede black movement to-
wards parity with whites.
Would Justice O'Connor and possibly Justice Kennedy vote to
uphold affirmative action in higher education on the basis of the so-
cial conditions argument? They have not closed their minds to the
possibility of finding that there is a compelling interest in ridding the
country of the conditions I have described in these pages. They agree
that scrutiny must be strict, but not so strict that it guarantees disap-
proval of every affirmative action plan. Of course, doting on Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy 
more
very well turn out to be badly misplaced.
A Justice, and perhaps re than one, may leave the Court at any
time. There is no way of knowing whom that may be. There is also no
way of knowing who will replace them.
553 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 93 (1995).
554 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
555 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
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Assumptions about the politics of judicial selection and confirma-
tion can easily be mistaken. The United States has argued in the latest
Adarand episode in the Supreme Court in support of the validity of
u[r] ace-conscious measures, such as DBE [disadvantaged business en-
terprises] goals for individual contracts, [that] may be used only if
race-neutral means prove insufficient."556 And the Court has upheld
the Adarand affirmative action plan, albeit by dismissing the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted 557—not a ringing endorsement of
affirmative action, but far from a repudiation where there was ade-
quate reason to decide on the merits.
That is not what one would have expected from the rhetoric of
the last political campaign, or the Court's latest decisions on affirma-
five action. If Bakke were overruled, the disabling environment that
has replicated itself in the black community over generations would
continue without the moderating influence of affirmative action. Af-
firmative action in higher education has been no panacea—no one
program could be—but for many African-Americans and their fami-
lies, it has broken the cycle of repetition of social conditions and
helped tens of thousands of African-Americans rise towards parity
with whites. If it were prohibited, that progress would falter. The so-
cial conditions argument should ,place before the Court some of the
best reasons why Bakke deserves to survive, which surprisingly have
played little or no part in the public debates in the Court or beyond.
But, for the Justices who are reluctant to venture into new terri-
tory, avoiding the constitutional question would spare that need. Stare
decisis is a well-settled, neutral doctrine that is exquisitely applicable
to Bakke. It is reason enough to avoid confronting new constitutional
arguments and has the added virtue of being good for the country.
POSTSCRIPT
As this Article is going to press, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a vote of 5 to 4 the District
Court judgment in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan law
school affirmative action case. 559 The court's opinion set forth views
much like those of this Article with regard to diversity as a constitu-
334
 Brief for the Respondents at 6, Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 967
(2001) (No. 00-780). In support of the program, the brief said that "I i] t is designed to
ensure that aid recipients employ race-conscious remedies only as a last resort." Id. at 19.
537 See supra text accompanying note 459.
885 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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tional justification of affirmative action and of what constitutes the
holding of a fragmented court, relying on Marks v. United States. 55g
There now is clearly a conflict of circuits, which increases the likeli-
hood of Supreme Court review.
5 	US. 188 (1977).
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: African American First Year Entering Students at
University of Texas Schools
University of Texas
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
U.T. Austin' 242 296 286 199 190 266
U.T. Law School' 16 17 9 9 4 29
U.T. Southwestern Med. Ctr. at Dallas' 13 11 7 1 8
U.T. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio' 5 3 4 3 1
a OFFICE OF INSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, UNIV. OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, FALL ENROLIrMENT
OF NEW STUDENTS BY GROUP AND ETHNICITY, available at http://www.utexas.edu/
academic/ois/stathb.01-02/students/s12a/main.html. (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
b
TEXAS HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING BD., REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE
HOPWOOD DECISION ON MINORITY APPLICATIONS, OFFERS, AND ENROLLMENTS AT
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS; App. E: Texas Medical
School, available at http://www.thechstate.tx.us/reports/littn1/0016/e.htm,  (last
visited Apr. 14, 2002). Data for 2000 obtained by  E-Mail from Charles Bushey, Data
Analyst, Educational Data Center, Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd (Sent Jun.
20, 2001 to Jun. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
4 TEXAS HIGHER EDUC. COORDINATING BD., REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE
HOPWOOD DECISION ON MINORITY APPLICATIONS, OFFERS, AND ENROLLMENTS AT
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS; App. E: Texas Medical
School, available at http://www.thechstate.tx.us/cfbin/ArchFetch.cfm?DocID=
03768eFormat=HrmL, (last visited Apr. 14, 2002); Bushey, supra note c. The
numbers for 2000 are for M.D. students only and do not include dental students.
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Appendix B: African-American First Year Entering Students at
University of California Schools
Table 1
University of California Law Schools
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
Emit Hall 14 7 7 8 1 20 21 31
U.C.L.A. 10 5 3 8	 ' 10 19 20 46
U.C. Davis 4 2 6 3 5 4 3 10
▪OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA'S LAW
SCHOOLS, available at http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/datamgmt/graddata/lawnos .
html. (last visited Apr. 14, 2002).
Table 2
University of California Medical School'
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996	 1995
U.C. Davis 1 2 1 2 5 0	 3
U.C. Irvine 2 2 2 2 0 2	 2
U.C.L.A. 6 6 8 8 10 10	 11
U.C. San Diego 4 3 3 3 0 S	 5
U.C. San Francisco 7 11 9 9 12 11	 15
' ASSOCIATE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC) AND CAMPUS SUBMISSIONS,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL SCHOOL APPLICANTS, ADMITS, AND FIRST-YEAR
CLASS EN-ROLLMENTS NUMBERS, available at http://ucop.edu/acadadv/dataingint/
meddata/med-numl.html. (last visited Apr. 14, 2002)
Table 3
University of California Business Schools'
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
U.C. Berkeley 4 9 4 11 9
U.C. Davis 2 1 "0 1 2
U.C. Irvine , 1 0 1 2 3
U.C.LA 10 5 13 13 12
U.C. Riverside 0 2 1 0 1
▪UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MASTER'S OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION FALL 1995 -
FALL 1999, available at http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/datamgmt/graddata/busnos
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2001 b 2000 1999 1998 1997
U.C. Berkeley 138 144 122 122 252
U.C.LA. 125 146 147 138 204
U.C. Davis 46 50 93 93 94
U.C. Irvine 115 72 74 73 50
U.C. Riverside 131 133 153 113 97
U.C. San Diego 27 23 33 52 61
U.C. Santa Barbara 88 92 82 97 121
U.C. Santa Cruz 78 68 52 51 41
'littp://www.ticop.edu/news/fctsheet/Flowfrc-9500onlyl.pdf
b University of California Office of the President, Information Resources &
Communications, University of California Corporate Student Systems (2002).
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